

SPEAKING OF INFORMATION MANIPULATION: A CRITICAL REJOINDER

STEVEN A. McCORNACK, TIMOTHY R. LEVINE, KELLY MORRISON, AND MARIA LAPINSKI

This essay critically examines two articles addressing deceptive messages. We take exception with the Jacobs, Dawson, and Brashers claim that IMT is inconsistent with Grice, and compare their arguments to those of Grice. The Jacobs et al. data are reanalyzed and shown to be inconsistent with their premise that deception derives solely from erroneous Quality implicatures. Burgoon, Buller, Guerrero, Afifi, and Feldman's article describing information management also is addressed. Although the scope of their endeavor is impressive, we believe that their conceptual definitions lack precision and that their proposed set of information dimensions offers little practical utility as a means of deception detection. We also believe that their findings do not significantly contribute to our knowledge of deception.

In the four years since we introduced Information Manipulation Theory, we have been surprised and flattered by the attention it has received. Most of this attention has been favorable. Miller and Stiff (1993) described IMT as a "promising avenue of research" (p. 106), and Fiedler and Walka (1993) attributed "considerable theoretical potential" to IMT (p. 200). Jacobs, Dawson, and Brashers (this issue) disagree. Although they believe "IMT is a breakthrough in drawing a connection between the nature of deceptive message design and principles of linguistic pragmatics," they argue that IMT is inconsistent with Grice, and that their data "overwhelmingly" disconfirm IMT. Conversely, Burgoon, Buller, Guerrero, Afifi, and Feldman (this issue) claim empirical support for IMT, but argue that their set of information dimensions "may provide more precision in testing predictions based upon message features." In the following pages, we frame our response to both groups of scholars.

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF JACOBS ET AL.

The principal conceptual thesis of Jacobs et al. is that "IMT makes assumptions about message meaning and editing that are inconsistent with Grice's theory." IMT purportedly is inconsistent with Grice in how it addresses deceptive message production and deceptive message processing.

Deceptive Message Production

IMT did not articulate a formal model of deceptive message production. Nevertheless, Jacobs et al. attribute a "dubious" model to IMT, one in which individuals edit "information contained in an initial [truthful baseline] message." Grice's maxims are treated "as distinctive operations performed on this body of information."

In criticizing this model as inconsistent with Grice, Jacobs et al. appear to attribute their own model of message production to Grice. They ascribe to Grice "a constructive account of message design," one in which "text and context are reflexively constructed." Consequently, "there is an important sense in which the

Steven A. McCornack is Associate Professor, Kelly Morrison is Assistant Professor, and Maria Lapinski is a doctoral student in the Department of Communication at Michigan State University. Timothy R. Levine is Associate Professor in the Department of Speech at the University of Hawaii. The authors would like to thank Dennis S. Gouran for his helpful suggestions on a preliminary draft of this paper, and Scott Jacobs, Ed Dawson, and Dale Brashers for making their data available for further analysis.

production of a message should not be seen as selections and transformations of pre-existing information, but as the very formulation of that information itself." In contrast, IMT

assumes that truthful, accurate, complete, and pertinent information is unproblematically given in (the speaker's construal of) the situation itself. In other words, there is some well-defined and uniquely specified body of information that exists in the context independently of the message conveyed. (Jacobs et al.)

The message production model that Jacobs et al. impute to Grice is not his; Grice did not articulate a model of message production. His brief discussion of communication suggests a view different from the Jacobs et al. account. Grice (1989) identified "the goals that are central to conversation/communication" as being "giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others" (p. 30), not the "fixation of textual meaning and contextual features that appear as stable, objective givens" (Jacobs et al.).

Grice's discussion of flouts highlights the dissonance between his theory and the Jacobs et al. account. Grice argued that when a flout occurs, listeners engage in the following inferential process: "he has said that p; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; he could not be doing this unless he thought that q . . ." (p.31). This process is guided by reliance "on the following data: (1) the conventional meaning of the words used, together with the identity of any references that may be involved; (2) the Cooperative Principle and its maxims; (3) the context, linguistic or otherwise, of the utterance; (4) other items of background knowledge; and (5) the fact (or supposed fact) that all relevant items falling under the previous headings are available to both participants and both participants know or assume this to be the case" (p. 31). Although Jacobs et al. claim that Grice did not believe "pertinent information is unproblematically given in the (speaker's construal of) the situation," Grice argued that individuals rely on this type of information in generating implicatures (i.e., data from "the context"). Without a strong sense of situationally pertinent information, individuals confronted with flouts could not derive "q" from "p." The only way implicatures of this type can be generated is through listener recognition that the message deviates from an expected "baseline" of complete, truthful, relevant, and perspicuous information. Listener recognition of this deviation (coupled with recognition that speakers still are behaving rationally) allows flouts to be decoded and implicatures generated.

Grice suggested that individuals recognize how their messages within talk exchanges compare with the messages that are expected of them. Rather than text and context being reflexively constructed, text is constructed and interpreted in response to and accordance with perceptions of context.¹ Individuals are expected to make their conversational contributions "such as is required," given perceptions of "the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange." Assumptions regarding "what is required" are not "quasi-contractual," but instead are based on the rational manner in which individuals must converse if they are going to pursue the fundamental goals of communication: "giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others" (see Grice, 1989, pp. 26-30).

Deceptive Message Processing

Jacobs et al. claim that the IMT model of deceptive inference "differs from a genuinely Gricean account." To assess the validity of this claim, consider a message

example excerpted from McCornack (1992)—one that responds to the Committed Chris situation. In Committed Chris, the respondent has been dating Chris for over a year, but recently things have changed. There have been numerous fights, a good deal of jealousy, and Chris has been pressing for a commitment. Unbeknownst to Chris, the respondent has been involved in a casual sexual relationship with a third party. One night, while out on a date, Chris asks the respondent whether “something is wrong.”

Yes, Chris, there is something wrong. Recently I feel as if we are growing further and further apart. All we ever seem to do is fight! And your jealousy is really getting on my case. I know that you are interested in a serious thing right now, but I am just not ready. In fact, I think we should see other people. (p. 10, message example #8)

According to IMT, Chris should infer the following: (1) I asked my partner if something was wrong; (2) in response, my partner has said there is something wrong, and has listed a number of concerns, including conflict, jealousy, degree of commitment, and desire to see other people; (3) my partner appears to be adhering to the CP; (4) given #3, I can fairly assume that my partner intends this message to be informative, truthful, relevant, and perspicuous. This process is similar to that proposed by Galasinski (1994) related to deception by omission. Deception by omission functions to induce “in the addressee a belief (or a set of beliefs) which does not represent the whole (relevant) picture of reality” (p. 11). In his subsequent discussion of deception by evasion, Galasinski argues that for messages involving covert violations of Grice’s maxims,

it is the hearer who forms her/his belief about the utterance. S/he bases her/his reasoning on the assumption that her/his interlocuter will indeed be truthful, relevant etc. (as argued by Grice 1975) and simply takes the . . . utterance at face value. (p. 15)

Jacobs et al. argue that “a genuinely Gricean account” would posit that what is deceptive “is not a covert violation of the quantity maxim per se; it is the way in which the listener’s assumption that . . . [speaker] is saying all that needs to be said leads to a quality violation at the level of what is implicated.” Messages such as the previous example are deceptive because listeners infer additional, false information from that which is said, and this involves a Quality violation at the level of implicature. Hence, the Jacobs et al. model adds a fifth inferential step to the IMT model: (5) given #4, I can fairly assume that nothing else unusual is going on that would merit disclosure, including my partner is not currently involved in a casual sexual relationship with someone else.

Jacobs et al. borrow in part from a position advanced by Levinson (1983), who argued that individuals can manipulate Quantity in a fashion so as to implicate false information (Quality). Levinson used the example of an individual informing a partner who cannot see the flag that “the flag is white” (p. 106). As he argued, “since I have given no further information about other colours the flag may contain, which might indeed be highly relevant to the proceedings, I may be taken to implicate that the flag has no other colours and is thus wholly white” (p. 106). In such cases, the speaker “would certainly be guilty of misleading . . . for he has failed to provide all the information that might reasonably be required in the situation” (p. 106). Levinson did not suggest that Quality implicatures form the basis for **all** verbal deception, however, nor did he argue that other types of violations (e.g., Quantity, Relation, Manner) necessarily give rise to erroneous Quality implicatures. He

argued that “the effect of the [Quantity] maxim is to add to most utterances a pragmatic inference to the effect that the statement presented is the strongest, or most informative, that can be made in the situation” (p. 106).

Recent work by Galasinski (1994) suggests that the Jacobs et al. model presents a narrow interpretation of Grice’s principles as they apply to deceptive discourse. In his discussion of “deceiving through implied information” (p. 20), Galasinski argues that deception deriving from covert maxim violations is distinctly separable from deception deriving purely from implicature, in that the former involves “utterances for which the speaker can be held accountable—there is “only” the problem of establishing what kind of information s/he believed and comparing it with the statement” (p. 21), whereas the latter involves a broad range of utterances, including those “expressions which systematically trigger implicatures” (pp. 22–23).

Upon juxtaposing the IMT model with the Jacobs et al. model, one finds much more similarity than difference. Both IMT and Jacobs et al. agree that the starting point for conversational deception is an utterance that involves a covert maxim violation. The point of contention is whether recipients of messages that covertly violate Quantity, Relation, and/or Manner **must** generate erroneous Quality implicatures to be deceived. IMT assumes that listeners faced with such messages form general and vague inferences, such as “my partner is being cooperative” and “my partner has disclosed what is relevant.” As Bowers et al. (1977) argued, listeners respect “respondents’ rights to invoke some slippage between the semantic and pragmatic realms, for we recognize the apparent indeterminacy of life and the cultural resistance to dogmatic, absolutist positions” (p. 238). Jacobs et al. argue that recipients of covert violations form specific, erroneous implicatures (e.g., “my partner is not currently involved in a casual sexual relationship with someone else”). **Regardless of the type of covert violation that occurs, the same type of implicature will be generated:** “therefore → [information that the speaker knows to be false].”²

Testing Rival Models

Whether IMT or Jacobs et al. is more descriptive of the inferential processes underlying deception is an empirical question. The line of reasoning advanced by Jacobs et al. suggests two specific, testable hypotheses. First, given that messages that covertly violate Quantity, Relation, and Manner each function deceptively because of Quality violations arising from false implicatures, there should be no significant differences between messages involving covert Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner violations in terms of perceived message deceptiveness because all such violations trigger erroneous Quality implicatures (i.e., **all such violations function identically at level of implicatures**) (H1A). Second, Jacobs et al. claim that Quantity, Relevance, and Clarity violations do not “play any clear or direct role in determining the deceptiveness of a message” because underlying Quality implicatures are responsible for perceived deceptiveness. Given this, one would expect that scales related to Quality violations and perceived honesty should load on the same factor (or be conceptually independent, but highly correlated). This factor should be empirically distinct from perceptions of other violation types, which alone are not sufficient to generate perceived deceptiveness. Thus, the arguments of Jacobs et al. suggest that a multidimensional measurement model with at least two factors (i.e., Quality and perceived honesty; Relation/Manner/Quantity) will provide the best fit to data that have been generated by studies examining IMT (H2A).

TABLE 1
HONESTY MEANS BY VIOLATION TYPE IN THE MCCORNACK ET AL. AND JACOBS ET AL. DATA

Condition	McCornack	Jacobs ^a
Baseline	21.88	21.10
Quantity	16.78	15.78
Quality	6.99	7.02
Relevance	11.71	14.98
Clarity	13.70	13.24

a. Due to potential problems with the manipulations in the Chris situation, only data from the Terry situation are reported. The data are also limited to the open condition, because this condition was intended to replicate our original study.

The line of reasoning advanced by IMT suggests two rival hypotheses. First, given that covert violations of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner each entail deceptive inferences decidedly different from those generated by covert Quality violations, there should be significant differences between messages involving covert Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner violations in terms of perceived message deceptiveness because such violations do **not** trigger erroneous Quality implicatures (i.e., all such violations do **not** function identically at the level of implicatures) (H1B). Second, IMT views violations of each maxim as (to some degree) independently contributing to perceived deceptiveness. At the same time, violations of each of the maxims, as well as judgments related to message deceptiveness, all represent separate sub-dimensions of a single more abstract, higher-order construct: adherence (or lack thereof) to the CP (see McCornack, 1992, p. 6). That is, perceptions of Quality, Quantity, Relation, Manner, and perceived "honesty" all should be interrelated to some degree because each is a function of the same latent variable: perceived adherence to rational, cooperative, conversational behavior. Thus, the reasoning of IMT predicts that a second-order unidimensional measurement model will provide the best fit to data generated by studies examining IMT (H2B).

Analysis and Results

To test these rival hypotheses and the competing models that gave rise to them, we reanalyzed data from two different studies: McCornack, Levine, Solowczuk, Torres, and Campbell (1992) and Jacobs et al. (this issue). Both data sets unequivocally supported the predictions of IMT and clearly were inconsistent with the Jacobs et al. model.

In regard to the first set of rival hypotheses (i.e., H1A vs. H1B), IMT allows for differences in perceived deceptiveness ratings as a function of violation type, whereas the Jacobs et al. model predicts no such differences. Both the McCornack et al. (1992) data and the Jacobs et al. (this issue) data are informative regarding these competing predictions. The results obtained from both studies are presented in Table 1. Two conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, the Jacobs et al. data almost perfectly replicate the McCornack et al. (1992) findings. Second, the results from both studies reveal differential effects for violation type on honesty ratings, something that should not occur if all such violations are triggering Quality implicatures.

In addressing the second set of rival hypotheses, we analyzed the psychometric properties of the measures used by McCornack et al. (1992) and Jacobs et al. Using confirmatory factor analysis on PACKAGE, and the criteria employed by Levine

and McCroskey (1990, see p. 65, pp. 68–69), we tested both data sets independently for consistency with the Jacobs et al. multidimensional (H2A) and the IMT second-order unidimensional (H2B) measurement models. The data from both studies yielded remarkably similar results. In each case, the data clearly were consistent with the second-order factor structure proposed by IMT. In the tests of this model, only one (of more than 100) observed correlations differed from its predicted value by more than one percent of the variance. The largest deviation was .12. The data from both studies were inconsistent with the parallelism criterion for the Jacobs et al. multi-dimensional model. Hence, in both data sets, perceptions of Quality, Quantity, Relevance, Manner and perceived honesty appeared to be a function of a single, unitary construct.

As a further test of the Jacobs et al. argument regarding the primacy of Quality, we tested a measurement model in which perceptions of Quality violations were specified as the higher-order (unifying) construct. The data were sharply inconsistent with the Quality-as-the-second-order-factor model. In the Jacobs et al. data set, all but one of the predicted correlations deviated significantly from its predicted value (largest deviation = .50, mean deviation = .19), and in the McCornack et al. (1992) data set, each and every deviation was significant (mean deviation = .24). Thus, **the data departed radically from the “primacy of Quality” model proposed by Jacobs et al. throughout their essay.**³

Conclusions

Our re-analysis of the McCornack et al. (1992) and Jacobs et al. (this issue) data clearly demonstrate that from the perspective of message recipients, judgments of message deceptiveness can be formed independently of implicatures related to the falsity of information (i.e., Quality). However, the full ramifications of this finding have yet to be explored. Specifically, this finding goes directly against prevailing conceptualizations that define verbal deception as messages that cause listeners to believe in false information (e.g., Miller & Stiff, 1993). This suggests that IMT ultimately may not be a theory regarding “deception” per se, but a theory addressing a broad range of messages that share the principal pragmatic purpose of being designed to mislead.

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF BURGOON ET AL.

Also included in this issue is an IDT article addressing information management (Burgoon et al.). We believe that empirically testing information dimensions is admirable, and are impressed by the scope of Burgoon et al. However, we possess three concerns regarding the theory that is advanced and the studies that are presented. First, the conceptual definitions that are offered lack clarity and precision. Second, the proposition that information dimensions can be used for detecting deception is questionable. Third, the reported findings merely reflect empirical confirmation of experimental instructions.

Conceptual Definitions

Burgoon et al. address information manipulation, source and recipient perceptions, syntax and semantics, and deception detection within the same article. Given this ambitious scope, it is not surprising that certain conceptual definitions lack precision. For example, informational completeness is defined as “the delivery of all

information germane to the given topic or question." This is distinguished from conversational completeness, "the apparent sufficiency of an utterance in satisfying current conversational demands." A semantic/syntactic distinction for two of their proposed dimensions also is posited. Syntactic directness involves the degree to which an utterance is "a grammatically coherent sequel to the previous utterance," whereas semantic directness involves "providing explicit content that is related to the previous utterance or the topic at hand." Semantic clarity is defined as "the comprehensibility of what is said," whereas syntactic clarity involves "how it is said."

The purpose of conceptual definitions is to provide precise theoretical specifications for posited constructs. The Burgoon et al. definitions lack adequate precision, and several of their definitions fail to distinguish between purportedly different constructs. For example, conversational and informational completeness are confounded. The "apparent sufficiency of an utterance in satisfying current conversational demands" derives from whether it is perceived as providing "all information germane to the given topic or question." Conversational completeness also is confounded with semantic directness (i.e., the presentation of explicit content relevant to the previous utterance).

The semantic/syntactic distinctions for directness and clarity are equally imprecise. The conceptual difference between "explicit content that is related to the previous utterance" and "a grammatically coherent sequel" is vague. The status of an utterance as a coherent sequel derives from the presence of content related to the previous utterance. Similarly, "the comprehensibility of what is said" stems from "how it is said."

Information Dimensions and Deception Detection

Burgoon et al. propose that information dimensions can be used to detect deception. As they describe, "if the proposed dimensions capture important underlying features of messages, they should successfully distinguish truthful discourse from various deceptive discourse forms."

We do not believe that the information dimensions proposed by IMT (or IDT) can be used as a deception detection framework analogous to sets of leakage cues. The Burgoon et al. premise that they can be used in this fashion is founded on three faulty assumptions about deception and discourse. First, Burgoon et al. assume that receivers strategically use various information dimensions "when interpreting messages and judging their credibility." There is strong evidence that individuals do **not** process message cues in such a vigilant and educated fashion. Grice (1989) argued that Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner are not conscious, evaluative standards for assessing the credibility of others' discourse. Rather, they are tacit, relatively unconscious assumptions regarding the principles that guide cooperative and rational exchanges. Fiedler and Walka (1993) demonstrated that "spontaneous judgments of the veracity of everyday communications are unlikely to be guided by the very cues that authentically reflect the cognitive and emotional processes of lie production" (p. 218). This is because within naturalistic settings, individuals

obtain no feedback about the objective truth of what people have said . . . there is no objective truth criterion but only a truth defined by convention in many cases . . . even when an objective truth criterion does exist, its relationship to particular cues might be weak to the extent that expressive behavior is flexible and varied. . . . In such a confusing environment, the social learning

process of lie detection is more likely to follow conventionalized rules than to figure out cue validities. (p. 202)

Second, Burgoon et al. assume that the information disclosed in deceptive messages is substantially different from truthful information (i.e., it is this difference that causes recipients to detect deception). However, examination of everyday discourse suggests that "to the extent that normal communication is not perfectly factual, often revolving around subjective wishes and opinions rather than objective facts, the distinction between lying and telling the truth is blurred" (Fiedler & Walka, 1993, p. 200). Many misleading messages involve only minor deviations from what would be considered "honest" messages (McCornack, 1992); deviations unlikely to trigger deceptiveness judgments. This is why such messages deceive; the information manipulations are quiet, unostentatious, and covert (Grice, 1989).

Third, Burgoon et al. assume that when message recipients detect information manipulation, they immediately will assume source deceptiveness. Grice (1989) suggests the opposite. For cases in which surface forms deviate observably from those expected, listeners will not immediately assume that the speaker is being dishonest, but rather will assume that the maxims still are being adhered to at some deeper level. This assumption forms the foundation for both conversational implicatures (Grice, 1989) and deception (McCornack, 1992). As Levinson (1983) noted:

in cases of this sort, inferences arise to preserve the assumption of cooperation . . . Grice's point is not that we always adhere to these maxims on a superficial level but rather that, wherever possible, people will interpret what we say as conforming to the maxims on at least some level. (pp. 102-103)

Each of these mistaken assumptions was reified by the method that Burgoon et al. employed. They instructed message sources to construct messages that manipulated information in substantial ways and then compared perceptions of these messages to perceptions of messages in which subjects had been instructed to "answer truthfully." Given these instructions, it is not surprising that the deceptive messages that were generated involved notable and detectable information manipulations. However, these findings should **not** be taken as evidence that individuals in everyday conversations assume deceptiveness when confronted with messages that deviate from Grice's maxims. Nor should such findings be construed as evidence that deceptive sources typically manipulate information in such dramatic ways.

Experimental Instructions

Burgoon et al. instructed their message sources to design messages in accordance with their proposed dimension set. Participants were instructed to "answer truthfully to the first two questions" and then generate "deceptive" messages involving information manipulations along their proposed dimensions. Observers then rated these messages using the same dimensions along which they had been constructed. Their results suggest that "senders, when instructed to create disparate forms of deception, do manipulate multiple message features corresponding to the proposed dimensions, (b) senders recognize alterations in their own encoding along some of these dimensions, and (c) the proposed dimensions distinguish truthful messages from deceptive ones."

Given the method employed, the Burgoon et al. studies involve an empirical examination of experimental instructions. The fact that their two studies can be construed as manipulation checks is raised in their discussion section:

One possible criticism . . . is that they [the sender ratings] are merely manipulation checks, i.e., senders were instructed to make false answers untruthful and to make equivocal ones indirect and unclear. In one respect, **this is probably true.** (emphasis added)

They defend their method by arguing that "senders could just as easily have produced deceptive messages with similar properties." This is difficult to imagine, however, given that participants specifically were instructed to generate messages representative of the Burgoon et al. proposed dimension set.

Conclusions

The value of empirical scholarship should be assessed by examining how particular works contribute to extant knowledge. Although we admire the ambition and scope of the Burgoon et al. studies, we do not believe that they contribute significantly to our knowledge of deception. Prior to these studies, research had documented that individuals vary information within deceptive messages in different ways, that these different ways approximately correspond to Grice's maxims, and that this information manipulation (within certain, controlled settings) influences judgments of message deceptiveness (McCornack, 1992; McCornack et al., 1992). Burgoon et al. have demonstrated that participants successfully can design messages in accordance with experimental instructions and that observers can rate messages designed to be deceptive as significantly more deceptive than messages designed to be truthful. We do not believe that these findings advance our understanding of deception significantly beyond that which previously was known.

ENDNOTES

¹This is not to suggest that all individuals perceive this to be true. Obviously, individuals possessing a rhetorical design logic (O'Keefe, 1988) view context in a substantially different fashion, one analogous to the Jacobs et al. "constructive account." The issue at hand is what Grice argued, and he clearly did not argue that text and context are "reflexively constructed."

²For example, it matters little whether sources in the Committed Chris situation covertly violate Quantity (as in the message example), or Quality, Relation, and/or Manner. According to Jacobs et al., each case of covert violation will cause Chris to generate erroneous Quality implicatures (e.g., "my partner is not currently involved in a casual sexual relationship with someone else").

³Jacobs et al. based their conclusions regarding the primacy of Quality in part on a series of correlation and regression analyses in which they tested the association between perceptions of the four violation types and perceived honesty. Their analyses, however, assumed that the five scales were measuring five different constructs. The results of our confirmatory factor analysis indicate that this assumption was false. Because their scales were shown to be a function of a common (second-order) factor, their results are spurious. That is, because a second-order model was consistent with the data, the subscales were correlated because each had a common cause, and there was no direct effect for any subscale on any other subscale.

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ANOTHER LOOK AT INFORMATION MANAGEMENT: A REJOINDER TO MCCORNACK, LEVINE, MORRISON, AND LAPINSKI

DAVID B. BULLER AND JUDEE K. BURGOON

In this brief response to McCornack, Levine, Morrison, and Lapinski (this volume), we consider how the information management concept in Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) is related to Information Management Theory (IMT) and address their criticisms of our dimensional approach to deceptive messages. IDT and IMT are compatible in some respects but differ on (a) the primacy of Grice's Cooperative Principle (CP), (b) the number of conversational expectations senders can violate to produce deceptive messages, and (c) whether communicators are sensitive to these violations. We focus on three claims: Grice's cooperative principle (CP) and its four maxims represent the best theoretical explanation for information management during deception; IDT takes a decoding perspective on information management, whereas IMT takes an encoding perspective on this process; and our experimental manipulations are problematic because they exaggerated changes in information management and produced results unlike natural conversation.

THE HISTORY OF INFORMATION MANAGEMENT IN IDT

Our interest in information management began in 1987 when we made the distinction between strategic and nonstrategic communication (Buller & Burgoon, 1994). The first published discussion of our strategic/nonstrategic distinction occurred in Buller and Aune (1987) and permeated subsequent studies of deception (Buller, Comstock, Aune, & Strzyzewski, 1989; Buller, Strzyzewski, & Comstock, 1991). The term *information management* as a class of strategic behavior was coined in 1992 and subsumed behaviors that signalled uncertainty, vagueness, reticence, and withdrawal. We considered information management to be largely accomplished through verbal behavior that altered information features in deceptive messages. Our thoughts about these verbal behaviors and information features appeared in a paper presented at the 4th International Conference on Language and Social Psychology in 1991 (Buller & Burgoon, 1991) and are further explicated in our theoretical essay in *Communication Theory* (Buller & Burgoon, in press).

We were certainly aware of McCornack's work as we were formulating our own thinking about information management. We also were strongly influenced by Bavelas, Black, Chovil, and Mullett's (1990) work on equivocation, as well as some of the studies on which McCornack also based his IMT (e.g., Hopper & Bell, 1984; Grice, 1969; Metts, 1989; Metts & Chronis, 1986; Metts & Hippensteele, 1988;

