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Sequential Request Compliance Tactics

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Have you ever gone to a store or auto sales lot with the intent of purchasing the "bargain" item that was advertised in the Sunday paper? If your experiences are anything like ours, when you arrived, the salesperson may have told you that the bargain item was sold out, but that a similar item at a higher price was available for you to purchase instead. Many people in such a situation find themselves buying the more expensive item and, once they walk out of the store, end up wondering why. The reason most people buy the more expensive replacement item is that they have already committed themselves to the purchase. As you will read later in this chapter, commitment can be a very powerful motivating force. The above scenario is an example of a compliance tactic called *bait and switch,* wherein an individual commits to purchasing one item, only to have it replaced by another, more expensive one.

Often we find ourselves purchasing items or agreeing with requests made by friends, family, or salespersons when we may not have initially planned to do so. In these situations, the individuals around us may have used persuasive appeals to gain our *compliance*. Compliance occurs when an individual behaves or responds in a particular way because another individual is encouraging him or her to do so (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). For instance, individuals who end up purchasing the more expensive item as a result of the bait-and-switch procedure are complying with the salesperson's suggestion. At some point, they acquiesce. There are many types of compliance tactics that can be used to increase the likelihood that we will agree with another's request. The focus of this chapter will be on sequential compliance tactics, that is, tactics that require more than one step (usually two) to be effective. These types of tactics can be successful in gaining compliance.

However, before we move on to a discussion of why compliance tactics work, we need to introduce a few terms that we will use throughout the chapter. Because most sequential request compliance tactics are two-step maneuvers, there are common terms for

each request or stage in the process. The first stage of a sequential request tactic is usually referred to as either *the initial* or *first request*. The next request or stage in the process is usually referred to as the *second* or *target request,* because it is the request on which the influence agent actually hopes to gain compliance. The first request is what helps to increase the likelihood of the target of influence acquiescing to the target request. This can occur for a number of reasons; the initial request may be too large or may be something that increases the target's commitment to the course of action.

Another set of terms that you will see throughout this chapter refers to the individuals involved in the attempt to gain compliance. First, the *target,* or target of influence, refers to the person at whom the attempt to gain compliance is directed. For instance, in the hypothetical example in the introduction, you would have been the target of influence. Next, the influence practitioner, or *agent* of influence, is the individual who makes the influence attempt—the one who wishes to induce compliance in others. In the example above, the salesperson was the influence practitioner. Now let us move on to answer the question of why influence tactics work.

Why Do Compliance Tactics Work?

Cialdini (2001) was interested in determining why influence practitioners such as salespersons are so successful in gaining compliance from their targets. To examine this question, he observed the methods used by sales practitioners in real situations such as advertising, fund-raising, recruiting, and sales. Based on his observations, Cialdini determined that six key principles of influence underlie most influence attempts: scarcity, reciprocity, consistency/commitment, authority, social proof, and similarity/liking.

When scarcity is used, an item or opportunity is presented as something that is not readily available, either due to low quantity or because the offer is only good for a short period of time. For example, when the Mazda Miata was first introduced, it was released in such low quantities that the cars usually sold for several thousand dollars over the manufacturer's suggested retail price. Because the Miata was both new and hard to get, its scarcity increased its desirability. The second principle, reciprocity, describes influence tactics that work because the influence practitioner has done a favor for or made a concession to the target of influence. Targets are more likely to agree with the request because they feel they "owe" the influence practitioner. Anyone who has received free address labels with a request for a charitable donation should be familiar with these types of tactics. Consistency-and-commitment tactics work because the influence practitioner is able to get the target to commit to the transaction before the practitioner alters the deal. The example of the bait-and-switch tactic mentioned at the beginning of this chapter illustrates this type of tactic. Next, experts can influence us because they are authorities on a topic. For instance, Senator Bob Dole is successful at selling Viagra because he has experienced prostate cancer. Social proof is most successful in situations where we look to others to guide our actions. We choose to engage in a behavior because we believe that others would do the same thing in that situation. Car salespeople take advantage of this when they emphasize how popular a particular car is. Internet service providers use this tactic when they emphasize the large number of subscribers to their service. Finally, similarity and liking

tactics emphasize that the influence agent is likable or similar to us. For instance, a salesperson may state that he or she shares the same hobbies or drives the same car as a potential customer. The mention of this similarity is intended to make a customer more likely to purchase from the influence practitioner.

The majority of sequential request compliance tactics fit into one of two categories from the list above: commitment and consistency or reciprocity. We will start off with a discussion of commitment-and-consistency tactics and then move on to reciprocal tactics. In each section we will cover the basic mechanism of each tactic, factors that affect the likelihood of its success in gaining compliance, and defenses against each type of tactic.

Commitment-and-Consistency Tactics

Have you ever seen an advertisement encouraging you to enter a contest concerning a certain household product? In such contests, individuals are asked to write a short testimonial on the product to explain why they use a certain laundry detergent or toothpaste. The prize for the contest is frequently a one-year supply of the product. Well, that kind of contest sounds like a good deal for the winner, but the manufacturer of the product will have to give away a large quantity of its product. Why would the manufacturer want to give away money that way? In actuality the manufacturer has found a subtle way to increase sales: By asking consumers to extol the virtues of the product, the manufacturer is ensuring that many people will make a public commitment to the product. This written and public commitment will increase most individuals' loyalty to the brand. So while giving away a one-year supply to one winner, the company is actually gaining thousands of customers who will become more loyal and more likely to purchase the product consistently than before the contest. And, commitment can be a powerful motivating force.

A number of sequential request compliance tactics work by making the targets of influence feel committed to an action or a product. We will review three of these tactics in the sections below. Table 12.1 presents the basic mechanism of each tactic: the low-ball procedure, the foot-in-the-door technique, and the bait-and-switch tactic. Although each tactic is different in the way it is implemented, all rely on the same underlying mechanisms to make them successful: *commitment* and *consistency*.

The Low-Ball Procedure

The reason the second author of this chapter studies social influence has to do with the low-ball procedure. During her senior year of college, she bought a car. At the time it seemed like a good deal. Two weeks later, however, the salesperson from the dealership called to say there was an error in the loan paperwork and that she had to return the car or pay an additional $2,000 for it. Of course she chose to pay the money, because she was already committed to the car and had already shown it to her friends and family. It was only after this stressful predicament was over that she realized she had never received an updated loan statement and that the extra cash was never recorded on any of the paperwork. It was then that she realized she had been duped.

TABLE 12.1 ***Commitment-Based Sequential Request Compliance Tactics***

Tactic	*Initial Request*		*Second Request*	
	How Initial Commitment Is Created	*Example*	*How the Initial Commitment Is Used to Trap the Target into a Less Desirable Outcome*	*Example*
Low-ball	Getting the target to agree to a specific desirable arrangement.	Negotiating a deal to purchase a car.	The terms of the agreement change to be less advantageous for the target.	Changing the deal due to an error in the financial paperwork so that it costs more.
Bait-and-Switch	Urging the target to commit to a certain behavior or action.	Getting the target to commit to purchasing a new stereo based on a low advertised price.	Making the behavior or action unadvisable or unavailable and proposing an alternative that is not as desirable an outcome for the target.	Informing the target that the desired stereo is sold out and offering an alternative, more expensive one.
Foot-in-the-Door	Asking the target to agree with a small request.	Getting the target to sign a petition advocating government aid to a group in need.	Following up with a request for more assistance on a (usually) related request.	Asking the target to volunteer time or donate money to help the same group.

This experience is one example of what social scientists refer to as the *low-ball technique*. This technique is used when an individual commits to one outcome, in this case purchasing the car for a specific price. Once the commitment has been made, the deal changes and becomes less desirable than the arrangement to which the target initially committed (i.e., the price on the car is raised). However, because of the existing commitment, many people will still agree to it. Thus, in the low-ball technique, an individual agrees to the first request because it is easy to agree to, or is advantageous to him or her. When the opportunity or deal changes to become less desirable, most individuals already feel committed and follow through on that commitment.

Cialdini, Cacioppo, Bassett, and Miller (1978) were first to demonstrate the low-ball technique. In their study, research participants were called and asked to participate in an experiment. Participants in the control group were told that the experiment was scheduled for a very undesirable time: 7:00 A.M. In contrast, participants in the low-ball group were first asked to participate in the experiment and then, once they agreed, were informed that it would take place at 7:00 A.M. As can be seen in figure 12.1, the initial commitment to the first request had the desired effect: Participants in the low-ball condition agreed to participate at a much higher rate than did control participants (56 percent to 24 percent respectively). In addition, the commitment made by the low-balled participants had a



FIGURE 12.1 ***Compliance with the Target Request in the First Low-Ball Study***

Source: Cialdini et al., 1978.

powerful impact on actual behavior: 95 percent of participants in the low-ball condition who agreed to participate actually showed up for the experiment.

Why is the low-ball technique so successful? It works because once someone agrees to a business deal or course of action, that individual feels committed and will stay committed to that course of action even when the details change. In addition, the initial request is usually perceived as a "good deal" by the target, and this perception helps enhance his or her commitment.

As the initial demonstration of the procedure presented above clearly illustrates, the low-ball approach is a powerful compliance tactic. However, a number of factors affect the likelihood of its success. For instance, additional research has indicated that the degree of commitment between the target and the influence agent plays an important role in the success of this technique. For example, Burger and Petty (1981) demonstrated that this tactic did not work when different people administered the first request and the target request. In addition, Burger and Cornelius (2001) demonstrated that both public and verbal commitment is necessary for this technique to work. In their study, participants who were interrupted before they had the opportunity to commit to the initial request were significantly less likely to agree to the less desirable target request than were participants in the low-ball condition. Additional research indicates that targets must also feel that they made the initial commitment freely in order to be successfully low-balled (Cialdini et al., 1978).

Bait and Switch

At the start of this chapter, we presented an example of the next consistency-based compliance tactic we will examine: *the bait-and-switch* technique. We are sure many people can remember instances when they have been drawn into a store after spotting the 40 percent off tag on a nice camera or pair of shoes. However, if your experiences have been anything like ours, you have probably been disappointed because the camera was out of

stock or the bargain shoes were available only in extremely large or small sizes. In most situations like these, the typical sales associate is only too happy to recommend an alternative shoe or camera that is very similar in appearance or features but is pricier. And if you are anything like us, you may have purchased the alternative item even though it was not what you went into the store for in the first place. If so, you have experienced the bait-and-switch procedure.

The tactic works by getting a target to commit to an item or a course of action. Then, once the commitment has been made or the "bait" taken, the influence practitioner alters the situation so that the item or action that the target has committed to is no longer available. The influence practitioner then offers an alternative option or course of action that is not nearly as good a deal for the target. Many targets in this situation will accept the alternative item or action even though they would not have done so if that had been the initial option.

Although this tactic has been around in the sales industry for quite a while, the initial published experimental demonstration of the bait-and-switch tactic was authored by the French social psychologists Joule, Gouilloux, and Weber (1989). They referred to it as the *lure* procedure. In their study, they recruited participants to take part in a study on film clips—a very interesting experiment in the eyes of the typical research participant. This was the bait. Once willing participants arrived to take part in the experiment, participants in the lure condition were told that the experiment had been canceled. Then they were switched: They were offered an alternative experiment in which their task would be to memorize lists of numbers—a very boring task in comparison to the original experiment. The results attested to the success of this compliance tactic. Among a control group of participants who were just asked to do the number-matching task, only 15 percent agreed, whereas 47 percent in the bait-and-switch condition agreed to be in the memory study.

Why does it work? Much like the low-ball procedure, the bait-and-switch technique works by getting an initial commitment to comply, which makes people more likely to accept a less attractive arrangement than they ordinarily would have accepted. It is different from the low-ball tactic in that the outcome the target commits to is not altered to become something less desirable; rather, it is replaced by a *different* outcome that is less desirable than the one initially committed to. For example, a victim of the low-ball procedure would agree to buy the same car for a higher price, while a victim of the bait-and-switch procedure would agree to buy a different, more expensive, car.

Foot-in-the-Door Technique

A few years ago, while walking through a shopping mall, the second author was stopped by a clean-cut young man who asked her a few short questions about her household demographics. Once she answered his questions, he thanked her for her time. Then, before she could walk away, he asked her to provide more information about her family demographics and consumption habits in a longer interview. An hour later, she walked out of this young man's office carrying with her a box of "fire-roasted grill snaps" that she had agreed to taste-test for a week and wondered what had hit her. Her family tried the crackers, and a week later she participated in a 20-minute telephone interview to provide feed-

back on the taste test. She was amazed that agreeing to answer a few short questions had led her to commit to a course of action that she would have initially refused if she had been informed of what the clean-cut young man really wanted from her in the first place. This is an example of the next consistency-based compliance tactic, the foot-in-the-door (FITD) technique.

Essentially, the FITD technique works by asking for something small—usually a minor commitment—and building upon that commitment to gain compliance with a larger, usually related request. When two social psychologists, Jonathan Freedman and Scott Fraser (1966), initially investigated the FITD technique, they found that once an individual agrees to the small request, he or she is more likely to agree to a related, larger request. They labeled this effect the foot-in-the-door technique because the small request is like the proverbial foot in the doorway that makes it hard for a potential customer to close the door on a salesperson.

In their initial demonstration of the FITD effect, Freedman and Fraser (1966, study 2) asked participants either to sign a petition or to place a small card in a window in their home or car. The petition and the card advocated one of two prosocial messages: to keep California beautiful or to support safe driving. Both requests were easy to agree to. After all, most people living in California believe in safe driving, and most Californians want to keep California beautiful. Approximately two weeks after complying with the initial request, participants were contacted by a second experimenter and asked to place a large sign advocating safe driving in their front yard. Although initial acceptance of the small card that advocated safe driving led to the greatest amount of compliance with the large request, all experimental conditions generated more compliance than the control group.

Why Is the FITD Technique Effective in Gaining Compliance? Freedman and Fraser explained their results in terms of self-perception. They concluded that compliance with a small initial request for a public service action causes a change in the individual's self-perception. This small act of compliance produces a change in self-concept in which the person "becomes in his own eyes, the kind of person who does this sort of thing" (p. 201). Thus, the initial act of compliance with a small request, a request virtually no one would refuse, makes an individual more likely to agree to a later, larger request—particularly if it is similar to the initial request.

Other researchers have challenged this explanation of the FITD technique both because they suggest alternative explanations seem more likely and because the FITD technique has been notoriously difficult to replicate. In a literature review on the FITD effect, DeJong (1979) concluded that support for the self-perception theory is weak. Similarly, in a meta-analysis of 120 FITD studies, Beaman, Cole, Preston, Klentz, and Steblay (1983) concluded that the FITD is an effective compliance technique, but that the size of the effect is smaller than was suggested by the results of the Freedman and Fraser study. The results of the meta-analysis by Beaman and colleagues also suggest that support for the self-perception theory to explain the FITD effect is inconsistent. In addition, in another FITD study, Gorassini and Olson (1995) measured participants' self-perceived helpfulness between the first and second requests. Although participants in the FITD condition perceived themselves as more helpful than participants in the control condition, this greater perception of helpfulness did not predict compliance with the second request. In

sum, much research on the FITD has indicated that other factors beyond self-perception may well influence susceptibility to it.

Factors That Affect the Likelihood of an FITD Effect. More recently, Burger (1999) conducted a meta-analysis on FITD tactics and found support for a number of factors that influence whether an attempted FITD tactic will be effective in increasing compliance. A detailed listing of many of the factors appears in table 12.2. The first, as we have already mentioned, is self-perception. Individuals who see the act of complying with the first request as indicative of the type of person they are will be more likely to comply with the target request than will individuals who do not experience this self-perception. For instance, Burger and Caldwell (2001) reported that a monetary reward for compliance with the first request reduces compliance with the second request. They explained this finding as indicating that a monetary reward leads people to believe that they agreed to the first request for the money, not because of the kind of people they were. In addition, Burger and Guadagno (in press) reported that individuals who have a clear or high self-concept are more susceptible to the FITD than are individuals who have a less clear sense

TABLE 12.2 ***Factors That Impact the Likelihood of a Successful FITD Attempt***

Psychological Process	*Potential Effect on the FITD*	*Example*
Self-perception	Enhances the effect	If an individual sees him- or herself as the type of person who engages in actions such as the initial request, he or she will be more likely to agree with the target request because of that self-perception.
Reciprocity	Reduces the effect	Individuals who comply with the initial request because the requestor has done them a favor are unlikely to comply with the target request because they perceive the favor as already having been returned.
Consistency needs	May reduce or enhance the effect	Individuals for whom consistency is not a core need are unlikely to be susceptible to the FITD. However, when consistency is a core need, the opposite is true.
Attributions	May reduce or enhance the effect	If individuals attribute their compliance to an external factor (e.g., payment for complying), an FITD effect is unlikely to occur. However, if individuals attribute their compliance to an internal factor (they are helpful by nature), they are more likely to comply.
Involvement	Enhances the effect	The greater the involvement required to complete the initial request, the more likely individuals are to comply with the target request.

Source: Adapted in part from Burger, 1999.

of self, because such individuals are more likely to alter their self-concepts when reacting to new information than are individuals with less clear self-concepts. Thus, after complying with the first request in the FITD manipulation, individuals with high self-concepts are more likely than those with low self-concepts to experience the resulting change in self-perception that will incline them to agree with the second request.

Self-perception, however, is only one factor affecting the likelihood of a successful FITD. For instance, according to Burger's (1999) meta-analysis, if targets comply with the initial request because of reciprocity norms, that is, because they think they owe the influence agent something, they are less likely to agree with the target request. The perceived reciprocity produces a boomerang effect, because the targets come to believe that they agreed with the initial request only to return a favor. For instance, if an individual received a free gift for signing a petition to change the speed limit (first request), he or she would be less likely to agree to attend a demonstration on the topic (target request) than if he or she had not received the free gift.

Individual differences in consistency needs also have an impact on the likelihood of success of the FITD effect. Cialdini, Trost, and Newsom (1995) suggested that individuals might actually differ in the amount of consistency they prefer. In their study, Cialdini and colleagues introduced a personality scale that measured individuals' *preference for consistency* (PFC). The PFC scale measures individual differences in the desire to be both internally and externally consistent on three separate but highly interrelated subscales: the preference for consistency within oneself, the preference to appear consistent to others, and the preference for others to be consistent. Individuals who score low on this scale may actually prefer to behave in an inconsistent manner. Conversely, individuals who score high on this scale consider consistency very important.

Cialdini and colleagues (1995, Study 1) conducted an FITD study, examining whether PFC level would have an impact on the success of an FITD manipulation. Specifically, they predicted that high-PFC individuals would be susceptible to the FITD and show the traditional increase in compliance after first agreeing to a small, related request. For low-PFC participants, they predicted no difference between the FITD and the control conditions because consistency was not important to them. To test this hypothesis, the researchers contacted experimental participants by telephone and asked them to answer three short questions about their television viewing habits (the first request). Next, all participants received the target request: to fill out a 50-item questionnaire on their television viewing habits and return it in two weeks. The results showed, as predicted, that high-PFC individuals (people for whom consistency is important) were more susceptible than the low-PFC participants to the FITD effect. Figure 12.2 presents a graphic representation of the results. Thus, high-PFC participants who agreed to a small request were more likely to agree to a second, larger request. Conversely, low-PFC participants were just as likely to agree to the second request whether or not they had agreed to the small request first. These results were interpreted to support the hypothesis that individual differences in PFC are one reason the FITD effect is difficult to replicate reliably. Additional data analyses revealed that the low-PFC participants displayed a relatively strong tendency to say yes regardless of condition. This finding suggests that low-PFC individuals tend to be interested in novel opportunities and experiences such as the chance to participate in an unknown survey about television viewing habits.



FIGURE 12.2 ***Individual Differences in Compliance with the FITD Technique.*** People with a low PFC are not susceptible to the tactic, whereas people with a high PFC show the traditional increase in compliance after first agreeing to a small initial request.

Source: Cialdini et al., 1995.

In a replication and expansion of the study by Cialdini and colleagues, Guadagno, Asher, Demaine, and Cialdini (2001, study 2) used the same method as in the previous study, with slightly modified FITD conditions. They found that for high-PFC individuals, reminding them of the concept of consistency between the first and second requests increased the extent of the FITD effect. For low-PFC individuals, however, reminding them of the concept of consistency had the opposite result, actually decreasing the FITD effect.

In addition to consistency needs, several other processes influence the likelihood of the FITD effect (Burger, 1999). For instance, the greater the action or involvement required to comply with the initial request, the greater the effectiveness of the FITD. Hansen and Robinson (1980), for example, reported a stronger effect when participants elaborated on their answers to questions than when they simply provided responses. Labeling the behavior as helpful also increases the likelihood of an FITD effect unless the target is low in PFC (Guadagno et al., 2001). Making the target request a continuation of the initial request also increases the effect. The many factors that affect the likelihood of a successful FITD make it one of the most difficult sequential compliance tactics to replicate reliably. Table 12.2 lists all of the factors that affect the likelihood of a successful FITD attempt.

Defense Against Commitment and Consistency Tactics

What can individuals do if they find themselves trapped by their own consistency and about to become a victim of the low-ball procedure, the bait-and-switch tactic, or the

FITD technique? Cialdini (2001) recommended two options, both based on the premise that consistency generally is a good thing unless it is foolish and rigid. Prospective targets of influence (e.g., most people) should learn to recognize both when a commitment and consistency tactic is being used on them and when they are engaging in such foolishly and rigidly consistent responses.

How can we tell the difference between healthy consistency and this perilous second variety? Sometimes when we are in a situation in which an influence agent is eliciting a foolishly consistent response from us, our instincts tell us that something is wrong and that we are being pressured to agree to a request with which we do not really want to comply. If this happens to you, we recommend that you inform the influence agent that complying with his or her request would be a foolish type of consistency that represents behavior in which you choose not to engage. A good way to judge the situation is to ask yourself whether you would make the same commitment if you could go back in time and make the initial choice knowing what you now know. If the answer is no, we suggest you refuse to comply with the influence agent's request.

Reciprocity-Based Sequential Request Compliance Tactics

While walking to class, have you ever been stopped by a friendly individual who offered you a free T-shirt or teddy bear if you would take the time to fill out a credit card application? Or, have you ever received free chocolate to entice you into a candy store? In either situation most of us have at some point in our lives found ourselves successfully influenced. We are influenced because we feel the need to "repay" the individual who has given us a "free" gift. This feeling stems from the *norm of reciprocity,* which states that it is appropriate for individuals to return favors (Gouldner, 1960). Although reciprocity is a prosocial behavior, influence practitioners can easily take advantage of this norm to induce compliance. The next two sequential request compliance tactics, the door-in-the-face and the that's-not-all-technique, work by using the norm of reciprocity against us. Each of these tactics is reviewed in the next section, while table 12.3 presents the basic mechanism of each.

The Door-in-the-Face Technique

Have you ever answered a knock on the door to find a salesperson asking you to buy 10 two-year magazine subscriptions for a total of over $350? For most of us, that is far too much money. Imagine you refused the request to buy the magazine subscriptions and the salesperson followed up by asking you to purchase a single two-year magazine subscription. This modified request seems so much more reasonable by comparison that you agree. As you shut your door, you immediately ask yourself why you just purchased a two-year subscription to *Modern Fishing* when you do not even fish. If you have ever had an encounter like this, you have experienced the door-in-the-face (DITF) technique.

In order for the DITF tactic to be successful, the influence practitioner has to come up with a request that is so large that most people would not even consider agreeing with

doing volunteer work.

TABLE 12.3 ***Reciprocity-Based Sequential Request Compliance Tactics***

Tactic	*Initial Request*		*Second Request*	
	How Reciprocity Is Initially Created	*Example*	*How Reciprocity Is Used to Trap the Target into a Less Desirable Outcome*	*Example*
Door-in-the-face	The target rejects an unreasonably large request from the influence agent.	Asking the target to spend five hours a week for the next two years doing volunteer work.	The influence agent concedes by making a second, smaller request, and the target feels normative pressure to reciprocate and agree to the concession.	Asking the target to spend one afternoon doing volunteer work.
That's-not-all	The influence agent offers to make a deal with the target.	Offering to sell someone a car for a certain price.	Before the target has a chance to respond, the influence agent sweetens the deal by offering more for the same price.	Adding a new CD changer to the offer without changing the price.

it. Once the target rejects the inordinately large request, the influence practitioner concedes and asks the target to agree to a smaller request. In this case, more people will agree with the second request than if they had been presented with that request initially. Most researchers believe that the concession on the part of the influence agent is essential for the DITF tactic to work. That is because the target feels normative pressure to reciprocate the concession of the target.

Cialdini, Cacioppo, Bassett, and Miller published the initial demonstration of the DITF technique in 1975. To examine the effectiveness of the technique, these experimenters approached students on a college campus and asked them to volunteer to chaperone juvenile delinquents on a daylong trip to the zoo on an upcoming Saturday. All participants received this request. For participants in the DITF condition, this seemingly large request followed an even larger one. Participants in the DITF condition were first asked to volunteer to counsel juvenile delinquents for two hours a week for two years. Once they refused to comply with this initial request, targets were then asked to volunteer for the trip to the zoo. As figure 12.3 shows, the results supported the effectiveness of the DITF: 50 percent of participants who received the request as part of the DITF technique agreed to chaperone the trip to the zoo, compared to 17 percent of participants who received only the target request.

In another DITF study, Cialdini and Ascanti (1976) demonstrated that this technique was more successful at getting individuals both to agree to donate and actually donate a pint of blood. That is, after refusing a request to donate a unit of blood every six weeks for two years, participants who then received a request to donate just one pint of blood were



FIGURE 12.3 ***Compliance with the Target Request in the First Door-in-the-Face Study***

Source: Cialdini et al., 1975.

more likely to agree than were those who had received only the request for one pint of blood. In addition, of those participants who agreed to donate blood, those in the DITF condition were more likely to follow through on their agreement and actually donate the blood. Thus, the DITF tactic has been shown to produce both verbal and behavioral compliance.

Another DITF study is of particular interest to students (Harai, Mohr, & Hosey, 1980). In it professors were the research participants. Initially, the professors were asked to spend two hours a week all term tutoring a student. The target request was to spend 15 to 20 minutes with the student. As predicted, compliance was much greater after the professors heard and refused the initial request: 79 percent agreed to spend 15 to 20 minutes with the student, compared with 59 percent of the control participants. Thus, one tip for students is that if you want some extra help or attention from your professor, ask for more time or help than you think you need. If your professor refuses, retreat to requesting a just adequate amount of help.

The That's-Not-All Technique

While flipping through the channels watching late-night television, have you ever stumbled across a commercial for a knife that slices wood and soda cans and is still sharp enough to slice a tomato? After demonstrating the knife's prowess, the announcer mentions that it is available for an all-time low price of $19.99. Then, after a short pause, the announcer says: "But wait, that's not all. For the same low price you'll also get a paring knife, a set of steak knives, and a knife sharpener." Getting additional items for the same price makes this seem like quite a bargain. At the end of the commercial, you may feel compelled to pick up the phone and order now. This is a classic example of the *that's-not-all* technique.

This technique works as follows: The influence practitioner offers the target a product for a specific price and then sweetens the deal by throwing in a "free" gift or lowering

the price. It works because the anchor point is adjusted. An *anchor point* is an initial value that establishes the standard price of an item, telling us what the item is worth. Once the initial price point sets the value of an item, the free extra items or the lowered price make the second offer seem like a bargain in contrast to the first. Reciprocity is also a factor here. By lowering the price or providing additional items for the same price, the influence practitioner appears to be doing the target a favor, increasing the normative pressure on the target to reciprocate by making the purchase.

In the initial demonstration of this tactic, Burger (1986) gave research participants the opportunity to buy cupcakes at a university campus bake sale. They were offered a cupcake for a specific price, asked to "wait a second," and then told that the price also included a small bag of cookies. These participants turned out to be significantly more likely to buy the cupcake and cookies package than participants who were told at the outset that the price was for the cupcake and cookies package.

However, Burger, Reed, DeCesare, Rauner, and Rozilis (1999) demonstrated that the that's-not-all technique can boomerang if the initial request is too large. Participants in their study were offered free coffee mugs for a charitable donation of a specific amount. After a short pause, participants were told that the minimum donation to receive a mug had been reduced. Some of these participants heard that the minimum donation had been dropped from $10 to $3; others were told that it had been reduced from $5 to $3. Compared to a condition in which participants heard only about a $3 donation, the manipulation from $5 to $3 produced a significant increase in donations. However, the switch from $10 to $3 caused participants to give significantly less money than those in the control condition. The researchers reasoned that because the initial request was so large, it led to an immediate rejection of the request. The experimenters were therefore unable to alter the participants' anchor point, and the effectiveness of the that's-not-all manipulation was lost.

Defense Against Reciprocity Tactics

What can we do when a favor or concession turns out not to be the boon it was initially perceived to be, but instead merely the initial step in the DITF or the that's-not-all technique? The most extreme response would be to reject all favors and concessions that come our way to protect ourselves from the potential misuse of the norm of reciprocity. While that approach may successfully protect against this type of compliance tactic, it may also end up hurting the feelings of people who honestly meant to do us a favor or make a concession. We therefore recommend a more moderate response: to reframe the favor or concession as the trick that it actually is rather than see it as a true act of generosity. Once people recognize the trick for what it is, the normative pressure to comply by reciprocating with a concession or favor from their own end will dissipate (Cialdini, 2001). The authors use this defense every time they get "free" address labels in the mail along with a request for a charitable donation. They recognize that the labels are actually not a gift at all but merely a sales tool. While they may or may not choose to donate money to the charity, this choice is based on their opinion of the charitable cause, not the result of any pressure to comply and reciprocate because they received labels at no cost. Although this example is not a sequential request tactic, the same defense technique can be applied to situations in which the influence practitioner is using the DITF or the that's-not-all technique.

Conclusion

Sequential request compliance tactics require two steps to produce a successful influence attempt. The majority of influence tactics can be categorized into one of the six principles of influence: scarcity, reciprocity, consistency and commitment, authority, social proof, and similarity or liking. Most sequential request compliance procedures fall into one of two categories of influence: commitment and consistency or reciprocity. There are three main commitment-based procedures—the low-ball approach, the bait-and-switch technique, and the foot-in-the-door effect—and two reciprocity procedures—the door-in-the-face tactic and the that's-not-all technique. Although more research in this area is needed, social scientists are slowly learning more and more about the factors that compel us to say yes to a request when our initial inclination is to say no.

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