Self-Monitoring: Appraisal and Reappraisal

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Theory and research on self-monitoring have accumulated into a sizable literature on the impact of variation in the extent to which people cultivate public appearances in diverse domains of social functioning. Yet self-monitoring and its measure, the Self-Monitoring Scale, are surrounded by controversy generated by conflicting answers to the critical question, Is self-monitoring a unitary phenomenon? A primary source of answers to this question has been largely neglected—the Self-Monitoring Scale’s relations with external criteria. We propose a quantitative method to examine the self-monitoring literature and thereby address major issues of the controversy. Application of this method reveals that, with important exceptions, a wide range of external criteria tap a dimension directly measured by the Self-Monitoring Scale. We discuss what this appraisal reveals about what self-monitoring is and is not.

According to the master actor and stage producer Sir Tyrone Guthrie (1971), good acting involves a talent whose natural medium is life itself, a talent readily observed in everyday social interaction: the ability to convincingly convey internal states through expressive channels—facial expressions, hand gestures, body posture, voice texture, and other paralinguistic cues—in the absence of the internal states. This ability may be drawn on in a wide range of life contexts. Most expressive control may be undertaken “in a good-natured endeavor to lubricate the creaking mechanism of social intercourse” (Guthrie, 1971, p. 7). But, it may also be an essential component in illicit social activities as well, such as lying, concealing one’s true intentions, or presenting an inauthentic self.

Laboratory studies confirm what Guthrie and others in his profession have known for ages: Individuals vary widely in expressive control (Riggio & Friedman, 1982; Siegman & Reynolds, 1983). This variation raises a number of questions: Why are some people better than others at expressive control? What environmental histories and genetic predispositions foster or inhibit the development of expressive control? What features of personality covary with expressive control, and how are these associations to be understood? Toward what ends is expressive control actually used, and what are its consequences? Theoretically informed answers to these questions offer enticing promises, for a theory of individual differences in expressive control may importantly inform a general framework for understanding how social interactions and interpersonal relationships are regulated by expressive behavior, a domain central to both psychological (e.g., Goffman, 1959) and ethiological (e.g., Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989) inquiry.

One theory of expressive control is the theory of self-monitoring, which concerns the antecedents and consequences of variation in the extent to which individuals strategically cultivate public appearances (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985, 1991; Snyder, 1974, 1979, 1987). This theory has generated an extensive literature on the role of such processes in diverse domains of individual and social functioning. At the same time, it has sparked spirited dialogue and debate about the centerpiece of this theory, the psychological construct of self-monitoring, and its method of measurement, the Self-Monitoring Scale. Our purposes here are to conduct a systematic appraisal of the self-monitoring literature and to build on this examination of the literature to offer a reappraisal of the self-monitoring construct, one that addresses fundamental questions about what self-monitoring is and is not, identifies propositions about self-monitoring that should not receive the emphasis heretofore accorded them, and helps define the agenda for the evolution of theory and research on self-monitoring.

Self-Monitoring: Theory and Research

The theory of self-monitoring, first introduced almost three decades ago, is an edifice of conceptual propositions built on a theoretically straightforward foundation (Snyder, 1974, 1979, 1987). According to fundamental postulates of the theory, people differ meaningfully in the extent to which they can and do engage in expressive control. Some people, out of a concern for the situational appropriateness of their expressive self-presentation, have come to monitor their expressive behavior and accordingly regulate their self-presentation for the sake of desired public appearances. Thus, the behavior of these high self-monitors may be highly responsive to social and interpersonal cues of situationally appropriate performances. By contrast, other people, those who (relatively speaking) do not engage in expressive control, have not acquired the same concern for the situational appropriateness...
of their expressive behavior. For these low self-monitors, expressive behaviors are not controlled by deliberate attempts to appear situationally appropriate; instead, their expressive behavior functionally reflects their own inner attitudes, emotions, and dispositions.

Stated otherwise, the theory of self-monitoring concerns differences in the extent to which people value, create, cultivate, and project social images and public appearances. High self-monitors can be likened to consummate social pragmatists, willing and able to project images designed to impress others. Moreover, they seem to believe in the appearances they create and to take stock in the fact that these appearances can and do become social realities. By contrast, low self-monitors seem not only unwilling but also unable to carry off appearances. They live as if put-on images are falsehoods, as if only those public displays true to the privately experienced self are principled.

From these basic propositions follow a number of testable hypotheses concerning, among other things, the determinants of specificity and consistency in social behavior, the origins of linkages between attitudes and actions, and the nature and consequences of conceptions of self and personal identity. Thus, for example, it follows that the behavior of those who engage in expressive control should be particularly sensitive to shifts in what constitutes a situationally appropriate performance; hence, in domains where situation-to-situation variation in behavioral appropriateness is high, self-monitors should display greater variability in their self-presentations across situations than should low self-monitors. By contrast, the core propositions of self-monitoring theory generate the hypotheses that low self-monitors should manifest greater consistency in their behavioral expressions of feelings and thoughts expected to be stable, and thus, they ought to show substantial covariation between their self-reports of their attitudes and preferences and actual behavioral indicators of them.

Research on self-monitoring designed to test these and other hypotheses typically has used multi-item self-report measures to identify people high and low in self-monitoring. The most frequently used instruments are the 25-item, true–false, original Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974) and an 18-item refinement of this measure (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986; see also Lemmon & Wolfe, 1984). Although multiple content domains are represented in these measures, expressive control figures prominently. Indeed, a Self-Monitoring Scale item with one of the highest item-total correlations is “I would probably make a good impression.”

By any criterion, the theory of self-monitoring has been a generative one. The self-monitoring construct has captured the interest of social psychologists and personologists alike. Empirical tests of hypotheses spawned by self-monitoring theory have accumulated into a very sizable literature. Several hundred articles on self-monitoring have appeared since its inception, prompting claims that it “is an important construct that promises social significance and attitude–value relations (see, e.g., DeBono, Green, Shair, & Benson, 1995; DeBono & Snyder, 1995; Kardes, Sanbonmatsu, Voss, & Fazio, 1986; Meltema & Bastili, 1992; Snyder & Cantor, 1980), (d) the correspondence between private attitudes and public actions (see, e.g., Ajzen, Timko, & White, 1982; DeBono & Omoto, 1993; DeBono & Snyder, 1995; Kraus, 1995; Maio & Olson, 1994; Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982; Snyder & Swann, 1976; Snyder & Tanke, 1976; Wyner & Penner, 1985; Zanna, Olson, & Fazio, 1980; Zuckerman & Reis, 1978), (e) tendencies to be influenced by the expectations of others (see, e.g., Harris, 1989; Harris & Rosenthal, 1986; Lassiter, Stone, & Weigold, 1987), (f) propensities to tailor behavior and judgments to general dispositional and to specific situational cues (see, e.g., Danheiser & Graziano, 1982; Dardenne & Leyens, 1995; Fiske & Von Hudy, 1992; Friedman & Miller-Herringer, 1991; Lippa & Donaldson, 1990; McCann & Hancock, 1983; Snyder & Monson, 1975; Wong & Watkins, 1996), (g) responsiveness to situational cues in the self-attribute of emotion, judgments about the self, and the expression of attitudes (see, e.g., Chen, Schechter, & Chaiken, 1996; Friz, Lavine, & Huff, 1996; Graziano & Bryant, 1998; Jones, Brenner, & Knight, 1990; Kronnick & Sedikides, 1990), (h) susceptibility to influence by advertisements that offer appeals to images associated with consumer products relative to those that make claims about the actual quality of the products being advertised (see, e.g., DeBono & Packard, 1991; Shavitt, Lowrey, & Han, 1992; Snyder & DeBono, 1985), (i) evaluations of consumer product quality (see, e.g., DeBono & Krim, 1997; DeBono & Leavitt, 1996; DeBono & Packard, 1991; DeBono & Rubin, 1995; DeBono & Snyder, 1989), (j) responsiveness to persuasive messages that invoke functional considerations associated with the display of social images versus those that invoke matters of the expression of personal attitudes and values (see, e.g., DeBono, 1987; DeBono & Harmish, 1988; Kristiansen & Zanna, 1988; Lavine & Snyder, 1996), (k) reliance on physical appearance as a criterion for evaluating other people (see, e.g., Snyder, Berscheid, & Glick, 1985; Snyder, Berscheid, & Matwychuk, 1988; Terkildsen, 1993), (l) orientations toward social interaction, friendship, and romantic relationships (see, e.g., Berscheid, Graziano, Monson, & Dermer, 1976; Broderick & Beltz, 1996; Ickes & Barnes, 1977; Ickes, Reidhead, & Patterson, 1986; Jones & Baumeister, 1976; Simpson, 1987; Simpson, Gangestad, & Bierk, 1993; Snyder, Gangestad, & Simpson, 1983; Snyder & Simpson, 1984; Snyder, Simpson, & Gangestad, 1986), (m) leader emergence in groups (see, e.g., Anderson & Tolson, 1989, 1991; Cronshaw & Ellis, 1991; Dobbins, Long, Dedrick, & Clemons, 1990; Ellis, 1988; Garland & Beard, 1979; Zaccaro, Foti, & Kenny, 1991), (n) organizational behavior and managerial outcomes (see, e.g., Baron, 1989; Caldwell & O’Reilly, 1982; Deluga, 1991; Fandt & Farris, 1990; Jenkins, 1993; Kilduff, 1992; Kilduff & Day, 1994), and (o) socialization and developmental processes (see, e.g., Eder, 1987; Eisenberg, Fubes, Schaller, Carlo, & Miller, 1991; Graziano, Danheiser, & Halverson, 1989; Graziano, Leone, Musser, & Lautenschlager, 1987; Graziano & Ward, 1992; Graziano & Waschull, 1995; Helling, Yu, & Hines, 1991; Musser & Browne, 1991).
Historical Chronology of Self-Monitoring

To some extent, the generativity of the self-monitoring construct may derive from the intrinsic interest value of expressive control itself and the challenge it poses to the widespread belief that nonverbal behavior may not be under voluntary control (see, e.g., Freud, 1905/1953). Yet we suspect that much of the explanation for self-monitoring’s popularity in personality and social psychology may reside in the historical context in which it was introduced. The self-monitoring construct arrived on the scene at a time of widespread concern about personality psychology and its central theoretical entity, the trait. It was a time of disenchantment on the part of those who accepted the indictments brought against the trait construct and notions of cross-situational consistency and a time of defensiveness on the part of those engaged in assessment of individual differences and research on personality dispositions.

Against this backdrop, self-monitoring seemed to offer hope that meaningful aspects of personal and interpersonal orientations could be validly assessed and related to important domains of individual and social functioning. The construct appeared to capture one of the fundamental dichotomies of psychological theory and research—whether behavior is a product of forces that operate from without (as exemplified by the situational orientation of the high self-monitor) or influences that guide from within (as typified by the dispositional orientation of the low self-monitor).

In this historical context, it is noteworthy that, soon after its inception, the self-monitoring construct was proffered as a partial resolution to two controversies that dogged researchers in personality and social psychology—the traits versus situations and attitudes versus behaviors controversies. Rather than regarding behavior as a result of either traits or situations for all people at all times, self-monitoring theory suggested a resolution. It claimed that the behavior of low self-monitors ought to be readily predicted from measures of their traits, whereas that of high self-monitors ought to be best predicted from features of their situations. Similarly, rather than regarding attitudes as either good or poor predictors of behavior, the theory again offered a compromise. Attitudes should be good predictors of behavior for low self-monitors but poor predictors for high self-monitors. In general terms, self-monitoring theory promised an appealing moderator variable resolution to debates concerning the relative roles of the person and the situation in determining behavior.

It seems, then, that self-monitoring owes much of its appeal to historical and contextual circumstances of the world into which it was born. It offered solutions to problems of the day, ones that appealed to both personality and social psychologists. The low self-monitor fit the trait-oriented conception of human nature typically associated with personality psychology, whereas the high self-monitor embodied the situation-oriented view of human nature typically associated with social psychology. No doubt because self-monitoring spoke to the issues of the day, these issues exerted considerable impact on the agenda for investigations of self-monitoring. In fact, during the first decade or so of self-monitoring theory and research, reviews of the literature, as well as critical commentary on the concept and its measure, were typically organized around these issues (see, e.g., Briggs & Cheek, 1988; Cheek, 1982; John & Block, 1986; Snyder, 1979; Wolfe, Lennox, & Hudiburg, 1983).

Only in the construct’s second decade did research on self-monitoring proceed by way of relatively autonomous programs of inquiry with their own inherent interest value apart from their links to the historically important issues of personal and situational determination of behavior. Perhaps the most prominent of these programs concerns the links between expressive control and interpersonal orientations, as revealed in friendships, romantic relationships, and sexual involvements (see, e.g., Snyder et al., 1983, 1985, 1986; Snyder & Simpson, 1984). Other such programs of research concern advertising, persuasion, and consumer behavior (see, e.g., DeBono & Snyder, 1989; Snyder & DeBono, 1985, 1987); personnel selection (see, e.g., Snyder et al., 1988); organizational behavior (see, e.g., Caldwell, & Burger, 1997; Caldwell & O’Reilly, 1982; Fandt & Farris, 1990; Jenkins, 1993; Kilduff, 1992; Kilduff & Day, 1994; Mehra & Kilduff, 1999); socialization and developmental processes (see, e.g., Eder, 1987; Eisenberg et al., 1991; Graziano et al., 1987); and cross-cultural studies (see, e.g., Gudykunst, 1983; Gudykunst & Nishida, 1984; Gudykunst, Yang, & Nishida, 1985).

It should be recognized that these programs of research, for the most part, do not root their hypotheses or interpretations in self-monitoring’s traditionally fertile ground—issues concerning the dispositional versus situational control of behavior. However, this is not to say that they do not reflect the spirit of the self-monitoring construct. To the contrary, the guiding themes of these programs of research represent returns to self-monitoring’s defining concerns with the worlds of public appearances and social images and with the processes by which appearances and images are constructed and sustained.

Consistent with these themes, research on interpersonal orientations has revealed that high, relative to low, self-monitors choose as activity partners friends who facilitate the construction of their own situationally appropriate appearances (Snyder et al., 1983). Furthermore, high self-monitors particularly prefer romantic partners with an attractive physical appearance (Snyder et al., 1985), a characteristic that enhances their own status in the eyes of others (see, e.g., Sigall & Landy, 1973). Perhaps because of their concern with appearances, high self-monitors have romantic relationships characterized by less intimacy than those of low self-monitors (Snyder & Simpson, 1984); as well, they seem more willing to engage in deception in romantic pursuits (Rowatt, Cunningham, & Druec, 1998). By contrast, the friendship choices of low self-monitors tend to reflect similar identities and shared values (Snyder et al., 1983). Their romantic relationships are relatively stable (Snyder & Simpson, 1984) and characterized by closeness and commitment prior to sexual relations (Snyder et al., 1986).

Also consistent with these themes, explorations of consumer attitudes and behavior have revealed that high self-monitors value consumer products for their strategic value in cultivating social images and public appearances, reacting positively, for instance, to advertising appeals that associate products with status; by contrast, low self-monitors judge consumer products in terms of the quality of the products stripped of their image-creating and status-enhancing veneer, choosing products that they can trust to perform their intended functions well (DeBono, 1987; DeBono & Hamish, 1988; DeBono & Packer, 1991; DeBono & Rubin, 1995; DeBono & Snyder, 1989; DeBono & Telesca, 1990; Snyder & DeBono, 1985).
These same orientations manifest themselves in the workplace as well, with high self-monitors preferring positions that call for the exercise of their self-presentational skills and low self-monitors preferring positions that permit the display of their own personalities (see, e.g., Snyder & Gangestad, 1982); in addition, high self-monitors seem to perform particularly well in occupations that call for flexibility and adaptiveness in dealings with diverse constituencies (see, e.g., Caldwell & O’Reilly, 1982), whereas low self-monitors appear to function best in dealing with relatively homogeneous work groups (see, e.g., Anderson, 1981). Similarly, concerns with public appearances versus personal attributes associated with self-monitoring may also enter the world of personnel selection, with simulations of personnel selection tasks revealing that high self-monitors are particularly attuned to the appropriateness of the appearance of job candidates, whereas low self-monitors are particularly attuned to the appropriateness of the personalities of the job candidates (see, e.g., Snyder et al., 1988).

It should be evident that these recent directions reflect a return to self-monitoring’s roots in concerns with self-presentation. However, it should also be recognized that these lines of research go beyond showing that individual differences in concern for cultivating public appearances affect self-presentational behaviors. They also demonstrate that these concerns and their manifestations in expressive control permeate the very fabric of individuals’ lives, affecting their friendship worlds, their romantic lives, their interactions with the consumer marketplace, and their work worlds.

Importantly, these lines of research also help clarify who the low self-monitor is, other than someone who does not engage in the self-presentational tactics of the high self-monitor. They indicate that the low self-monitoring repertoire may have its own motivational underpinnings. In particular, they suggest that, as much as high self-monitors are concerned with constructing social images, low self-monitors may be equally motivated to establish and protect reputations of being earnest and sincere, with no desire (or perhaps even ability) to construct what they perceive as false images of themselves. Only by fostering such reputations can low self-monitors effectively inhabit social worlds in which the public faces that they and their partners display authentically represent inner realities (see, e.g., Snyder & Campbell, 1982).

Controversy and Confusion

Despite the generativity of the self-monitoring construct, self-monitoring theory and research have become shrouded by clouds of controversy and confusion. Initially, these clouds were seeded by factor analyses showing that the internal structure of the items of the Self-Monitoring Scale is multifactorial. Three (Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980) or four (Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980) factors appeared necessary to account for the measure’s interitem correlations, with the three-factor solution being the most familiar (see also Briggs & Cheek, 1986; Gangestad & Snyder, 1985; Hosch & Marchioni, 1986; Lennox & Wolfe, 1984; Nowack & Kammer, 1987; Riggio & Friedman, 1982; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986; Sparacino, Ronchi, Bigley, Flesch, & Kuhn, 1983). The three factors have been interpreted as Acting (marked by, for instance, the item “I would probably make a good actor”), Extraversion (e.g., “In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention” [reverse-keyed]), and Other-Directedness (e.g., “I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people”).

Although these factor analyses concern the instrument used to measure self-monitoring, they are more than a matter of measurement, because they have prompted a core conceptual question, one that continues to be asked today: Does the self-monitoring construct describe a real, unitary phenomenon? In short, these analyses have raised questions about the very existence of self-monitoring.

Does Self-Monitoring Exist?

Although there is widespread agreement about the multifactorial nature of the items of the Self-Monitoring Scale—an agreement in which we share—there exist diverging viewpoints on the proper interpretation of this state of affairs. One interpretation questions the very existence of self-monitoring. According to this interpretation, multiple factors mean that some criterion variables represented in the literature might relate to one factor, other criterion variables to a second factor, and others to still a third factor. This line of reasoning, along with the possibility that the relations of the full Self-Monitoring Scale with external criteria hide differential relations of its individual components, has led to the recommendation (made first by Briggs et al., 1980) that researchers score and separately analyze three individual self-monitoring subscales used to measure the Acting, Extraversion, and Other-Directedness factors (see also Carver, 1989; Hull, Lehn, & Tedlie, 1991; Miell & LeVoi, 1985; Richmond, Craig, & Ruzicka, 1991; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986; Sullivan & Hamish, 1990). More fundamentally, however, this line of reasoning leads one to question the very existence of individual differences in self-monitoring, as interpreted by self-monitoring theory. Simply put, because the theory concerns the motivations of individuals and the means by which individuals fulfill those motives, it requires that the different purported manifestations of self-monitoring are performed by the same people and, hence, reflect the same individual differences.

It is possible, however, to construe the well-documented factor structure of the Self-Monitoring Scale in a decidedly different fashion, one that is highly compatible with the existence of self-monitoring as a unitary psychological construct underlying the many and diverse manifestations of self-monitoring. In our own analyses of self-monitoring, we have never disputed the multifactorial nature of the items of the Self-Monitoring Scale (the factors, after all, emerge in our own factor analyses, too; Gangestad & Snyder, 1985; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). However, we have reported taxonomic analyses that reveal that the structure of the self-monitoring items is consistent with there being a common latent variable that may reflect two discrete (or quasi-discrete) classes of high and low self-monitoring individuals (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985). Moreover, these analyses indicated that the Acting, Extraversion, and Other-Directedness subscales all tap, to varying degrees, this common variable, with the full Self-Monitoring Scale outperforming all subscales. As further evidence of this common latent variable, we have shown how the Self-Monitoring Scale taps a large general factor (approximated by the first unrotated factor) accounting for variance in many of the scale’s items and also correlating, to varying degrees, with all three of the subscales (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). On the basis of these analyses, we have suggested that the Self-Monitoring Scale may empirically
work to predict phenomena related to expressive control and impression management because it taps this general factor, a claim bolstered by the demonstration that the full Self-Monitoring Scale outperformed any of its factorial subscales in a large number of data sets (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986).

Moreover, and on the basis of these analyses, we proposed a shortened 18-item Self-Monitoring Scale that taps this general factor better than the original 25-item measure (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). In light of the clear multidimensionality of the self-monitoring items and the fact that the separate components may differentially relate to particular criterion variables, however, we too have recommended that researchers examine the separate subscales and their pattern of linkages to relevant phenomena, as well as their relations with the full scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986).

We should emphasize that our discussion of these measurement issues, as important as they are in their own right, occurred in the context of, and was explicitly directed to, addressing fundamental matters concerning the validity of the self-monitoring construct itself. Surely, for any personality construct, there can be no conceptual issue more foundational than the question concerning the very existence of the individual differences it purports to capture—in the terms of Loevinger's (1957) classic paper, the intrinsic validity of the construct. So it is for the self-monitoring construct.

Is Self-Monitoring Really Something Else?

Our articles, it soon became apparent, were hardly the last words on the nature of self-monitoring, either on matters of assessment or on matters of validity. To the contrary, they quickly sparked a new round of spirited but critical commentary (Briggs & Cheek, 1988; Hoyle & Lennox, 1991; Lennox, 1988; Miller & Thayer, 1989). Some investigators challenged our claim that two latent classes or quasi-classes underlie the Self-Monitoring Scale (Miller & Thayer, 1989); we have addressed their challenges elsewhere and found them wanting on theoretical and empirical grounds (Gangestad & Snyder, 1991; see also Kilduff, 1992). Other researchers offered further factor analytic studies as challenges to our claim about a general self-monitoring factor (see, e.g., Finch & West, 1997; Hoyle & Lennox, 1991; Lennox, 1988), but no factor analytic model in the published literature has fairly tested with appropriate confirmatory analyses our claims about a general factor that aggregates in the Self-Monitoring Scale. That model should specify not only a general factor but also group factors corresponding to the three self-monitoring subscales.

In perhaps the most concerted and systematic of the responses, Briggs and Cheek (1988) addressed our claims in two ways. First, they argued that, like the original measure, the multifactorial nature of the items of the revised Self-Monitoring Scale means that it too confounds multiple factors (a Public Performing factor and an Other-Directedness factor). Second, although acknowledging that the revised Self-Monitoring Scale taps a general factor better than does the original measure, Briggs and Cheek asserted that this psychometrically strengthened self-monitoring measure had weakened links to core aspects of self-monitoring and correspondingly strengthened links to individual differences best described by other constructs. Specifically, they argued that the general factor tapped by the revised Self-Monitoring Scale is best interpreted not in terms of expressive control and propensities to create public appearances but instead in terms of the familiar temperamental traits of extraversion, social surgency, exhibitionism, and social self-confidence. They further suggested that the studies that support the meaningfulness of this general factor may do so because they concern aspects of interpersonal behavior (such as friendships and relationships) that have more to do with extraversion and social surgency than with expressive control and image management. Our psychometric line of reasoning, they claimed, did not turn up the true self-monitoring construct; rather, they asserted, our arguments served only to confuse matters by misidentifying extraversion as self-monitoring.

The self-monitoring as extraversion hypothesis is, we readily acknowledge, a highly appealing one. It is a hypothesis with a history almost as long as self-monitoring's (for early attempts to discriminate measures of self-monitoring and extraversion, see Lippa, 1976, 1978; Snyder, 1974; Snyder & Monson, 1975). Moreover, the self-monitoring as extraversion hypothesis is one very much in keeping with the zeitgeist reflected in current concerns with the Big Five superfactors of personality (Costa & McCrae, 1988; Digman & Inouye, 1986; Digman & Takemoto-Chock, 1981; Goldberg, 1990; John, 1990; McCrae & Costa, 1987; Norman, 1963; Tuples & Christal, 1961; Wiggins & Trapnell, in press). Extraversion is, of course, a prominent member of the Big Five, and any identification of self-monitoring with extraversion would readily place the widely researched self-monitoring measure within the structural context provided by the Big Five. The self-monitoring as extraversion hypothesis, then, not only argues against the existence of self-monitoring as conceptualized but also supplies a ready alternative account for much of the self-monitoring literature.

Recently, John, Cheek, and Klohnen (1996) reported evidence purported to be consistent with the claim that the revised Self-Monitoring Scale really measures extraversion. To test this claim, they devised a second, independent, operational definition of the self-monitoring construct: observer ratings on an expert-defined, self-monitoring prototype for the California Adult Q-Set (CAQ; Block, 1978), the expert being Mark Snyder. These observer-ratings covaried with a measure of extraversion or social surgency (the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire Social Potency Scale; Tellegen, 1982) more highly than with the 18-item Self-Monitoring Scale itself, findings that John et al. claimed "raise serious questions about the uniqueness of the construct measured" by the revised Self-Monitoring Scale (p. 772).

The Missing Evidence: The Literature

The years of debate and controversy, the rounds of point and counterpoint, converge on two major questions concerning the foundations of self-monitoring:

First, do the many and varied phenomena that have been related to the Self-Monitoring Scale over the past several decades of research constitute a single, coherent constellation of behavioral and interpersonal propensities, an outcome congruent with the view of self-monitoring as a unitary psychological construct? Or do these diverse phenomena fractionate into subsets, each of which taps several distinct individual differences, as a multidimensional view of the self-monitoring construct would hold?
Second, if phenomena related to the Self-Monitoring Scale generally do cohere and define a psychologically meaningful set of individual differences, can these differences be meaningfully traced to the conceptual roots of self-monitoring—concern with public appearances and the management of social images? Or are they best interpreted as having more to do with such familiar building blocks of personality and social behavior as extraversion and surgency?

Although these questions ask for outright yes or no answers, the truth of the matters addressed by them may very well lie somewhere in between. Diverse self-monitoring phenomena may largely, but not exclusively, reflect the same underlying psychological propensities. Moreover, these propensities may have to do with some, but not all, of the conceptual roots of self-monitoring and may generally, but not exclusively, relate to a dimension having more to do with these conceptual roots than with extraversion or surgency. The ways in which categorical yes or no answers must be qualified are of theoretical importance, for they may trace the outlines of a conceptual framework within which self-monitoring phenomena ought to be understood and pursued in further work.

We suggest that resolution of conflicting answers to fundamental questions about the existence and nature of self-monitoring as a psychological construct has yet to occur because these fundamental questions have yet to be addressed in a truly informative fashion. Despite the many pages of rhetoric that have been devoted to the controversy and confusion surrounding self-monitoring, the most relevant source of evidence has yet to be adequately consulted. That source of evidence is, quite simply, the self-monitoring literature itself. Clearly, there has been a wealth of psychometric analyses of the internal structure of responses to the items of the Self-Monitoring Scale. These internal structural analyses have been informative. Yet comparatively little scrutiny has been directed at the abundance of data concerning the Self-Monitoring Scale's relations with external criterion variables. These data are provided by the extensive self-monitoring literature. The task of systematically reviewing the self-monitoring literature and assessing self-monitoring's relations with external criteria in a way that can address foundational questions concerning self-monitoring remains undone.

Just how is a systematic examination of the empirical literature on self-monitoring and its external relations to be conducted? To perform such an appraisal, we used a novel, quantitative approach to organizing a body of literature and assessing its implications for understanding a psychological construct. This quantitative strategy builds on the known internal dimensional structure of a measuring device and uses that structure as a framework for systematically organizing and appraising the empirical literature on that measure's relations with external criterion variables. This strategy is particularly well suited for self-monitoring research, which uses a measuring instrument whose internal structure is well known and widely agreed on and which has generated a sizable literature on empirical relations with external criteria.

In the sections that follow, we first outline the rationale and procedures used in our quantitative review of the self-monitoring literature. Next, we examine the answers provided by this appraisal of the literature for resolving fundamental issues concerning the self-monitoring construct. We then consider the implications of this review for defining the agenda for the evolution of theory and research on self-monitoring. Finally, we delimit the domain of applicability of our approach by comparing and contrasting it with other quantitative and nonquantitative approaches for reviewing literatures on psychological constructs and their relations to individual and social phenomena.

The Self-Monitoring Structural Framework

The framework within which we examined the nature of self-monitoring is that provided by the well-documented internal structure of the items of the Self-Monitoring Scale, that is, the familiar self-monitoring factor space. Through quantitative methods, we placed external criterion variables with which the Self-Monitoring Scale has been related within this familiar space and, on the basis of this quantitative appraisal of the self-monitoring literature, attempted to address the conceptual issues concerning self-monitoring that we have laid forth.

Self-Monitoring Within Its Own Structural Framework

In light of the general agreement that the revised 18-item measure is similar but psychometrically superior to the original 25-item measure (Briggs & Cheek, 1988; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986), we focused on its structure as the basis for the structural framework for our examination of the self-monitoring literature. Two factor analyses of this measure using large samples of respondents (together containing about 5,000 participants) have produced nearly identical two-factor structures (Briggs & Cheek, 1988; Gangestad & Snyder, 1985). Briggs and Cheek's (1988) rotated Factor 1, labeled Public Performing, is nearly identical to the first unrotated factor reported by Gangestad and Snyder (1985; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986); Tucker's (1951) coefficient of factor congruence is .98. Briggs and Cheek's Factor 2, labeled Other-Directedness, is almost identical to Gangestad and Snyder's second unrotated factor; here, the coefficient of factor congruence is also .98. The two-dimensional structure of the 18-item Self-Monitoring Scale is graphically illustrated in Figure 1, in which each of the 18 items is placed in the two-factor space on the basis of factor loadings reported by Briggs and Cheek (1988). As can be seen, most items load positively on Factor 1. Some items load positively on Factor 2 (largely, Other-Directedness items), whereas others load negatively (largely, Extraversion items).

Because the systematic, reliable variance of the Self-Monitoring Scale ought to be captured by Factors 1 and 2, the Self-Monitoring Scale itself can be placed within the two-factor space. The axis defined by this placement represents the dimension that the Self-Monitoring Scale itself taps. That is, that dimension accounts for nearly all of the Self-Monitoring Scale's systematic variance.

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1 One should not be misled into thinking that, because the self-monitoring item covariation reflects more than a single source of variance, the full measure cannot tap a single source of variation. Factors that account for item covariation can cancel or wash out in a full scale (Cronbach, 1951). Indeed, if two factors underlie all of the self-monitoring item covariation, then there must exist some axis within the factor space that mathematically accounts for all of the Self-Monitoring Scale's reliable variance. That axis is the one that goes through the Self-Monitoring Scale placed in its own factor space. Although the two-factor structure may not account for all of the self-monitoring item covariation (see Miller & Thayer, 1989), it accounts for the bulk of it and hence captures most of the systematic, reliable variance.
Let us see, then, where the Self-Monitoring Scale lands in the two-factor space. Cronbach (1951) showed that the variance within a sum of items attributable to a common factor is equal to the squared sum of the products of items’ factor loadings and standard deviations. In the case of the Self-Monitoring Scale, two common factors account for variance. In addition, each item’s unique variance (estimated as one minus the sum of the item’s squared loadings on the factors) accounts for variance in the total measure. The total variance in the measure, then, is the sum of three components: variance attributable to Factor 1, variance attributable to Factor 2, and item-specific variance. Taking the square roots of the proportions of variance attributable to a factor gives the estimated correlation between a measure and the factor.

On the basis of these procedures and the factor loadings reported by Briggs and Cheek (1988), we estimated the correlations of the Self-Monitoring Scale with Factor 1 and Factor 2 (see Gangestad & Snyder, 1991). On the basis of these correlations (.84 and .15, respectively), we placed the Self-Monitoring Scale in the two-factor space as illustrated in Figure 2. As can be seen, the dimension that goes directly through the Self-Monitoring Scale is close to Factor 1. Indeed, the Self-Monitoring Scale owes 70% of its variance (i.e., nearly all of its reliable variance) to Factor 1. It owes just 2% to Factor 2. Given that the axis that goes directly through the Self-Monitoring Scale accounts for essentially all of its reliable variance, we refer to that axis as the Self-Monitoring axis. 2

Briggs and Cheek (1988) claimed that the Self-Monitoring Scale taps both Factor 1 and Factor 2. Their claim was based on the fact that the two factors account for similar percentages of item variance. Item variance attributable to Factor 2, however, largely cancels out in the full measure because, with items keyed as they are for computing self-monitoring scores, some items load positively on the factor, and some load negatively (i.e., the sum of the Factor 2 loadings is fairly small; Cronbach, 1951). (Naturally, one could key items differently to measure this factor, but that would result in a measure very different from the Self-Monitoring Scale.)

The Self-Monitoring Subscales in the Structural Framework

Just as the total Self-Monitoring Scale can be located in the two-factor space, the self-monitoring subscales (Acting, Extraversion, and Other-Directedness) can be placed in the space using the psychometric procedures (see Figure 2). All three subscales load on Factor 1. Other-Directedness and Extraversion load on Factor 2 but with opposite variances. The axis that goes through the Extraversion subscale is rotated 44° from the Self-Monitoring axis toward the negative pole of Factor 2. The original Other-Directedness subscale is rotated 64° from it toward Factor 2’s positive pole; the subset of Other-Directedness items remaining in the 18-item set is rotated 54° toward Factor 2. The Acting subscale best mirrors the total Self-Monitoring Scale, being displaced a mere 3° from the Self-Monitoring axis. (The correlation between two factors is the cosine of the angle of displacement between them expressed in degrees. Hence, a 60° displacement corresponds to a correlation of .50, a 30° displacement to a correlation of .87, a 10° displacement to a correlation of .98, and a 5° displacement to a correlation of over .99.)

2 We assumed here that all items have equal variance. Briggs and Cheek (1988) used 6-point response scales, and we do not know the item variances using those scales. Variances using true-false response scales are generally similar (all are between .16 and .25; Snyder, 1974). Taking the slight variation in item variances into account makes negligible difference to the results. The original 25-item Self-Monitoring Scale lies on an axis displaced from the axis defined by the 18-item Self-Monitoring Scale 18° toward the Other-Directedness factor and away from the Public Performing factor (see also Briggs & Cheek, 1988). Although these measures tap somewhat different individual differences, the axes they define share 90% of their variance. One might wonder what the consequences are if self-monitoring is, in fact, taxonic rather than dimensional in nature (Gangestad & Snyder, 1985). As discussed by Waller and Mebhi (1998), factors may be either taxonic or dimensional in nature. Indeed, Thurstone (1947) originally thought the factors that represented primary mental abilities might be taxonic rather than dimensional. (See Waller & Mebhi, 1998, for further discussion and examples of taxonic variables expressed as factors.) The results of our review do not directly speak to whether self-monitoring is taxonic or dimensional in nature.
Figure 2. The Self-Monitoring Scale and the Acting, Extraversion, and Other-Directedness subscales represented in the self-monitoring factor space. O-D = Other-Directedness; PP = Public Performing; S-M = Self-Monitoring.

We refer to the axes defined by the Extraversion and Other-Directedness subscales as the Extraversion and Other-Directedness axes, respectively. Because the axis defined by the Acting subscale is nearly identical to the Self-Monitoring axis, we do not give it independent identity.

Placing External Criterion Measures Within the Structural Framework: A Quantitative Review of the Self-Monitoring Literature

Let us now imagine that we could place self-monitoring phenomena (as represented by independent external criterion measures reported in studies using the Self-Monitoring Scale) within the two-factor space. Where would they fall? What dimension within the factor space would the ability to control expressive behavior directly tap? Where would the ability to decode nonverbal displays lie? Consistency between private belief and public performance? Variation of performance across different contexts, roles, or audiences? Behavioral sensitivity to others' expectations? Commitment to friends and relationship partners? Would these external criterion measures tap different dimensions—some, perhaps, loading on the Extraversion axis, others on the Other-Directedness axis? Or would they tap the same dimension in the factor space? If they did tap the same dimension, would it be the Self-Monitoring axis? Or would it be some other dimension, such as the Extraversion axis?

Answers to these questions directly address fundamental issues concerning self-monitoring. If self-monitoring phenomena of all varieties (as represented by external criterion measures of all varieties) cluster in the same region of the structural framework, then all varieties of self-monitoring phenomena define a coherent, unitary, covarying cluster of behavioral and interpersonal tendencies. If that region is the Self-Monitoring axis, then this coherent, unitary cluster of behavioral and interpersonal tendencies is the self-monitoring construct. Alternatively, if self-monitoring phenomena (and external criterion measures) tend not to cluster in a single region of the structural framework, then these phenomena do not define a coherent, unitary, covarying set of behavioral and interpersonal tendencies.

In fact, we need not merely wonder about answers to these questions. The literature contains many studies relevant to the validity of the Self-Monitoring Scale. Many studies have reported relations between criterion variables and the three self-monitoring subscales in addition to the full measure. One can use any external criterion measure's correlations with the three subscales to estimate its loadings on Factors 1 and 2 and hence its location within the two-factor space. Let us first consider the general rationale of the quantitative procedures that allow one to do so.

The Rationale of the Procedures

The self-monitoring factor space should account for systematic (common) variance contained within the self-monitoring items, including the collections of items represented by the self-monitoring subscales. If it did not do so, Briggs and Cheek (1988) would have extracted more than two factors in their analyses of the
An Example of How the Procedures Work

Consider an example of how these procedures work. Briggs and Cheek (1986) reported correlations of the self-monitoring subscales with three clear measures of extraversion and social surgency: Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Extraversion (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975), Personality Research Form (PRF) Dominance (Jackson, 1974), and PRF Exhibition (Jackson, 1974). We entered these values into the formulae derived to estimate variables’ relations to Factor 1 and Factor 2. All three measures are estimated to correlate positively with Factor 1 and negatively with Factor 2 (see Figure 3). The axes that the measures define are thus rotated away from Factor 1 toward Factor 2. Indeed, the average of the axes lies only 1° from the axis defined by the Extraversion subscale. This finding should not be at all surprising, for the Extraversion measure does possess content very similar to that of social surgency measures. Hence, our procedures in this illustrative example yield results that are highly reasonable.

The Sample of Studies

The Self-Monitoring Bibliography (Snyder, 1999) lists over 200 empirical journal articles published since 1981, the year following the appearance of Briggs et al.’s (1980) factor analysis. About half appeared in leading journals in personality and social psychology (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Journal of Personality, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin). The remainder appeared in more specialized journals (e.g., Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, Journal of Applied Social Psychology) or in journals of fields related to personality and social psychology (e.g., Communications Monographs, Journal of Personal Selling and Sales Management). In addition, a number of studies on self-monitoring on the bibliography remain unpublished. Also, a large number of dissertations have used the Self-Monitoring Scale over the years (largely as a measure of secondary interest). We examined all of these sources for studies to include in our review.

Not all studies, however, qualified for our review. Studies had to fulfill several requirements for inclusion. Specifically, they must have reported (a) quantitative data on self-monitoring subscale scores; (b) research relating behavioral, behavioroid, or performance measures to the Self-Monitoring Scale (self- or observer-ratings of other personality constructs were excluded); and (c) relations relevant to self-monitoring theory. A total of 41 criterion measures fulfilled these requirements.

Most of the external criterion variables measured in these studies could be sorted into nine conceptually based categories:

1. Expressive control: the ability to feign emotional displays outside of contexts that normally elicit those displays (Riggio &

Related techniques for estimating the loadings of variables in a factor matrix are discussed by Dwyer (1937; see also Gorsuch, 1983). Of course, our procedures yield estimated correlations, not precise population or sample-specific values. Such values require no sampling variability of correlations, an impossibility. Nonetheless, if the factor structure is reasonably consistent across the populations to which the procedures are applied, they should provide reasonably valid estimates.

The appropriate formulae are somewhat different when the Other-Directedness subscale includes only those items retained on the 18-item Self-Monitoring Scale (all Acting and Extraversion subscale items were retained on the revised measure): $f'_{x1} = 0.80 \times r_x.ACT + 0.46 \times r_x.EXT + 0.19 \times r_x.OD$, and $f'_{x2} = 0.32 \times r_x.ACT - 0.83 \times r_x.EXT + 0.90 \times r_x.OD$.

Most studies did not meet our criteria simply because quantitative data on the factors were not reported. A number of articles reported correlations between the Self-Monitoring Scale and other personality measures (see, e.g., Briggs & Cheek, 1986, 1988; Briggs et al., 1980; Daly, Vangelisti, &
Figure 3. Personality Research Form (PRF) Exhibition, PRF Dominance, and Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) Extraversion represented within the self-monitoring factor space. O-D = Other-Directedness; PP = Public Performing.
(8) Attention and responsivity to others, including the extent to which one's own behavior is responsive to others' behavior (Miedl & LeVoi, 1985), the accuracy of inferring the content of others' thoughts after interacting with them (Ickes, Stinson, Bissonette, & Garcia, 1990), and making decisions similar to those of friends (Kilduff, 1992); compared with low self-monitors, high self-monitors are expected to attend to others' behavior as a source of information about what is situational appropriate and hence should make more accurate inferences about the thoughts of others after interacting with them; and

(9) Peer–self trait rating discrepancy (Cheek, 1982; Wymer & Penner, 1985).

Criterion measures in several studies could not be sorted into one of these groups: Douglas (1984), Kilduff (1992, measure of reasons for making choices), Snyder and Cantor (1980), Snyder and Gangestad (1982, 2 studies), Tobey and Tunnell (1981); correspondence of ratings made by self and peers should be lower for high self-monitors than low self-monitors.

It should be emphasized that, although the criterion variables in these studies are not the full literature on self-monitoring, they are the only ones that can address the fundamental issues concerning self-monitoring. We excluded no studies that met the criteria for inclusion in our review. Furthermore, the criterion variables in these studies span a remarkably broad range of phenomena central to traditional and recent themes of theory and research on self-monitoring. The set of studies included in our quantitative review, therefore, would appear to constitute a reasonably representative sample of the larger self-monitoring literature. To the extent that they are not representative, it is partly because they nonrepresentatively reflect the mainstream literature in social and personality psychology and hence perhaps concern phenomena of mainstream interest within these fields. Whereas about half of the published empirical literature can be found in the leading mainstream journals (Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Journal of Personality, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin), 90% of the studies we could include appeared in these journals. Appendix A briefly describes all criterion variables included in our appraisal of the literature.

Quantification

Placement of studies' criterion variables within the self-monitoring factor space required quantified relations of the variables with the self-monitoring subscales. Whereas some articles published correlations between the self-monitoring subscales and criterion variables, others presented test statistics relating to differences between high and low scorers on each subscale. In these cases, we used the test statistics in conjunction with sample sizes to estimate the point-biserial correlations of the subscales with the criterion variable or eta, a measure of association comparable to r (Hays, 1990).

On the basis of these statistics and the triangulation procedures that we have described, we placed each study's criterion variable in the self-monitoring factor space (see Table 1).² (Placements were always computed so that, if a variable covaried with the self-monitoring axis as expected, it would load positively on that factor.) To systematically characterize the placements, we performed several analyses.

Averaged Placement

First, we computed the average placement of all criterion variables. On average, variables loaded .30 on the Self-Monitoring axis and .03 on the axis orthogonal to the Self-Monitoring axis. Because they covary with the Self-Monitoring axis, the Extraversion and Other-Directedness axes were also marked by criterion variables (average loadings = .19 and .16, respectively).

A total of 23 criterion variables loaded at least .30 on their own self-identified axes. On average, these variables loaded .45 on the Self-Monitoring axis, .30 on the Extraversion axis, and .23 on the Other-Directedness axis. Their mean loading on the axis orthogonal to the Self-Monitoring axis was .03. The axis defined by the average is thus displaced just 4° from the Self-Monitoring axis.

Averaged Placement Within Conceptually Defined Categories

Next, we computed average placements of variables within conceptually defined categories. Within each category, we averaged the loadings of all criterion variables on Factor 1 and Factor 2 and placed this average measure within the two-factor space. As seen in Figure 4, the mean criterion variable in seven of the nine categories is in one region of the factor space close to the Self-Monitoring axis. For these seven categories, the average absolute disparity between the axis defined by the mean criterion variable and the Self-Monitoring axis was 12°. By contrast, the average disparities between the criteria-defined axis and the Extraversion and Other-Directedness axes were 47° and 61°, respectively. The criterion variables in one of the two remaining categories (peer–self trait rating agreement) simply did not relate strongly to any

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² The Ickes et al. (1990) study of empathic accuracy could have been placed in the category of nonverbal decoding skills instead. We included it in the category of attention to and responsiveness to others because participants were not instructed to attend to what their partner was thinking during the interaction. Hence, whether they attended to their partner’s thoughts and feelings during the interaction was probably partly based on their motivation to do so rather than simply on their skill in decoding nonverbal cues. Because this criterion variable landed in the self-monitoring space between the two clusters it could have been assigned to, placing it in the other category would make no difference to our overall conclusion.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subscale effects</th>
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<tr>
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<td>ACT</td>
<td>EXT</td>
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**Expressive control**

- Riggio & Friedman (1982)
  - Emotional sending
    - B&C factor: .24 .11 .00
    - Subscale effects: \( \beta \) = .24 .11
    - Loadings: ACT = .24, EXT = .11, O-D = .00
  - Deception
    - B&C factor: -.13 -.12 .19
    - Subscale effects: \( \beta \) = -.13 .19
    - Loadings: ACT = -.13, EXT = .19, O-D = .19

- Siegman & Reynolds (1983)
  - Study 1: \( \beta \) = .57 .21 .09
  - Study 2: \( \beta \) = .41 .52 .03

- Riggio, Widaman, & Friedman (1985)
  - \( \beta \) = .26 .22 .08

**Nonverbal decoding skills**

- Riggio & Friedman (1982)
  - B&C factor: -.13 .12 .18
  - Subscale effects: \( \beta \) = -.13 .12
  - Loadings: ACT = -.13, EXT = .12, O-D = .18

- Mill (1984)
  - B&C factor: .56 .40 .08
  - Subscale effects: \( \beta \) = .56 .40
  - Loadings: ACT = .56, EXT = .40, O-D = .08

- Funder & Harris (1986)
  - B&C factor: .34 .35 .53
  - Subscale effects: \( \beta \) = .34 .35
  - Loadings: ACT = .34, EXT = .35, O-D = .53

- Costanzo & Archer (1989)
  - B&C factor: .28 .32 .12
  - Subscale effects: \( \beta \) = .28 .32
  - Loadings: ACT = .28, EXT = .32, O-D = .12

**Attitude-behavior relations, attitude accessibility, and attitude change**

- Snyder & Kendzierski (1982)
  - B&C factor: .26 .32 .28
  - Subscale effects: \( \beta \) = .26 .32
  - Loadings: ACT = .26, EXT = .32, O-D = .28

- Wymer & Penner (1985)
  - B&C factor: .03 .19 .20
  - Subscale effects: \( \beta \) = .03 .19
  - Loadings: ACT = .03, EXT = .19, O-D = .20

- Lasseter, Stone, & Weigold (1987)
  - B&C factor: .38 .35 .19
  - Subscale effects: \( \beta \) = .38 .35
  - Loadings: ACT = .38, EXT = .35, O-D = .19

- Graziano & Bryant (1998)
  - B&C factor: .13 .10 .14
  - Subscale effects: \( \beta \) = .13 .10
  - Loadings: ACT = .13, EXT = .10, O-D = .14

- Bearden & McDonald (1990)
  - B&C factor: .28 .22 .19
  - Subscale effects: \( \beta \) = .28 .22
  - Loadings: ACT = .28, EXT = .22, O-D = .19

**Behavioral sensitivity to others’ expectations or external cues**

- Harris & Rosenthal (1986)
  - B&C factor: .24 .33 .53
  - Subscale effects: \( \beta \) = .24 .33
  - Loadings: ACT = .24, EXT = .33, O-D = .53

- Lasseter, Stone, & Weigold (1987)
  - B&C factor: .38 .35 .19
  - Subscale effects: \( \beta \) = .38 .35
  - Loadings: ACT = .38, EXT = .35, O-D = .19

- Lavine & Snyder (1996)
  - B&C factor: .25 .13 .20
  - Subscale effects: \( \beta \) = .25 .13
  - Loadings: ACT = .25, EXT = .13, O-D = .20

**Behavioral variability**

- Snyder, Gangestad, & Simpson (1983)
  - Study 1: \( \beta \) = .65 .27 .51
  - Study 2: \( \beta \) = .24 .06 .12

- Snyder & Simpson (1984)
  - Study 1: \( \beta \) = .71 .53 .58
  - Study 2: \( \beta \) = .33 .51 .28
  - Study 3: \( \beta \) = .20 .21 .13
  - Study 4: \( \beta \) = .10 .10 .03

- Snyder, Simpson, & Gangestad (1986)
  - Study 1: \( \beta \) = .37 .24 .23
  - Study 2: \( \beta \) = .23 .32 .45

**Being impressed by physical attractiveness**

- Snyder, Berscheid, & Glick (1985)
  - Study 1: \( \beta \) = .23 .32 .45
  - Study 2: \( \beta \) = .13 .58 .35

- Snyder, Berscheid, & Matwychuk (1988)
  - Study 1: \( \beta \) = .19 .27 .41
  - Study 2: \( \beta \) = .12 .26 .52

- Miel & LeVoi (1985)
  - \( \beta \) = -.20 -.06 .29

- Joles, Stinson, Bissonette, & Garcia (1990)
  - \( \beta \) = .09 .00 .31

- Kilduff (1992)
  - \( \beta \) = .00 .14 .04

**Peer-self trait rating discrepancy**

- Cheek (1982)
  - \( \beta \) = -.10 .10 -.13

- Wymer & Penner (1985)
  - \( \beta \) = -.20 .04 .02

**Other**

- Snyder & Cantor (1980)
  - \( \beta \) = .10 .01 .14

- Snyder & Gangestad (1982)
  - Study 1: \( \beta \) = .18 .21 .24
  - Study 2: \( \beta \) = .15 .18 .07

- Tobey & Tunnell (1981)
  - \( \beta \) = .25 -.01 -.03

- Douglas (1984)
  - \( \beta \) = .15 .14 .07

- Kilduff (1992)
  - \( \beta \) = .19 .06 .04

**Friend influence**

- \( \beta \) = .00 .14 .04

**Note.** Boldface indicates columns of greatest interest. ACT = Acting; EXT = Extraversion; O-D = Other-Directedness; B&C factors = Briggs and Cheek (1988) factors; F1 = Public Performing factor; F2 = Other-Directedness factor; SM = Self-Monitoring axis; SM-O = axis orthogonal to Self-Monitoring axis; PP = Public Performing.
factor. The variables in the other of these categories (attention and responsivity to others) tended to correlate with the axis orthogonal to the Self-Monitoring axis.

For each category, we also estimated the loadings of the averaged criterion variable and the Self-Monitoring, Extraversion, and Other-Directedness axes (see Table 2). For the seven categories in the same region of the factor space, criterion variables loaded on the Self-Monitoring axis an average of .38. By contrast, their mean loadings on the Extraversion and Other-Directedness axes were lower and nearly equal (.26 and .18, respectively). The mean loading on the axis orthogonal to the Self-Monitoring axis was just .02, such that the axis defined by the average is displaced just 3° from the Self-Monitoring axis.

**Individual Placements**

We also considered placements of criterion variables of each study. To do so, we identified the axis through each criterion measure loading at least .30 on its self-identified axis. We then calculated displacement (in degrees) of each axis from the Self-Monitoring, Extraversion, and Other-Directedness axes (see Table 1). Results revealed that 78% (18/23) correlated more highly with the Self-Monitoring axis than either the Extraversion or Other-Directedness axes; 13% (3/23) and 9% (2/23) loaded most highly on the Extraversion and Other-Directedness axes, respectively. Of variables belonging to the seven categories placed within the same region of the factor space, 81% (17/21) correlated most highly with the Self-Monitoring axis. The average absolute disparity of the axes defined by these variables from the Self-Monitoring axis was 17°. By contrast, the average disparity between variable-defined axes and either Extraversion or Other-Directedness, whichever was closest, was 36°.

Within the seven categories of variables generally related to the Self-Monitoring axis, 70% (21/30) correlated with the axis .30 or higher. Several variables loading less than .30 (Baize & Tetlock, 1985; Snyder et al., 1983; Snyder & Simpson, 1984; Wymer & Penner, 1985) were interaction effects (e.g., moderating effects of self-monitoring on attitude–behavior relations). Meaningful interaction effects may account for only a few percent of the variance in a criterion measure, and it should thus not be surprising that these variables have small effect sizes (see, e.g., Tellegen, Kamp, & Watson, 1982).  

Several studies not included in our review (Snyder & Simpson, 1984; Wymer & Penner, 1985) were interaction effects (e.g., moderating effects of self-monitoring on attitude–behavior relations). Meaningful interaction effects may account for only a few percent of the variance in a criterion measure, and it should thus not be surprising that these variables have small effect sizes (see, e.g., Tellegen, Kamp, & Watson, 1982).  

![Figure 4](image-url)

**Figure 4.** Self-monitoring criterion variables represented within the self-monitoring factor space. Each point represents the average criterion variable within a conceptually defined category. The criterion-defined axis is defined by the average of the axes going through the seven categories falling along the self-monitoring axis. 1 = expressive control; 2 = nonverbal decoding skills; 3 = attitude–behavior relations, attitude accessibility, and persuasion; 4 = behavioral sensitivity to others’ expectations or external cues; 5 = behavioral variability; 6 = interpersonal orientations; 7 = being impressed with physical attractiveness; 8 = attention and responsiveness to others; 9 = peer–self trait rating discrepancy; EXT = Extraversion; O-D = Other-Directedness; PP = Public Performing; SM-O = orthogonal to Self-Monitoring axis.)
There is no issue more fundamental to the self-monitoring construct than whether or not it captures a real, unitary set of phenomena. Earlier in this article, we posed two questions that capture the recurring themes of a controversy concerning this fundamental issue, questions that could be answered with a systematic, quantitative review of the literature on self-monitoring’s relations with external criterion variables. That review having been conducted, we can now return to the questions that served as its springboard.

First, do self-monitoring phenomena, as tapped by criterion measures used by researchers, generally mark a unitary dimension? The answer to this question is yes, although a highly qualified yes. External criterion measures representing diverse phenomena theoretically and empirically linked to expressive control all cluster in a single region within the self-monitoring factor space. Of nine conceptually based categories of criterion measures, seven could be placed in this region. Nonetheless, there were two clear exceptions: peer-self trait discrepancy and responsiveness to others. Any interpretation of self-monitoring must be sensitive to these important exceptions, and shortly we will consider their implications for understanding the nature of self-monitoring.

Second, is the single dimension that external criterion variables generally mark most directly tapped by the Self-Monitoring Scale, or is it a dimension better tapped by measures of Extraversion, Social Surgency, or Other-Directedness? In this case, the findings are unequivocal: The dimension defined by the bulk of the external criterion measures is the dimension tapped by the Self-Monitoring Scale. Measures of Extraversion, Social Surgency, or Other-Directedness generally relate to these self-monitoring criterion measures only to the extent that they share variance with the self-monitoring dimension. Other-Directedness relates more highly than the Self-Monitoring axis, however, to variables within one conceptually defined category: attention and responsivity to others.

What, then, are the implications of the answers to these critical questions provided by the quantitative examination of the self-monitoring literature? First of all, we are now better able to understand the multidimensionality of the Self-Monitoring Scale. Inarguably, the 18 items of the Self-Monitoring Scale are multifactorial; a single underlying dimension simply cannot account for the intercorrelations of these items. Also inarguably, the Self-Monitoring Scale itself does measure a single, mathematically defined dimension within the factor space, a dimension represented by the axis that runs directly through the Self-Monitoring Scale’s placement within the factor space. The real question of concern about the Self-Monitoring Scale, then, is not whether it can measure a single dimension—it clearly can do that—but rather, whether the dimension it taps is a conceptually meaningful one and whether that conceptually meaningful dimension is self-monitoring.

To address the issues in the Self-Monitoring Controversy

In the latter two, Holyoak and Gordon (1983) found no association between the full scale and tendency to use the self as a reference point in making similarity judgments; subscale effects were inconsistent. In a conceptual replication of Harris and Rosenthal (1986), Harris (1989) found no expectancy bias effect for the full scale or any subscales. The results of these studies generally mirror those included in our review, the one exception being Harris’s. We also estimated axis loadings of criterion variables in studies not directly relevant to self-monitoring theory (see Footnote 4). All results are available from us.

Addressing the Issues in the Self-Monitoring Controversy

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<td>SM</td>
<td>SM-O</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expressive control</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>-.06</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nonverbal decoding skills</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>-.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitude-relevance</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sensitivity to expectations</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavioral variability</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>-.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal orientation</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impressed by physical attractiveness</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention to others’ behavior</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peer-self trait discrepancy</td>
<td>-.12</td>
<td>-.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. Positive displacements are degrees variable as displaced from axis in counterclockwise direction in Figure 2. Negative displacements are degrees variable as displaced from axis in clockwise direction. Boldface indicates columns of greatest interest. SM = Self-Monitoring axis; SM-O = axis orthogonal to Self-Monitoring axis; EXT = Extraversion axis; O-D = Other-Directedness axis.
individuals dealing with their social worlds. This review of the literature shows that self-monitoring phenomena, as reflected by external criterion measures, do define the dimension tapped by the Self-Monitoring Scale as a simple-structure dimension.

Moreover, not only does this review of the literature demonstrate that the dimension measured by the Self-Monitoring Scale is a conceptually meaningful one, it also speaks clearly against an alternate interpretation of that dimension. This examination of the literature simply does not support claims that self-monitoring criterion variables merely reflect extraversion or social surgency. To be sure, an extraversion dimension emerges within the self-monitoring factor space, yet that dimension is distinct from the one defined by self-monitoring criterion variables. Indeed, not a single conceptually defined group of variables correlated more positively with the Extraversion axis than with the Self-Monitoring axis. Of course, this is not to say that self-monitoring is independent of extraversion. Because the Self-Monitoring and Extraversion axes correlate substantially, one must expect measures of self-monitoring to covary with the Extraversion axis and vice versa. However, measures of self-monitoring should not (and, in the studies we reviewed, generally do not) covary strongly with extraversion once their associations with the Self-Monitoring axis have been partialed out.

In reviewing the self-monitoring controversy, we discussed a study by John et al. (1996), who found no correlation between observer ratings of self-monitoring (as assessed on a Q sort) and the Self-Monitoring Scale once extraversion had been partialed out, rather than vice versa. These data appear to fly in the face of our review-based conclusions. This apparent contradiction must have an explanation, one likely to be found in two differences between validation studies of self-monitoring in the literature and John et al.’s study. One is sheer sample size. Whereas 86 individuals participated in John et al.’s study, over 3,600 jointly participated in the studies we reviewed. A second is that the criterion measures used in the studies differ.

The CAQ consists of 100 personality descriptors that John et al.’s (1996) observers (who had contacts with participants over several days) sorted into piles ranging from most to least characteristic according to a preset distribution. An individual’s self-monitoring prototype score is equivalent to a weighted sum of items (where weights are based on a prototype sort by an expert). For a CAQ measure of self-monitoring to possess both convergent and discriminant validity, CAQ statements should of course contain content relevant to core propositions of self-monitoring. In fact, only a handful do: “Aware of impression made on others,” “Is socially perceptive,” “Behaves in ethically consistent manner” (reversed), and “Does not vary roles” (reversed). As a result, many items not core to self-monitoring receive high weight in the measure, including several related to extraversion (Lanning, 1994), for example, “Is skilled in social techniques,” “Has social poise and presence,” and “Is introspective.”

A compounding problem is that items having to do with extraversion were assessed by John et al.’s (1996) observers more reliably and validly than items more central to self-monitoring. On average, the four items having to do with core aspects of self-monitoring had interrater reliabilities of .17; two reliabilities were 0, and one was only .09 (Jack Block, personal communication, October 31, 1991). By contrast, the three heavily weighted items having as much to do with extraversion as self-monitoring had a mean reliability of .62 (not surprisingly, as social potency can be validly assessed by observers even in minimal exposure paradigms; see, e.g., Watson, 1989). Naturally, items with very poor reliability cannot account for reliable and valid variance in the full measure.

Accordingly, perhaps John et al.’s (1996) apparently incongruous findings merely reflect inadequacies in the criterion measure rather than the failure of the Self-Monitoring Scale to measure a meaningful construct distinct from extraversion. To test this interpretation, we used each item’s correlation with the two subscales, Public Performing and Other-Directedness (provided by Oliver John, personal communication, December 17, 1991, and disattenuated for unreliability of the observer ratings), to place each of the 10 CAQ items most heavily weighted in the self-monitoring prototype score in the self-monitoring factor space. The three items having as much or more to do with extraversion as self-monitoring did load on the Self-Monitoring axis (on average, .31) and therefore possess convergent validity for assessing self-monitoring. The mean loading of the remaining items on the self-monitoring axis was similar, .32. Not surprisingly, however, items central to extraversion loaded even more highly on the Extraversion axis (on average, .44), displaced 46° away from the Self-Monitoring axis (and only 1° from the Extraversion axis). By contrast, the remaining items were, on average, displaced a mere 3° from the axis defined by the criterion measures in the self-monitoring literature. They possessed smaller and nearly equal loadings on the Extraversion and Other-Directedness axes (on average, .20 and .18, with mean displacements of 51° and 57°, respectively). It seems that, even in John et al.’s purportedly contradictory study, evidence points to a meaningful self-monitoring dimension distinct from extraversion.

Interpreting Self-Monitoring: Exclusionary and Inclusionary Messages of the Literature

The two critical questions concerning the self-monitoring construct and its measure having been asked and answered by the literature itself, it is now possible to move on to the next item on the agenda: a reappraisal of the self-monitoring construct and a refining of the interpretation of self-monitoring. In moving forward, we emphasize that to assert that the Self-Monitoring axis is a conceptually meaningful one (as the quantitative review of the literature indicates) does not automatically provide an interpretation of the axis. In Loewinger’s (1957) terms, intrinsic validity (the extent to which a dimension reflects some meaningful trait) is conceptually distinct from validity of the interpretation (the extent to which a specific theoretical account of the dimension is correct). It is now our task to allow our examination of the literature to begin to speak on behalf of such an interpretation.

Although most self-monitoring phenomena represented in the literature cluster around a Self-Monitoring axis, clear exceptions do exist. Accordingly, our analyses can permit progress on at least two fronts. First, our analyses, because they have indicated the lack of association between certain variables and the Self-Monitoring axis, can indicate features that ought not to receive prominent attention in any evolving interpretations of the self-monitoring construct. That is, they can narrow the field and tell us something about what self-monitoring is not. Second, our analyses, by indicating what domains most strongly mark the Self-Monitoring axis,
can point to the directions that further theorizing can and should take. That is, they can tell us what should be emphasized in the evolution of the self-monitoring construct and help to delineate what self-monitoring is. Thus, our analyses yield conclusions about both discriminant and convergent validity (Campbell & Fiske, 1959).

We begin with those domains where the examination of the literature indicated a lack of association with the Self-Monitoring axis. We begin with these exclusionary messages because they point to some propositions that simply do not warrant the prominent emphasis heretofore accorded them in theoretical formulations of self-monitoring. At least two such exclusionary messages command our attention, both of which concern (what have been thought to be) fundamental aspects of the construct.

**Exclusionary Message: Self-Monitoring and Impression Management**

The quantitative review of the self-monitoring literature also revealed that phenomena in the category of attention and responsiveness to others were not closely associated with the Self-Monitoring axis. Closely tracking and responding to others' behavior was a core feature within the original self-monitoring formulation. Indeed, the very term self-monitoring was coined to refer to regulating one's presentations of self on the basis of social and interpersonal cues to situational appropriateness, including the behavioral guidelines provided by other people (Snyder, 1974, 1979). Ironically, then, the Self-Monitoring axis simply may not measure propensities to "self-monitor" in the precise sense in which that term was defined in the original statements of self-monitoring theory. The exclusionary message is that claims that the forms of impression management associated with the Self-Monitoring axis involve close attention and responsiveness to other people should no longer be made.

Although not linked to the Self-Monitoring axis, the external criterion measures of attention and responsiveness to others were somewhat associated with the orthogonal axis. These associations contribute further to a narrowing of the field of the self-monitoring construct by indicating some forms of impression management that ought to be excluded from conceptualizations of self-monitoring. To interpret the orthogonal axis, we estimated relations between various self-report measures and the axes within the self-monitoring structural space (using data reported by Briggs and Cheek, 1986, 1988). These relations (see Table 3) indicate that high scorers on the axis orthogonal to the Self-Monitoring axis are socially anxious and restrained, are concerned about negative social evaluation, have low self-esteem, avoid the social spotlight, and seek to please and appease others.

Recently, various theorists (e.g., Baumeister, Tice, & Hutton, 1989; Trower & Gilbert, 1989; Trower, Gilbert, & Sherling, 1990) have argued that people who fail to effectively exert social influence adopt a defensive self-presentational mode of interacting with others. Central to this interactional mode is a repertoire of submissive appeasement gestures that assure others that their status is not being threatened. Those who adopt this mode also may be in a habitual state of threat-readiness in social interactions, may attend closely to others for signs that they should engage in appeasement behaviors, and may stay in the background in social situations. The correlates of the axis orthogonal to the Self-
Measures Loading Highly on the Axis Orthogonal to the Self-Monitoring Axis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Estimated SM factor loading</th>
<th>Estimated SM-O factor loading</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Texas Social Behavior Inventory</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>-.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheek and Buss Shyness Scale</td>
<td>-.41</td>
<td>.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eysenck Personality Inventory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neuroticism Scale</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personality Research Form Social Recognition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manifest Anxiety Scale</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janis-Field Self-Esteem</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>-.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosenberg Self-Esteem</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>-.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extraversion subscale</td>
<td>.56</td>
<td>-.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other-Directedness subscale</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. SM = Self-Monitoring axis; SM-O = axis orthogonal to the Self-Monitoring axis.

Monitoring axis suggest that this orthogonal dimension, and not the Self-Monitoring axis, reflects this defensive, socially ineffective interactive mode.

Moreover, this interpretation of the orthogonal axis suggests that the forms of self-presentation adopted by socially ineffective, defensive individuals (e.g., avoiding social rejection by being shy and passively remaining in the background; when engaged by others, displaying submissive appeasement gestures) should not be included in any emerging conceptualization of the self-monitoring construct. Indeed, although these defensive interpersonal tactics involve adapting to others, as does self-monitoring, this mode of adaptation presents a restrained, appeasing social self that, unlike that of the high self-monitor, may be relatively invariant across many social circumstances, relationships, and roles.

Inclusionary Message: Impression Management and Image Management

It is now time to turn to the inclusionary messages of our quantitative examination of the literature. Four categories of phenomena most strongly associated with the Self-Monitoring axis are particularly informative about what self-monitoring is. The first two of these categories (behavioral variability, sensitivity to expectations and other cues) clearly concern outcomes of active impression management processes that traditionally have been near and dear to self-monitoring theory. The latter two categories (interpersonal orientations, being impressed by physical attractiveness) have been the focus of relatively recent programs of self-monitoring research. The strong relations of studies in these categories with the Self-Monitoring axis indicate that the individual differences underlying the Self-Monitoring axis, and therefore the individual differences tapped by the Self-Monitoring Scale, reflect variation in predispositions to engage in certain forms of impression management. In a general sense, impression managers attempt to control information relevant to inferences about themselves that is available to others. The studies in these categories can best be characterized as concerning the active construction of public selves designed to achieve social ends, a process perhaps most appropriately referred to as image projection. That is, the specific form of impression management practiced by high self-monitors may involve attempts to control such inferences not merely by suppressing information about the self that could be construed by others in a negative way but rather by actively constructing and cultivating public identities (that is, by projecting images) that entitle favorable outcomes.

Three additional categories of criterion variables covaried with the Self-Monitoring axis notably, even if somewhat less impressively than the four with the strongest associations. Two of these categories (expressive control, nonverbal decoding skills) concern skills that effective image cultivation and projection can and must draw on, and the third category (attitude-behavioral relations, attitude accessibility) concerns the ways by which concern with social images on the one hand and with publicly presenting a true self on the other can influence the relation between private beliefs and public actions. One recent study is illustrative. Whereas high self-monitors are most effectively persuaded by appeals to how particular action or attitude may be the right ingredient in a social image, low self-monitors are more persuaded by appeals to how the action or attitude reflects their true underlying values (Lavine & Snyder, 1996).

Taken together, the criterion measures that mark the Self-Monitoring axis point to a clear conclusion. The Self-Monitoring axis reflects individual differences in the tendency to engage in, or to eschew, forms of impression management tactics that involve the construction of social appearances and cultivation of images. Whereas high self-monitors pragmatically accept (and perhaps even embrace) these appearances and images, low self-monitors may actively attempt to convey that they present no false images.

Setting the Agenda for Self-Monitoring: Theory, Research, and Assessment

As much as our quantitative appraisal of the self-monitoring literature, coupled with its inclusionary and exclusionary messages, has prompted a conceptual reappraisal of the self-monitoring construct, further theoretical analysis and empirical inquiry is needed to fully refine an interpretation of self-monitoring. Let us now turn to some of the directions that this quantitative examination of the literature on self-monitoring and its external criterion relations suggest for theoretical and empirical inquiry.

Clearly, one front on which self-monitoring theory and research must make progress is an articulation of the precise forms of impression management associated with self-monitoring. Of potential relevance to a further articulation of self-monitoring are two distinctions concerning self-presentation and impression management. The first distinction concerns assimilative versus accommodative styles of impression management (Barnes, 1976; Barnes & Ickes, 1979; Ickes et al., 1986). Assimilative impression managers seek to bring the behavioral reactions of other people in line with their own goals and expectations. By contrast, accommodative impression managers seek to bring their behaviors in line with the goals and expectations of other people. The assimilative impression manager bears obvious similarities to the person who seeks to
cultivate and create public images. A second relevant distinction concerns acquisitive versus self-protective self-presentation (Arkin, 1981; Arkin, Lake, & Baumgardner, 1986; Wolfe, Lennox, & Cutler, 1986), according to which people are thought to engage in self-presentational activities either to get what they want (acquisitive self-presentation) or to protect themselves from others making negative evaluations about them (self-protective self-presentation).

Each of these distinctions represents important advances in theorizing about impression management. Nonetheless, we suggest that neither distinction by itself is sufficient to provide an interpretation of the Self-Monitoring axis and its relations with external criterion variables in the self-monitoring literature. Hence, evolution in the domain of self-monitoring, although recognizing these distinctions, must move beyond them. The notion of assimilative impression management, although highlighting an important feature of the image management techniques of the high self-monitor, fails to specify the motives that appear to be highly related to the Self-Monitoring axis. Similarly, although the notion of acquisitive self-presentation captures the self-serving nature of image cultivation, it raises a question that it fails to answer directly: Just what do high self-monitors attempt to acquire? Moreover, neither of these distinctions readily accounts for many of the Self-Monitoring axis's relations, most notably, its strong relation with interpersonal orientations and choices of friends and relationship partners. Perhaps most importantly, both distinctions fail to characterize the motives and social agendas of low self-monitors, except as the absence of motives underlying the high self-monitoring style. We suggest, on the basis of these considerations, that a major issue to be addressed by further research and theory concerns the motives that underlie the forms of image management associated with self-monitoring.

Our own suspicion is that, despite the fact that it contains few items that explicitly describe impression management motives, the Self-Monitoring Scale relates to status-oriented impression management motives. That is, high self-monitors may well attempt to cultivate public images that create appearances that connote social status and may strive to construct social worlds that function as effective instruments of status enhancement. In this view, the behavioral and behavioroid criterion variables measured in self-monitoring studies that, as revealed by our examination of the literature, relate highly to the Self-Monitoring axis may reflect the outcomes of precisely these sorts of image management tactics. If so, and in partial answer to the question that we posed earlier (Just what do high self-monitors attempt to acquire?), the impression management and image projection activities of high self-monitors may have more to do with status enhancement and effective negotiation within informally defined hierarchical social structures than with acquisitiveness broadly considered.

This interpretation offers some insight into why interpersonal orientations covary with the Self-Monitoring axis so strongly. A considerable body of empirical evidence indicates that the interpersonal world of the high self-monitor, relative to that of the low self-monitor, is characterized by less committed and stable social bonds (see, e.g., Snyder et al., 1983, 1986; Snyder & Simpson, 1984). Social bonds are generally characterized by equal status between relationship members. High self-monitors may be more involved in negotiating status within unequal-status social structures than in establishing and maintaining equal-status bonds. Just as importantly, low self-monitors may be particularly invested in close social relationships in which they and their partners can be trusted.

We suggest that as new theoretical perspectives on the self-monitoring and image projection develop, the emphases of empirical researchers ought to shift as well. Our appraisal of the self-monitoring literature and our attendant reappraisal of the self-monitoring construct prompt questions about high and low self-monitors.

With respect to high self-monitors and their characteristic orientations, if they do not attempt to impress others merely by performing in situationally appropriate ways, what image projection strategies do they use to impress others? Through what specific techniques might they be able to cast others into roles that bolster their own entitlements? Moreover, how are their social performances moderated by the demands of specific interpersonal contexts? Although this last question has a long history in self-monitoring research, it has typically been posed with respect to situational appropriateness of social performances. Other aspects of interpersonal situations, such as the status relationships of participants, may be as important as or even more important than moderating features of image projection. Thus, new research could explore whether high self-monitors interacting with persons who have formally defined status higher than their own (e.g., their bosses) may be best able to enhance their own entitlements by using techniques very different from those most effective with persons with whom they have no formally defined status relationships (e.g., their friends).

New theoretical insight into the motives of low self-monitors ought to also generate research designed to specify the strategies by which they meet these aims. Are low self-monitors, far from being unconcerned about public opinion, in fact highly concerned that they have reputations of being genuine and sincere people who act on their beliefs? If so, how do they achieve and preserve these reputations, other than simply by acting on their beliefs? Do low self-monitors in fact publicly display their defining acts of inner self-expression in ways that facilitate their desired reputations? With what audiences do they most care about establishing reputations as sincere and genuine? How do they keep these audiences from interpreting their attempts to gain reputations of being earnest as precisely that, which might earn them the reputation of not being earnest? New research may address the nature of this dilemma and its resolution.

In sum, it would appear that the lessons learned from this quantitative examination of the literature can provide the foundations needed for theory development, foundations that set forth clear research agendas. As these agendas become fulfilled, we fully expect to witness considerable evolution of the self-monitoring construct. As this evolution unfolds, the very definition and meaning of the self-monitoring construct most certainly will change. So too, however, should the construct's meaningfulness. With empirically informed changes of theory, we hope there also comes greater correspondence between theory and truth.

In addition to providing foundations that set forth clear research agendas, however, our quantitative examination of the literature provides a framework within which to interpret new self-monitoring research. We now have a good understanding of the ways in which phenomena studied in previous research relate to dimensions underlying self-monitoring. We can use the same
structural framework, however, to ask how phenomena studied in future research relate to the domain of self-monitoring. Do such phenomena relate to the Self-Monitoring axis, as do most self-monitoring phenomena studied to date? Or do they relate to other axes within the self-monitoring domain?

To answer these questions, all that researchers need to do is follow procedures outlined in Appendix B for estimating correlations of a criterion variable of interest with the Self-Monitoring axis and the axis orthogonal to it. We recommend that researchers regularly apply these procedures to estimate these correlations and report these values in published work.

On the Domain of Applicability of This Approach to Reviewing Literatures

In closing, we wish to comment on the domain of applicability of the quantitative approach that we used for reviewing the literature on self-monitoring. We fully recognize that other methods for reviewing empirical literatures exist. Nonetheless, we believe that our quantitative method has particular advantages, at least in the context of questions that theoretical concerns pose of the self-monitoring literature. Consider, specifically, two other review methods that we could have used.

First, we could have used a tally or box-score method to count the number of studies that revealed superior effects for the full Self-Monitoring Scale as compared with the subscales and the number of studies that revealed superior effects for one or more of the subscales as compared with the full measure. The tally method has a major drawback. It is nonquantitative. Degrees to which one or another subscale outperforms, or is outperformed by, the full scale are ignored, and thereby much meaningful information is lost. Moreover, the method does not provide results that translate easily into answers to the major questions at issue within the self-monitoring controversy, questions which ask for comparisons of the dimensions tapped by the Self-Monitoring Scale and their relations with self-monitoring’s external criterion variables.

Second, we could have performed a meta-analysis to estimate effect sizes of the Self-Monitoring Scale and the self-monitoring subscales across subsets of self-monitoring criterion measures (defined in terms of content, investigator, publication date, or other characteristics; see, e.g., Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). A comparison of these effect sizes could have yielded conclusions about the relative contributions of the self-monitoring subscales to particular effects. In our view, a meta-analysis would have been preferable to a tally of studies, largely because a meta-analysis yields quantitative estimates of effect sizes. Nonetheless, for our purposes, a drawback of meta-analysis, as of the tally method, is the nature of its results. Effect size estimates of the self-monitoring subscales do not directly translate into answers to the questions at the heart of the self-monitoring controversy and are therefore not directly informative about the self-monitoring construct itself.

The method we propose is, like meta-analysis, a quantitative method and hence does not throw away information lost by the tally method. Unlike meta-analysis, our method yields results that address directly and explicitly the major issues raised over the course of theory and research on self-monitoring and that have been the focal points of controversy concerning the nature of self-monitoring. Stated otherwise, where traditional meta-analyses permit effects-focused reviews, our approach permits a construct-focused quantitative review of the empirical literature, one with considerable ability to refine the self-monitoring construct by virtue of its clear exclusionary and inclusionary messages.

Finally, although we have focused on the specific case of self-monitoring theory and research, we should emphasize that our quantitative approach may have broader applicability. As we have indicated in explicating it, it is an approach designed for reviewing literature generated by research on psychological constructs concerning differences between individuals and their relations to aspects of individual and social functioning. Although we developed the approach specifically for use with self-monitoring, it is potentially applicable to research programs that, like self-monitoring, use a measuring instrument whose internal structure is well-known and that have generated sizable research literature on external criterion relations. We expect that this approach will be most useful in research domains like self-monitoring, where the known internal structure of the measure is clearly linked to the theoretical questions to be asked of the empirical literature. This construct-focused quantitative review is most appropriate for literatures associated with multifaceted constructs (see Hull et al., 1991). Issues concerning the location and precise nature of the broad dimensions of personality captured by the Big Five factors (see, e.g., John, 1990) can potentially be addressed by the method we have used. Of course, whether the domain of applicability of this approach is broad or narrow remains to be seen. At the very least, though, and as we have seen, the approach has been able to bring the extensive empirical literature on self-monitoring to bear on critical issues in theory, research, and measurement in this domain of personality and social behavior.

References


Appendix A

Studies Reviewed: Criterion Measures

**Expressive Control**

1. Riggio and Friedman (1982): expressive control tapped by two measures: (a) a measure of emotional sending skill, the correspondence between an emotion intended to be expressed and the emotion judged by a set of raters, aggregated across six emotions; and (b) a measure of deception ability, consisting of rater judgments of truth-telling across several trials of lying. The criterion relation reported was derived from the average relation of the two measures with the Self-Monitoring Scale subscales. N = 68.

2. Siegman and Reynolds (1983): differences between nonverbal behaviors under conditions of truth-telling and deception. In Study 1, differences in average pause duration (APD) and proportionality constant ratio (PCR) were examined. In Study 2, differences in APD, PCR, and reaction time (RT) in responding to questions were examined. All variables were reversed to yield larger values for lesser differences between truth-telling and deception. Effects within the study were averaged; then, effects across studies were averaged to yield reported criterion relations. N = 70.

3. Riggio, Widaman, and Friedman (1985): general emotional sending skill across six different emotions. The criterion measure reported reflects correspondence between intended and rated emotion across the six emotions. Gender was partialled out of criterion relations. N = 68.

**Nonverbal Decoding Skills**


3. Funder and Harris (1986): the PONS, N = 64.


**Attitude—Behavior Relations and Attitude Accessibility**

1. Snyder and Kendzierski (1982): willingness of individuals to engage in a discussion of affirmative action programs based on favorable attitudes toward affirmative action and gender. The criterion effect was derived from predicted contrast across 8 cells of 2 × 2 × 2 design. N = 80.

2. Wymer and Penner (1985): congruence between religious attitudes and religious behaviors. The criterion measure was an attitude—behavior congruence score, reversed to render predicted high self-monitors' scores higher. N = 228.


4. Kardes, Sanbonmatsu, Voss, and Fazio (1986): attitude accessibility measured by RT responding “good” or “bad” to each of 125 attitude objects, controlling for general response latency. The accessibility scores assessed on three occasions positively covaried. Criterion relations were derived from multiple correlations between the three scores and the Self-Monitoring Scale subscales. N = 34.

5. Lavine and Snyder (1996): effect of two different forms of persuasive appeals, one designed to influence individuals whose attitudes serve social-adjustive functions and one designed to influence individuals whose attitudes serve value-expressive functions. The criterion relations reported corresponded to interaction effects of the Self-Monitoring Scale subscale and the message type (social-adjustive or value-expressive) on the mean of four related criterion variables: cognitive responses, perceptions of message quality, attitudes, and behavior. N = 106.

**Behavioral Sensitivity to Others’ Expectations**

1. Harris and Rosenthal (1986): tendency to act in accord with the expectations of a role-played counselor/interviewer. The criterion variable was pre–post change in self-perceived introversion/extraversion in the direction of counselor’s manipulated expectations. N = 52.

2. Lassiter, Stone, and Weigold (1987): tendency to be swayed by leading questions posed by an experimenter. The criterion relations were derived from the difference between a subscale’s correlation with memory in leading versus nonleading condition. N = 48.

3. Graziano and Bryan (1998): effect of false heart rate feedback about emotional reaction on men’s ratings of attractiveness of Playboy centerfolds. The criterion variable was summed attractiveness ratings for centerfolds paired with increased heart rate. N = 100.

**Behavioral Variability**

1. Lippa and Donaldson (1990): consistency of diary and computer-assisted reports of behaviors, settings, and traits. The criterion relation reported was derived from mean Self-Monitoring Scale subscale relations with inconsistency (variability) across behaviors, situations, and traits. N = 65.

2. Friedman and Miller-Herringer (1991): concealment of victory gestures in the presence of others during a competitive game. The effect reported was derived from the difference between the correlation of Self-Monitoring Scale subscales and victory gestures when participants were alone and the same correlation when participants were observed by their competitors. N = 40.

**Interpersonal Orientations**

1. Snyder, Gangestad, and Simpson (1983), Study 1: friendship worlds based on a series of choices to engage in a particular activity with one of (Appendices continue)
two friends: a friend chosen to fit the activity (predicted for the high self-monitors) or well liked (predicted for the low self-monitors). The criterion reported was number of friends selected for their activity fit. N = 45.

2. Snyder, Gangestad, and Simpson (1983), Study 2: friendship worlds based on reported likelihood and enjoyment of engaging in particular activities with particular friends. The criterion relation derived the average of relations between similarity of ratings and (a) suitability of friends to activities and (b) similarity of friend to self, reversed to render high self-monitors’ predicted scores higher. N = 60.

3. Snyder and Simpson (1984), Study 1: preferences to do activities with own dating partner versus other opposite-sex friends who were more skilled at the activities. The criterion measure reported was total number of other opposite-sex friends chosen over own partner. N = 32.

4. Snyder and Simpson (1984), Study 2: willingness to change dating partners from current one to another opposite-sex friend. The criterion measure reported was percentage of other opposite-sex friends chosen over current one. N = 30 (subset of Study 1).

5. Snyder and Simpson (1984), Study 3: number of dating partners in the past year and longevity of current dating relationship (reversed to render high predicted scores for high self-monitors). The criterion relation was derived from average relation of each subscale with the two measures. N = 160.

6. Snyder and Simpson (1984), Study 4: growth of intimacy in romantic relationships. The criterion variable reported was derived from the difference between beta weight of time as a predictor of intimacy for high and low scorers on Self-Monitoring Scale subscales. N = 257.

7. Snyder, Simpson, and Gangestad (1986): behavioral and attitudinal markers of unrestricted sociosexual orientation, the tendency to engage in sexual relations in absence of psychological closeness and commitment. The criterion variable reported was the factor defined by these markers. The revised, 18-item Self-Monitoring Scale was used, N = 145.

**Being Impressed by Physical Attractiveness**

1. Snyder, Berscheid, and Glick (1985), Study 1: relative impact of personality and physical attractiveness information on dating decisions of high and low self-monitors. Participants looked through files corresponding to potential dates. Measures examined were percentage of time participants spent looking at photographs and percentage of time participants spent looking at personality information. The criterion relations reported were derived from average relations of these two measures with SMS subscales. N = 39, all men.

2. Snyder, Berscheid, and Glick (1985), Study 2: relative impact of physical attractiveness and personality on dating decisions. Participants chose between two potential dates: an attractive date with an undesirable character of the situation in relatively clear and consistent terms. N = 234.

3. Snyder, Berscheid, and Matwychuk (1988), Study 1: weight given to physical attractiveness as a criterion of personnel selection. Participants decided which of two persons should receive a job offer: a person with job-appropriate dispositions or a person without such dispositions but more skilled at the activities. The criterion measure reported was number of friends selected for their activity fit. N = 38.

4. Snyder, Berscheid, and Matwychuk (1988), Study 2: weight given to physical attractiveness as a criterion of personnel selection. Participants decided which of two persons should receive one of two job offers: one for which physical attractiveness was an appropriate criterion and one for which physical attractiveness was not an appropriate criterion. One person was attractive. High self-monitors were predicted to prefer the physically attractive person regardless of job. Low self-monitors were expected to prefer the person with job-appropriate characteristics. The criterion effect reported was predicted contrast. N = 22.

5. Snyder, Berscheid, and Matwychuk (1988), Study 3: situational preferences as-assessed by asking participants to tailor the sort of experimental confederate they would be willing to be. The criterion relation reported was the average of two effects: the extent to which low, relative to high, subscale scorers defined the character of the situation as one congruent with own dispositions; and the extent to which high, relative to low, scorers defined character of the situation in relatively clear and consistent terms. N = 234.

6. Snyder and Gangestad (1982), Study 2: situational preferences assessed by asking participants to tailor the sort of experimental confederate they would be willing to be. The criterion relation reported was the average of two effects: the extent to which low, relative to high, subscale scorers defined the character of the situation as one congruent with own dispositions; and the extent to which high, relative to low, scorers defined character of the situation in relatively clear and consistent terms. N = 234.

7. Tobey and Tunnell (1981): awareness of the impressions made on others as assessed by agreement between participants' predicted ratings and actual ratings made by others on 24 adjectives. N = 48, all women.

**Attention and Responsiveness to Others**

1. Mieli & LeVoi (1985): responsiveness of interactant to other. The criterion measure was response of partner to the question, "How much do you feel your partner used your behavior as a guide to what to do in the interaction?" N = 108.

2. Ickes, Stinson, Bissonette, and Garcia (1990): accuracy with which interactants could state their interaction partner’s thoughts. The criterion measure was correspondence between participants’ predicted thoughts of partner and the partner’s self-listed thoughts, each assessed by a video-assisted technique following the interaction. N = 76.


**Peer–Self Trait Rating Discrepancy**

1. Cheek (1982): congruence between self- and peer-trait ratings across four higher order traits. The criterion measure was a measure of self-peer congruence, reversed to render predicted high self-monitors’ scores higher. N = 85.


**Other**

1. Snyder and Cantor (1980), Study 2: self-knowledge and social knowledge. Participants were asked to describe either (a) themselves with regard to how they expressed or did not express each of seven personality traits or (b) prototypical persons possessing each of seven personality traits with regard to how they would express the trait. The major criterion measure was the number of information units expressed in descriptions. The criterion effect reported was derived from interaction of Self-Monitoring Scale subscales with self-versus prototypical-other instructions. N = 60.

2. Snyder and Gangestad (1982), Study 1: choices to enter situations. Participants were invited to participate as either an introverted or an extraverted confederate in an experiment, with the confederate clearly or minimally defined. The criterion effect was derived from predicted contrast, with high self-monitors predicted to be attracted to situations with clear specifications and low self-monitors predicted to be attracted to situations with self-congruent specifications. N = 125.

3. Snyder and Gangestad (1982), Study 2: situational preferences assessed by asking participants to tailor the sort of experimental confederate they would be willing to be. The criterion relation reported was the average of two effects: the extent to which low, relative to high, subscale scorers defined the character of the situation as one congruent with own dispositions; and the extent to which high, relative to low, scorers defined character of the situation in relatively clear and consistent terms. N = 234.

4. Tobey and Tunnell (1981): awareness of the impressions made on others as assessed by agreement between participants' predicted ratings and actual ratings made by others on 24 adjectives. N = 48, all women.

5. Douglas (1984): socially scripted knowledge assessed by asking participants to describe how they would interact with a partner whom they were just getting to know. Measures were number of conversation topics listed, percentage of conversation acts that were goal-directed (e.g., related to goals such as making the partner feel comfortable), and percentage of conversation acts that were contingent on the partner’s behavior. The criterion effect reported was derived from average relations of Self-Monitoring Scale subscales with these measures (individual effects were similar). N = 141.

6. Kilduff (1992): factors important to M.B.A. students making choices about what organizations to interview with. The criterion measure reported was relative importance of social conformity factors (e.g., preferring "work that is of high status and prestige") and individual freedom factors (e.g., preferring "work that is compatible with my personal values and beliefs"). N = 180.
Appendix B

Estimating Criterion Relations With Axes in the Self-Monitoring Factor Space

To estimate correlations of a criterion variable of interest with axes in the self-monitoring factor space, all researchers need do is calculate scores on the factor subscales of the Self-Monitoring Scale (Acting, Extraversion, and Other-Directedness), correlate the criterion variables of interest with these subscales, and then apply the following formulae to estimate the relations between the criterion variable with the Self-Monitoring axis and the axis orthogonal to the Self-Monitoring axis:

\[ f'_{SM} = .86 \times r_{ACR} + .35 \times r_{EXT} + .33 \times r_{OD} \]  \quad (B1)

and

\[ f'_{SM-O} = .26 \times r_{ACR} - .84 \times r_{EXT} + .74 \times r_{OD} \]  \quad (B2)

where \( f'_{SM} \) and \( f'_{SM-O} \) are the estimated correlations of the criterion variable with the Self-Monitoring axis and the axis orthogonal to the Self-Monitoring axis, respectively, and \( r_{ACR} \), \( r_{EXT} \), and \( r_{OD} \) are the correlations of the criterion variable with the Acting, Extraversion, and Other-Directedness subscales, respectively. These formulae have been derived from simple linear combinations of Formulae 5 and 6, based on the extent to which the Self-Monitoring axis and orthogonal axis are rotated away from Factors 1 and 2 of the self-monitoring factor space. These formulae apply when the Other-Directedness subscale includes items on the 25-item Self-Monitoring Scale not retained on the 18-item Self-Monitoring Scale. If only items retained on the 18-item version are used on the Other-Directedness subscale, the appropriate formulae are

\[ f'_{SM} = .85 \times r_{AC} + .34 \times r_{EXT} + .35 \times r_{OD} \]  \quad (B3)

and

\[ f'_{SM-O} = .17 \times r_{AC} - .89 \times r_{EXT} + .85 \times r_{OD} \]  \quad (B4)

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