Almost one half of A Rhetoric of Motives is devoted to what he titles 'traditional principles of rhetoric.' To characterize the first part of A Rhetoric of Motives as a traditional treatment of rhetoric, regardless of what Burke calls it, is a dangerous oversimplification of the facts. Viewing as he does the whole realm of traditional rhetoric from the standpoint of his identification concept, Burke discusses the traditional rhetoric in a far from traditional way. For instance, in summing up his discussion of Aristotle, Burke tells us, "Thus, all told, besides the extension of rhetoric through the concept of identification, we have noted . . . purely traditional evidences of the rhetorical motive." He also uses his discussion of Aristotle to introduce ideas of "semi-verbal, semi-organizational, tactics which Burke calls a "Rhetoric of Bureaucracy." In this discussion, Burke is illustrating the workings of the identification hierarchy in the social structure. He points to the devices in Machiavelli's The Prince as an example. Surely these ideas cannot properly be called Aristotelian.

I would like to suggest that Mr. Day and other writers in the field who have made such an effort to relate Burke to the rhetorical tradition now take a look at the other side of the coin and examine more closely what is unique in his position.

Identification in its function as a structure is an order based on the resolution of conflicts by finding their common source. A conflict is "resolved" by discovering a larger generalization which will encompass both sides of the conflict. In this structure, "truth" is arrived at not by eliminating one side of a conflict and allowing the other to stand, but by finding a "name" which will describe the state of the conflict at any given time. A result of this approach is a uniquely modern statement of "truth" not in absolute terms but in terms of an ordered contingency. This new kind of rhetorical statement is fundamentally akin to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, Weiner's physics of contingency, and other contemporary scientific statements about the nature of the universe.

The implications of this new rhetorical statement have yet to be considered by scholars in our field. Aristotle met Plato's challenge in fashioning a rhetoric to deal with the Platonic notion of truth as an absolute. Is it not possible that Burke is fashioning a rhetoric to deal with the modern notion of truth as a contingency? We can answer this question by examining closely Burke's "hierarchy of identification," being careful to avoid over-simplifications and too-easy categorizations of this difficult but exciting concept.

John W. Kirk
University of Florida

Kenneth Burke and Identification—A Reply

To the Editor:

In the foregoing letter, Mr. Kirk bases his disagreement with my treatment of the Burkian conception of identification on two points: (1) the term identification should be treated as "an essentially new term," and (2) identification "functions not only as a process . . . but also as a . . . hierarchial structure. . . ." Both points involve semantic difficulties.

Identification is neither a "new" term nor a "new" concept with Burke. The semantic problem here is what we mean by the term "new." Let us drop the term "new" and phrase the point in a different way. Neither the concept of identification nor the term identification originate with Burke. With this statement there should be no disagreement.
What then is original with Burke? Burke’s treatment of rhetoric solely in terms of identification is original. This is the point I made in the concluding paragraph of my discussion of the concept.

It is difficult to determine from Mr. Kirk’s letter what value will accrue from dissociating Burke’s discussion of identification from previous discussions of the concept. Mr. Kirk is concerned with exploring the implications of identification for rhetoric. We can agree that before we begin exploring the implications of a concept we should define the concept. The purpose of my article was directed to this end. Our understanding of Burke’s use of the concept is facilitated by examining previous treatments of the concept in both rhetoric and psychology.

The semantic difficulties involved in Mr. Kirk’s second point, that identification is not only a process but a structure, are obvious. What is a process? A structure? Furthermore, to say that identification is a process and a structure does little to illuminate the concept itself. Some of the confusion in attempting to define identification stems from the fact that Burke uses the term in two fundamentally different senses: identification of and identification with. Identification of refers to the act of indicating consubstantiality. Identification with refers to the affective relationship which results from the perception of consubstantiality. Neither of these uses of the term suggests that identification is structure. Admittedly, identification may operate within a structure such as a social system. It may even be the “force” or “motive” which holds the structure together—as Freud suggests in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego—but it does not follow from such an analysis that identification is the structure.

The recognition that Burke’s treatment of rhetoric is related to both classical and modern treatments of rhetoric does not mean that we cannot explore the implications of that which is original in Burke. A careful reading of my article will indicate that I do not suggest that Burke should be “pigeonholed” with Aristotle or even that he should be “grouped with classical tradition.” I agree with Mr. Kirk that “in order to make full use of Burke’s contributions, we need to dwell on what is new in Burke,” but I would add that in order to understand what is new in Burke, we need to examine his relations with traditional and modern principles of rhetoric and psychology.

Dennis Day
San Diego State College

GHOSTWRITTEN SPEECHES

To the Editor:

In his article on “The Ethics of Ghostwritten Speeches,” (QJS, October 1961), Professor Bormann is right in contending that the practice of ghostwriting raises an important and difficult ethical issue. Ghostwriting and collaborative writing are widespread in our culture, and the practice seems to be increasing. Such practice often carries overtones of deception, and to this extent calls for serious and sustained attention by students of speech.

However, I believe Professor Bormann is wrong in his effort to establish a kind of generalized ethical indictment of ghostwriting regardless of the context within which the “ghost” does his work, or the motivations which occasion the work. Professor Bormann’s method of attacking the problem of ghostwriting seems to be first to cite instances of such writing which are patently uneth-