

Interaction Between Self-Monitoring and Manipulated States of Self-Awareness

William M. Webb
Marshall University

William Schneiderman
International Business Machines
Rochester, Minnesota

Kerry L. Marsh
Ohio State University

Bob Davis
Marshall University

We conducted four experiments to examine the differential responses of high and low self-monitors to variations in public and private self-awareness. The first 2 experiments used an attribution of responsibility paradigm to test the hypothesis that high self-monitors would show greater responsiveness than low self-monitors to manipulations of public self-awareness. This hypothesis was supported. Two additional experiments tested the hypothesis that low self-monitors would be more responsive than high self-monitors to manipulations of private self-awareness. Manipulations of private self-awareness following a Velten (1968) positive-mood induction exercise strengthened the induced mood in low but not in high self-monitors. Thus, when the dependent measure had implications for their public self, high self-monitors were more responsive than low self-monitors to public self-awareness manipulations; low self-monitors, on the other hand, were more responsive than high self-monitors to manipulations of private self-awareness when the dependent measure required subjects to access aspects of their private self.

Current trends in self theory and research emphasize the manifold nature of the self. Foremost among the different aspects of the self is the distinction drawn between internal, private self-processes and external public self-concerns (e.g., Baumeister, 1986; Cheek & Briggs, 1982; Greenwald & Breckler, 1985; Scheier & Carver, 1983). The cogency of this distinction is substantiated in theories that emphasize motivational factors in self-conception and self-presentation (Arkin & Baumgardner, 1986; Baumeister, 1982; Schlenker, 1980, 1986; Swann, 1983; Swann & Read, 1981). More important, perhaps, is the acknowledgment that different aspects of the self can be engaged by different situational forces in different contexts. We follow this contextual paradigm by examining how different situational cues to self-focus influence the behavior of high versus low self-monitors when the context favors either public concerns or private deliberations.

The construct of self-monitoring is directly relevant to the public-private distinction, dealing as it does with the extent to

which people manage their public impressions consistent with the demands of the situation or from their own attitudinal or affective stance (Snyder, 1974, 1979, 1987). People scoring high on the Self-Monitoring Scale can be characterized as good social actors; they are motivated and talented in fashioning the appropriate social response to the specific situation. Low self-monitors are apparently less motivated by self-presentational concerns or at least show no special capabilities in this endeavor. The challenges arising within the past decade to self-monitoring's unidimensional nature (Briggs & Cheek, 1988; Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980; Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980; Lennox & Wolfe, 1984) indeed indicate the probable complexity of such a construct as a person's adherence to his or her private self versus public appearance of self. Self-monitoring appears likely to be composed of three dimensions relating to motivational, ability, and performance factors (other-directedness, acting, and extraversion) in tailoring one's behavior in response to social cues.

The current understanding of private versus public aspects of the self suggests that the difference between high self-monitors and low self-monitors may not simply be between those who tailor their self-presentations to the social situation and those who adhere more to their real self in social situations. Rather, a more useful approach is to attempt to understand the situational factors that mediate different self-monitoring orientations and to understand the private and public factors that delimit the expression of those orientations.

One possible situational mediator of self-monitoring may be

Portions of this research were supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation to William Schneiderman.

We wish to thank Stephen Briggs, Gifford Weary, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments on a draft of this article. We also acknowledge the comments of Bella M. DePaulo and Steve Worchel on a much earlier version of this article.

Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to William M. Webb, who is now at the Department of Psychology, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio 45701.

focus of attention. High self-monitors should be attentive to the various cues for appropriate social behavior available in a situation in order to be in the most favorable position to self-present. Low self-monitors, on the other hand, are presumed to be less responsive than high self-monitors to cues for appropriate social behavior (Snyder, 1987). One way of addressing this difference in sensitivity to cues is through the mechanisms specified by the theory of objective self-awareness (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975; Wicklund & Hormuth, 1981). This theory distinguishes two broad categories of self-focus, objective and subjective. The objectively self-aware person is aware of self in the sense that self is a distinct object that can be differentiated from nonself. In the state of subjective self-awareness, however, attention is directed away from the self; the individual is aware of self only in the sense that one is aware of ground in a figure-ground relation. These states of awareness are thought to be both mutually exclusive and under the control of external stimuli. A familiar stimulus for inducing objective self-awareness is a mirror, and the corresponding stimulus for the subjective state is a pursuit rotor.

Fenigstein, Scheier, and Buss (1975) and A. H. Buss (1980) elaborated self-awareness theory by suggesting that manipulations of focal attention differed in the extent to which public or private aspects of the self were made salient. For example, a mirror small enough to reveal only the face has been shown to elicit behaviors reflecting an awareness of more internal, private aspects of the self (Baldwin & Holmes, 1987; Froming, Walker, & Lopyan, 1982; Gibbons, Carver, Scheier, & Hormuth, 1979; Scheier & Carver, 1977, 1980), whereas one's image on a television monitor, hearing one's voice on tape, or the presence of an audience is likely to elicit behaviors reflecting an awareness of aspects of one's public appearance (see Carver & Scheier, 1981, for a review). Personality measures (Public and Private Self-Consciousness scales) were also constructed to measure dispositional tendencies corresponding to these manipulated states of private and public self-awareness.

Interactions between self-monitoring and self-awareness have been found in two previous studies (Ickes, Layden, & Barnes, 1978; Snyder & Monson, 1975). The forms of the interactions, however, were different. Snyder and Monson found high self-monitors to be more responsive than low self-monitors to self-awareness manipulations, whereas Ickes et al. found the reverse interaction. Examination of the specific manipulations and experimental contexts of each study provides some clues to reconciling these conflicting findings.

In Snyder and Monson's (1975) study, the dependent variable was the amount of opinion change after participation in a public or private group discussion of their opinions. In the *public* condition, the discussion was videotaped, and subjects were told that the tapes would be replayed for their introductory psychology classmates. In addition to the video camera, the room was furnished with several large mirrors and a television monitor that allowed subjects to view their image. In the *private* condition, there were no mirrors, camera, or monitor. It was argued that the public and private conditions represented divergent cues for appropriate social behavior, with the private condition favoring opinion change and the public conditions favoring resistance to opinion change. As predicted, high self-monitors were more responsive than low self-monitors to variations in

cues for appropriate social behavior: A significant difference in the opinion change across the conditions was found for high but not for low self-monitors.

In contrast, the dependent variable in the Ickes et al. (1978) study was the degree of individuation in free responses to the question "Who am I?" (Gordon, 1968). In the experimental condition, subjects responded to the Who Am I questionnaire while being videotaped. Each subject in the experimental condition was matched to a control subject on self-monitoring, self-esteem, and gender. Control condition subjects worked without the camera or the cover story. The major prediction of the study was confirmed: Subjects in the objective self-awareness condition offered more individuated responses to the Who Am I questionnaire. Although no hypothesis concerning an interaction involving self-monitoring and self-awareness was offered, an interaction was serendipitously obtained. The responses of the low self-monitors were significantly different across the self-awareness conditions, whereas the responses of the high self-monitors did not differ across conditions.

Differences between these two studies involve the nature of the self-awareness manipulations and the context of each study as defined by the dependent variable. The experimental conditions in the Snyder and Monson (1975) study can be interpreted as inducing varying degrees of public self-awareness. The audience, video camera, large mirrors, and video monitor probably engaged elements of the public self, particularly given the public nature of the dependent measure: publicly stated opinion change. In the Ickes et al. (1978) study, the camera, when used in conjunction with the Who Am I questionnaire, was more likely to have elicited self-reflection of a more private nature.

Snyder and Cantor (1980) showed that high self-monitors have a rich repertoire of prototypic role behavior, whereas low self-monitors have well-articulated and more easily accessible self-images. This suggests that to the extent that self-awareness-inducing stimuli are cues for people to view themselves as others see them (as in the Snyder & Monson, 1975, study), high self-monitors should find such focus more informative. On the other hand, high self-monitors should find themselves at a relative disadvantage when the self-focusing cues and context are toward the private aspects of the self (as in the Ickes et al., 1978, study). This pattern should be reversed for low self-monitors.

The current study examined this predicted relation between self-monitoring and manipulated states of public and private self-awareness. The first 2 experiments in the present study tested the hypothesis that high self-monitors would be more affected by manipulations of self-awareness; furthermore, this sensitivity was postulated to be a function of the public aspect of objective self-awareness. The final 2 experiments attempted to reverse the interaction by demonstrating that low self-monitors were more affected by manipulations of private self-awareness when the dependent measure was more appropriate to private aspects of the self.

Experiment 1

The first experiment was designed to test the hypothesis that high self-monitors would differ more than low self-monitors across levels of awareness. Attribution of responsibility was chosen as the dependent measure for several reasons. First, at-

tributions can vary from *self* to *nonself*, thus paralleling attentional focus. Second, main effects have already been noted with this measure for both self-awareness and self-monitoring. Duval and Wicklund (1973) found that objective self-awareness increased the tendency to attribute responsibility to the self. Snyder (1976) found that low self-monitors attributed more to self than did high self-monitors. Although Snyder (1976) suggested that these attributional patterns may be a result of differences in the cognitive organization of information about self and others (Snyder & Campbell, 1982), these patterns may simply reflect differences in attentional focus in the same way that actors and observers attribute causality to the events that are for them perceptually salient.

While high self-monitors are thought to be attentive to situational cues, they are also likely to be more flexible in their focus of attention as a function of their need to respond to changes in situational demands. The question is whether high self-monitors' flexibility in responding to situational cues will extend to those situations in which the cue is to focus on the self. If so, the high self-monitors should make more self-attributions in the presence of a self-awareness-inducing stimulus. For low self-monitors, the self-awareness-inducing stimulus should add little, if anything, to their tendencies to make self-attributions.

Method

Overview

This experiment independently manipulated objective and subjective self-awareness with mirrors and a turntable, respectively. Pretest scores from the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974) were available to classify subjects as high or low on this dimension. The three between-subjects variables, objective self-awareness (mirror vs. no mirror), subjective self-awareness (turntable vs. no turntable), and self-monitoring (low vs. high), were crossed in a $2 \times 2 \times 2$ factorial design. Each of the eight groups in this design contained 10 subjects. Subjects completed an attribution task patterned after Duval and Wicklund's (1973): Imagined events were read aloud, and subjects were asked to assign percentages of responsibility to self and other for each of eight events.

Subjects

When the semester began, all introductory psychology students were administered an inventory that included the Self-Monitoring Scale (Snyder, 1974) and the Self-Consciousness (Fenigstein et al., 1975) Scale. Subjects whose scores fell within the upper or lower third of the distribution of Self-Monitoring scores were contacted to participate in Experiment 1 or 2. Subjects who received Self-Monitoring scores of 15 or higher formed the high self-monitors group ($M = 17.8$); students with scores of 7 or below formed the low self-monitors group ($M = 6.8$). Subjects were unaware of the connection between the inventory and experimental participation. Experimenters were kept unaware of Self-Monitoring scores, and students within self-monitoring groups were randomly assigned to a condition, with the constraint of 10 subjects per cell.

Materials

The imagined events were reproduced exactly from the Duval and Wicklund (1973) research and are available in their article. One example is "You're diving off a diving board and just as you dive off, someone swims from underwater and you land on top of him. To what degree did

your actions cause the accident and to what degree did the actions of the person that swam under the diving board cause the accident?" Eight events were used, half with negative outcomes and half with positive outcomes.

Self-Awareness Manipulations

Objective self-awareness. A large mirror (89 cm \times 62 cm) was directly in front of the subject. Two narrower mirrors of equal height were placed at an angle to each side such that the subject could not easily avoid seeing his or her image when the mirrors were facing him or her. Objective self-awareness was manipulated by making the mirrors face toward or away from the subject (toward the wall). In both cases a sign on the mirrors identified them as part of another experiment and not to be moved. None of the subjects expressed any suspicion concerning either the mirrors or sign when debriefed.

Subjective self-awareness. Subjective self-awareness was manipulated through either the use or nonuse of a record turntable. For the subjective self-awareness condition, once the experimenter had introduced the experiment as an evaluation of a questionnaire and a manual dexterity task, he elaborated that during the manual dexterity task the subject would position his or her finger on a white dot painted on the outside edge of the turntable and manually rotate the turntable. He further explained that it was important that the turning response be automatic by the time the manual dexterity task began. The subject was told that this could be accomplished if he or she would practice rotating the turntable during the first part of the experiment. Thus, the subject was required to rotate the turntable while the experimenter read the practice situation and also for the duration of the experiment. In the no-turntable conditions, the turntable was not mentioned at all except for an indirect reference in the "two-part study" rationale.

Procedure

Subjects were tested individually. They were seated at a table within a cubicle. The turntable was on the table, and wall-mounted mirrors faced either the subject or the walls. The procedure was patterned after that devised by Duval and Wicklund (1973). Subjects were instructed that the experiment had two parts: evaluation of a questionnaire and a manual dexterity task. These instructions had two purposes: (a) to reduce or eliminate any uncontrolled objective self-awareness that could arise through concern over evaluation by placing the burden of evaluation on the questionnaire rather than on the subject and (b) to provide a rationale for the turntable.

All subjects were instructed that the questionnaire consisted of hypothetical situations and that their task would be to imagine themselves as realistically as they could in each of the situations. Subjects were also told that each situation would consist of two people, plus an outcome or event that would occur. They were then asked to indicate the extent to which they or the other person in the situation was responsible for the outcome. The experimenter explained that estimates of responsibility would be in the form of percentages written by the subject. Subjects could assign any combination of percentages as long as the percentage summed to 100%. After a practice situation was read and rated to ensure that the subject understood the procedure, the remaining situations were read through a speaker from an adjoining cubicle to minimize the effect that experimenter presence could have on objective self-awareness. The negative and positive situations were alternated. When the protocol was complete, the experimenter returned to the experimental cubicle, probed for suspicion, and carefully debriefed the subject.

Results

An analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on the dependent variable, the percentage of responsibility assigned to

Table 1
Percentage of Responsibility Attributed to Self: Experiment 1

Self-awareness	Outcome		<i>M</i>
	Negative	Positive	
No mirror			
High self-monitors	37.91	52.63	45.27
Low self-monitors	50.31	48.81	49.56
Mirror			
High self-monitors	47.80	55.44	51.62
Low self-monitors	45.56	54.94	50.25

self for each trial. The analysis included three between-subjects variables: objective self-awareness (mirror vs. no mirror), subjective self-awareness (turntable vs. no turntable), and self-monitoring (high vs. low). There were two within-subjects variables: outcome (positive vs. negative) and trials (four per outcome).

Several main effects were obtained. There was a main effect for objective self-awareness such that subjects assigned more responsibility to themselves in the objective self-awareness (mirror) condition than in the control condition, $F(1, 72) = 4.64, p < .04$. The subjective self-awareness manipulation showed neither main nor interactive effects. There was a main effect for outcome, with subjects attributing significantly more responsibility to self for positive outcomes than for negative outcomes, $F(1, 72) = 15.57, p < .001$. Finally, there was a main effect for trials as well as a significant interaction between trials and outcomes, indicating that some situations reliably evoke more responsibility than others.

The interaction of primary interest between self-monitoring and objective self-awareness was marginally significant and in the predicted direction, $F(1, 72) = 3.01, p = .087$. The means in Table 1 show that high self-monitors attributed more responsibility to self in the presence of the mirror than without the mirror. The simple effect of objective self-awareness within the level of high self-monitoring was significant, $F(1, 36) = 10.48, p < .003$. For the low self-monitors, the means were almost identical in the mirror and no-mirror groups: Apparently, objective self-awareness had little impact on low self-monitors' behavior.

A significant three-way interaction involving self-monitoring, objective self-awareness, and outcome also was obtained, $F(1, 72) = 5.49, p < .03$. In the no-mirror condition, high self-monitors showed a large outcome effect, whereas low self-monitors showed no outcome effect at all. However, in the mirror condition both high and low self-monitors showed a moderate difference between positive and negative outcomes. This three-way interaction can also be understood in terms of the self-monitoring, objective self-awareness interaction, which was significant only for negative outcomes. In a separate analysis with only negative outcomes, the two-way interaction between self-monitoring and objective self-awareness was significant, $F(1, 72) = 6.21, p < .02$.¹

Discussion

The main effect for objective self-awareness replicated findings reported by Duval and Wicklund (1973). Also, although

self-monitoring did not show a main effect, the marginally significant interaction suggested that there were differences attributable to self-monitoring. The results of the no-mirror condition paralleled those of Snyder's (1976) study, in which high self-monitors made significantly fewer dispositional attributions than did low self-monitors. When the data for the no-mirror condition were analyzed separately, high self-monitors attributed significantly less responsibility to self (primarily for negative outcomes) than did low self-monitors, $F(1, 36) = 4.03, p = .05$ (means in Table 1). Thus, known effects for both objective self-awareness and self-monitoring were replicated in the present research, attesting to the construct validity of the procedures.

The interaction of primary interest involving self-monitoring and self-awareness qualifies the aforementioned (replicated) effects. The main effect for objective self-awareness was due primarily to the behavior of the high self-monitoring subjects. Also, the self-monitoring difference appeared only in the no-mirror (unmanipulated control) condition. These results lend support to the prediction that high self-monitors should be more affected by variations in self-awareness than low self-monitors. Low self-monitors were relatively unaffected by the self-awareness manipulation in Experiment 1.

The significant three-way interaction involving self-monitoring, objective self-awareness, and outcome indicated that the increase in self-attributions by high self-monitors primarily occurred with negative outcome scenarios. Additionally, the patterns suggest that low self-monitors were not completely unaffected by self-awareness induction. We are hesitant to give much attention to this triple interaction, however, because it was not replicated in the second experiment.

The subjective self-awareness manipulation showed neither main nor interactive effects. This was both contrary to predictions and inconsistent with previous findings. The failure to replicate this aspect of the Duval and Wicklund (1973) findings was probably due to our requiring subjects to rotate the turntable under their own power. This did not demand as much focal attention as tracking a moving dot would have.

Experiment 1 provided some support for the major interaction prediction. Effects for objective self-awareness and self-monitoring were replicated as well. Nevertheless, loose ends remained: the marginal significance of the primary ANOVA finding and the three-way interaction involving outcome. Therefore, Experiment 1 was conceptually replicated to explore

¹ Despite psychometric criticisms regarding the unidimensional nature of the Self-Monitoring Scale (Briggs & Cheek, 1987; Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980; Gabrenya & Arkin, 1980; Lennox & Wolfe, 1984), the full scale scores reliably differentiated patterns of responses to self-awareness in all four of our experiments. In addition, analyses of variance in Experiment 1 using Self-Monitoring subscale splits (for Other-Directedness, Acting, and Extraversion) all showed similar patterns, matching the patterns of the full scale scores. Although the Self-Awareness \times Self-Monitoring interaction was marginally significant only for the Acting split, $F(1, 72) = 3.65, p = .06$, the pattern of the interaction was in the right direction for the other two subscales. Additionally, for the Acting split there was a main effect for self-awareness, $F(1, 72) = 4.67, p < .04$. There was also a marginally significant main effect for Other-Directedness, $F(1, 72) = 3.38, p = .07$, indicating that subjects higher in other-directedness made fewer attributions to self.

more fully the nature of the objective self-awareness variable. In keeping with Fenigstein et al. (1975) and A. H. Buss (1980), we dropped the subjective self-awareness variable in favor of self-awareness manipulations of either a public or private orientation.

Experiment 2

An important theoretical and empirical issue that arose from Experiment 1 was the probable public nature of the objective self-awareness manipulation. Theoretically, one would expect high self-monitors to show greater attentiveness to the public self, whereas low self-monitors should be more attentive to the private self. This suggests that the interaction between self-monitoring and objective self-awareness obtained in Experiment 1 was primarily due to public self-awareness. Our reasoning follows from A. H. Buss's (1980) assertion that size of the mirror used may contribute to whether private or public self-awareness is induced. There is clear empirical evidence to suggest that a small mirror induces private self-awareness (Baldwin & Holmes, 1987; Froming et al., 1982; Scheier & Carver, 1980). Rarely, however, have large mirrors been used when the public-private distinction was important, usually audience presence or a video camera has been used to induce public self-awareness. The results of the first experiment suggest that A. H. Buss's distinction between large and small mirrors may be valid. The large dressing mirror configuration such as the one used in Experiment 1, revealing as it did the full front and side image of the subject, probably induced primarily public self-awareness. The attribution of responsibility paradigm, however, is potentially relevant to either public (e.g., presentational) or private (e.g., personal responsibility) dimensions of self-awareness.

We therefore set out to replicate the procedures of Experiment 1, with the additional distinction between public and private self-awareness built into the design. This was intended to serve several purposes. It would allow us to settle empirically the question of the nature of the objective awareness induced in Experiment 1 as well as serve as a conceptual replication. It was predicted that, given the context, the objective self-awareness manipulation in Experiment 1 would be shown to be primarily an inducer of public self-awareness. Experiment 2 also allowed us to test the convergent validity of manipulations designed to induce public self-awareness. Finally, Experiment 2 provided the opportunity to test A. H. Buss's (1980) theory of self-awareness (Carver & Scheier, 1987; Fenigstein, 1987) against Wicklund's (1975) theory of self-focused attention, given that the Wicklund formulation suggests that the public-private distinction is unnecessary (Gollwitzer & Wicklund, 1987; Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1987).

Method

Overview

There were three self-awareness conditions: control, public, and private. The self-awareness variable was crossed with self-monitoring (high vs. low) to form six groups of 10 subjects each. In other respects, the procedure was the same as in Experiment 1.

Self-Awareness Manipulations

Private self-awareness was manipulated with the presence of a small (45 cm × 30 cm) mirror placed at eye level. Public self-awareness was manipulated by instructing subjects that they would be discussing their attributions of responsibility with other student-subjects at the conclusion of the questionnaire. This manipulation for public self-awareness should keep the attributions salient as a dimension of the public self. The control group received neither the private nor the public manipulation.

Procedure

The task and imagined situations were the same as in Experiment 1, except that the turntable and accompanying rationale were removed from the protocol. The high and low self-monitors were recruited from the sample of students described in Experiment 1.

Results

Once again, the dependent variable was attribution of responsibility to self. The main and interactive effects of each self-awareness manipulation are best understood by placing the data from each manipulated self-awareness condition in a separate ANOVA with the control condition. Thus, one analysis includes the control and public self-awareness conditions, and the second analysis includes the control and private self-awareness conditions. Both of these analyses parallel those carried out in Experiment 1. The primary result of interest was to determine whether the form of the interaction in Experiment 1 better paralleled the interaction in Experiment 2 between public self-awareness and self-monitoring or between private self-awareness and self-monitoring.

The first analysis used data from the control and public self-awareness conditions. Between-subjects variables were self-awareness (control vs. instructions) and self-monitoring (high vs. low). Within-subjects variables were outcome (positive vs. negative) and trials (four per outcome). The results for this analysis are very similar in form to those obtained in Experiment 1 and are shown in Table 2. Once again, significantly greater responsibility was attributed to self for positive outcomes than for negative ones, $F(1, 36) = 5.78, p < .03$. High self-monitors attributed significantly less responsibility to self than did low self-monitors, $F(1, 36) = 5.27, p < .03$.² This effect was qualified by the once again marginally significant interaction between self-monitoring and public self-awareness, $F(1, 36) = 3.53, p = .068$. The form of this interaction closely resembled that of Experiment 1; the responses of low self-monitors did not differ across self-awareness conditions, but the responses of high self-monitors did. The three-way interaction involving self-moni-

² Although the lower attributions of responsibility to self for negative outcomes might be due to presentational concerns, a different presentational gambit would be required to explain the lower attributions to self for positive outcomes. An alternative explanation is that a high self-monitor is less likely to be focused on himself or herself as the causal agent. This overall attributional tendency suggests that high self-monitors may be less likely to attribute either negative or positive outcomes to themselves because of their relative sensitivity to situational and external cues and relative insensitivity to their own causal impact.

Table 2
Percentage of Responsibility Attributed to Self: Experiment 2

Self-awareness	Outcome		<i>M</i>
	Negative	Positive	
Control			
High self-monitors	39.65	48.73	44.19
Low self-monitors	51.00	54.33	52.66
Public			
High self-monitors	45.00	53.38	49.19
Low self-monitors	48.38	51.63	50.00
Private			
High self-monitors	51.50	52.50	52.00
Low self-monitors	52.50	60.25	56.38

toring, self-awareness, and outcome found in Experiment 1 was nonsignificant ($F < 1$).

The second analysis included data from the private self-awareness and control conditions. In this case the self-awareness variable was control versus small mirror. The results from this analysis were different in form from those just presented. This is also shown in Table 2. In this case the significant effect for outcome was again apparent, $F(1, 36) = 4.51, p < .05$. High self-monitors attributed significantly less to self than did low self-monitors, $F(1, 36) = 7.23, p < .02$. There was also a significant main effect for private self-awareness, the privately self-aware subjects attributing more to self than did the controls, $F(1, 36) = 5.78, p < .03$. In this analysis, the main effects were not qualified by the interaction between self-monitoring and private self-awareness ($F < 1$), suggesting that both high and low self-monitors were sensitive to the small-mirror manipulation. The triple interaction that was significant in Experiment 1 was not significant in this analysis, $F(1, 36) = 1.64, p > .2$.

On the basis of the two analyses just described, it can be argued that the predicted interaction obtained in Experiment 1 was due to public self-awareness. In Experiment 2, consideration of the public self-awareness data along with those of the control condition yielded the same Self-Monitoring \times Self-Awareness interaction as in Experiment 1. This interaction was not found when the private self-awareness data were tested against the control condition. To be certain that the interactions obtained in Experiments 1 and 2 could be justifiably considered not different, we performed an analysis on the combined data from both experiments. In the combined analysis, only those data from the control and public self-awareness conditions of Experiment 2 and the no-turntable (no-mirror and mirror) conditions of Experiment 1 were used. (Recall that the turntable manipulation had no significant effects in Experiment 1.) This equalized the sample size ($n = 40$) for each experiment by using only data from comparable procedures.

In the combined analysis, there were no significant effects involving the experiment variable. The Self-Monitoring \times Self-Awareness interaction was significant, $F(1, 72) = 5.36, p < .03$. Thus, the interaction was replicated across experiments, and the overall significance level was improved through the additional observations included in the combined analysis.³ The three-way interaction involving self-monitoring, self-awareness, and outcome was not significant ($p = .26$).

Discussion

The results of Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate convergent validity for the public self-awareness construct and two associated manipulations. The large mirror and the expected discussion were not statistically distinguishable from one another in terms of their effects on attributions. This convergence was specified in A. H. Buss's (1980) theory of self-awareness.

Discriminant (as well as convergent) validity was shown for the public self-awareness manipulation. In particular, the private self-awareness manipulation (small mirror) did not produce the interaction with self-monitoring that the public self-awareness manipulation did. On the surface, the large mirror from Experiment 1 and the private self-awareness manipulation of Experiment 2 are quite similar. The difference involves only a change in mirror dimensions. Yet, in terms of underlying process, there is a greater similarity between a large mirror and expected discussion than between mirrors of different sizes.

The main effect for private self-awareness replicates the D. M. Buss and Scheier (1976) and Duval and Wicklund (1973) findings that private self-awareness increases internal attributions (but see also Franzoi & Sweeney, 1986). However, the seemingly contradictory finding that high self-monitors should be as responsive to the private self-awareness manipulation as low self-monitors requires further explanation. One plausible explanation is that the context in which the mirror is used is important. The use of a small mirror in conjunction with a dependent measure that has implications for the public self (attributions of responsibility) may cause high self-monitors to look inward, find few cues for their standards, and thus respond in a self-presentational way.

The self-monitoring variable also demonstrated discriminant validity. Recall that subscale scores from Fenigstein et al.'s (1975) self-consciousness instrument were also available: public self-consciousness, private self-consciousness, and social anxiety.⁴ All of the major analyses were redone with high-low splits on each of these subscales. Of course, these splits were within-cell median splits done post hoc, given that we could not balance both self-monitoring and all subscales a priori. This means that we were not able to achieve the substantial separation between high and low groups with the subscale splits that we had with self-monitoring. Nevertheless, none of these reanalyses showed a significant Self-Consciousness (subscale) \times Self-Awareness interaction.

The findings of these first two studies are consistent with the

³ When data from the private self-awareness condition were entered into the combined analysis (replacing the public self-awareness condition), the interaction between self-monitoring and self-awareness was not significant, $F(1, 72) = 2.43, p = .12$, even though this interaction was significant when considered in Experiment 1 alone. This provides additional evidence that the manipulation of objective self-awareness in Experiment 1 was indeed a manipulation of public and not private self-awareness.

⁴ Private self-consciousness was correlated .32 with self-monitoring (.27 with Other-Directedness, .21 with Extraversion, and .36 with Acting subscales); public self-consciousness was correlated .31 with self-monitoring (.27, .28, and .26 with Other-Directedness, Extraversion, and Acting subscales, respectively). Social anxiety was correlated only $-.08$ with self-monitoring (.11, $-.28$, and $-.19$ with the subscales).

Snyder and Monson (1975) results discussed earlier. We are suggesting that in the Snyder and Monson study, the camera and other manipulations, in a context of publicly stated attitude change, elicited awareness of one's public self and thus high self-monitors responded more strongly to the manipulation than low self-monitors. If one applies that same logic to the Ickes et al. (1978) study, the self-awareness induction (camera aimed at head and shoulders) is presumed to be sufficiently nondirective, allowing the Who Am I questionnaire to establish a context favoring private self-awareness. Thus, low self-monitors were more affected than high self-monitors.

This consideration of contextual constraints allowed us to form hypotheses regarding high self-monitors and public self-awareness that were supported in the first two experiments. However, a full test of our general hypothesis, that self-monitoring-self-awareness interactions are, in part, context dependent, requires that we show low self-monitors to be differentially affected by private self-awareness inductions when the dependent variable directs the subject to consideration of some aspects of the private self. We directly tested this hypothesis in Experiments 3 and 4. In these two experiments the dependent measure was mood; private self-awareness was manipulated with a small mirror or thought instructions. We predicted that low self-monitors would be sensitive to manipulations of private self-awareness; manipulations that would cause them to focus inward should strengthen their responses on measures relating to their internal states. High self-monitors, if they are sensitive to the self-awareness manipulation at all, should not be able to demonstrate that sensitivity because of the internally located feature (mood state) tapped by the dependent measure.

Experiment 3

Method

Overview

This experiment had three levels of self-awareness: control, small mirror (private), and instruction (private). High and low self-monitors were selected by using the screening process described in Experiment 1. The private self-awareness variable was crossed with self-monitoring to form six groups of 12 subjects each. In this experiment, a positive mood was induced (Velten, 1968), each subject's mood was measured, self-awareness was manipulated, and a postmood measure was taken.

Materials

The Velten positive-mood inducement exercise was reproduced exactly from Velten's (1968) article and is available in that report. Examples of the Velten statements are "FOR THE REST OF THE DAY, I BET THINGS WILL GO REALLY WELL" and "I FEEL SO VIVACIOUS AND EFFICIENT TODAY—SITTING ON TOP OF THE WORLD." Each statement was typed on a separate index card, and the cards were contained in a small ring notebook. The initial and final measures of mood were ten 11-point bipolar scales adapted from Scheier and Carver's (1977) article; one form of the scale was given immediately after the mood inducement task, and the other was given subsequent to the self-awareness manipulation (following mood inducement). Forms were counterbalanced across subjects.

Self-Awareness Manipulations

Private self-awareness was manipulated with the presence of the same small mirror used in Experiment 2 and by instruction to think about their thoughts, feelings, and emotions in the instruction condition. Subjects in the control condition received neither private self-awareness manipulation.

Procedure

Subjects were tested individually. They were seated at a table in the experimental cubicle. They were instructed that they would be participating in two experiments. The first experiment would involve the inducement and measurement of a mood, whereas a second separate experiment would, ostensibly, involve a reaction time task on a computer.

The experimenter then read over the Velten (1968) mood instructions with each subject to make sure they understood them. The instructions explained that the cards that followed were intended to induce a mood in them and that they should try to respond to the feeling suggested by the statements and try to think of their self as moving into that mood state. Subjects were then told that the tape player was there to ensure that each subject spent the same amount of time on each statement and that they were to flip the cards one at a time when they heard the beep from the tape player. The experimenter then started the tape player and left the room.

When the tape was over, the experimenter returned and gave the mood scale (1 of 2 forms, counterbalanced). He left for 2 min and then picked up the forms. In keeping with the private nature of this measure, subjects were expressly told not to put their names on the forms.

Subjects were then told that the computer being used in the second experiment was malfunctioning and that they should wait in a nearby cubicle until the next experimenter came to get them. They were informed that the problem would be straightened out in just a few minutes. They were also told that it was necessary to wait in the cubicle because another subject was coming in to start the first experiment. Subjects then entered a cubicle containing either no mirror (instruction and control conditions) or a small mirror. In the instruction condition, the experimenter said it would help with his own experiment if they focused on their own thoughts, feelings, and emotions. In the other conditions, no further instructions were given.

After 3 min, the second experimenter entered the cubicle, introduced himself, and thanked the person for waiting. He then gave the person the alternate form of the mood scale, explaining that it was similar to the one previous completed but that he needed it to factor out any influence the first experiment might have on the second. The experimenter left, waited 2 min, returned, and then explained that the experiment was over and probed for suspicion during a careful debriefing of the subject.

Results

The 10 items of the initial mood scores and the 10 items of the final mood scores were each averaged, and an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was performed on the dependent variable, final mood, using initial mood as a covariate. The analysis included two between-subjects variables: self-awareness (private/mirror, private/instruction, and control) and self-monitoring (high and low). High self-monitors had higher initial mood scores than low self-monitors. No main effects were found ($F_s < 1$), but a significant interaction was found between private self-awareness and self-monitoring, $F(2, 65) = 3.63, p < .04$. As the adjusted means in Table 3 indicate, low self-monitors who received the private self-awareness manipulations showed more

Table 3
Mood Scores for Experiment 3

Self-awareness	Self-monitoring	
	High	Low
Control		
Adjusted final	8.72	8.10
Unadjusted initial	8.76	8.00
Unadjusted final	8.89	7.59
Small mirror (private)		
Adjusted final	8.33	8.69
Unadjusted initial	9.10	8.44
Unadjusted final	8.81	8.57
Instruction (private)		
Adjusted final	8.37	8.51
Unadjusted initial	8.73	8.40
Unadjusted final	8.52	8.35

Note. Adjusted final mood scores are averages of final mood items, adjusted for averages of initial mood items.

positive moods than low self-monitors who did not, whereas high self-monitors who received a manipulation did not show this pattern. High self-monitors in private self-awareness conditions showed less positive moods relative to those in the control condition.

Discussion

The interaction between private self-awareness and self-monitoring is similar to that found in Ickes et al.'s (1978) article. In that study, responses of low self-monitors differed across self-awareness conditions, whereas the responses of high self-monitors did not. Before we discuss this interaction, it may be informative to consider the nature of transient mood states. Normally, transient mood states such as those induced by the Velten (1968) procedures can be expected to decay over a relatively short time period. With regard to this study, however, there are at least two circumstances under which this decay would not be evident: (a) when the final mood assessment corresponds with the initial mood assessment because of demand characteristics and (b) when private self-focus truly enhances the initial mood induction over the time interval. A comparison of high versus low self-monitors in the control condition reveals that the induced mood for high self-monitors did not change from the initial to the final assessment, whereas low self-monitors reported lower mood states at the final mood assessment than they had reported at the initial assessment. This, combined with the elevated initial moods for all high self-monitors, suggests that highs were responsive to demand characteristics.

However, when high self-monitors were focused inward by the self-awareness manipulation, their resulting mood decayed: They reported less positive moods relative to high self-monitors who received no such manipulation and relative to their own initial moods. This suggests that high self-monitors, when focused inward, find themselves on unfamiliar ground. Low self-monitors, however, clearly were able to access information about their internal states, and when they focused on those states or on their private self (small-mirror condition), their re-

sulting moods were more positive than low self-monitors' in the control condition. Note that if moods were examined when collapsed across self-monitoring conditions, self-awareness would seem to have had no effect. This provides a possible explanation for Scheier and Carver's (1977) failure to find an effect for self-awareness on (Velten-induced) positive moods: Self-monitoring mediates response to this self-awareness manipulation.

Experiment 2 validated the contention that the Person \times Situation interaction found in Experiment 1 was due to manipulation of public self-awareness by using a measure relevant to the public self. Similarly, Experiment 3 was replicated in Experiment 4 with an additional condition: a large-mirror, public self-awareness condition to validate that the low self-monitors' sensitivity to the manipulations was in fact due to the manipulation of private self-awareness.

Experiment 4

Method

Overview

There were four levels of self-awareness: control, large mirror (public), small mirror (private), and instruction (private). The low and high self-monitors were selected using the procedure described in Experiment 1. The self-awareness variable was crossed with the self-monitoring variable to form eight groups of 12 subjects each.

Procedure

The mood-inducement exercise, mood measures, and procedure remained the same as in Experiment 3. Mirror and instruction (private self-awareness) conditions remained the same as in Experiment 3. However, in an additional condition of public self-awareness, subjects waited (without further instruction) in the presence of the large mirrors used in Experiments 1 and 2.

Results

An ANCOVA was again performed on the averages of final mood items, using the averages of initial mood items as the covariate, with four levels of self-awareness and two levels of self-monitoring. Again, no main effects for self-awareness or self-monitoring were found. A significant interaction between self-awareness and self-monitoring was found, $F(3, 87) = 4.18, p < .01$. The adjusted final mood scores in Table 4 indicate that high self-monitors in the public self-awareness condition did not report the lower mood scores reported by the high self-monitors in the private conditions. The means also indicate that the sensitivity to internal states for low self-monitors was due to inducement of private self-awareness rather than to awareness of themselves as a public object. In fact, low self-monitors in the public condition showed a maintenance of mood suggestive of responsiveness to demand characteristics—the same pattern that high self-monitors showed under control conditions in Experiments 3 and 4. Overall, different response patterns in private and public conditions provided clear evidence for divergent validity of the manipulations.

Because of the use of an internal measure (mood), the mood scores in the public condition were not of interest other than to validate that the effects found in Experiment 3 were due pri-

Table 4
Mood Scores for Experiment 4

Self-awareness	Self-monitoring	
	High	Low
Control		
Adjusted final	8.45	7.82
Unadjusted initial	8.65	8.52
Unadjusted final	8.68	7.98
Small mirror (private)		
Adjusted final	8.22	8.68
Unadjusted initial	9.26	8.52
Unadjusted final	8.99	8.78
Instruction (private)		
Adjusted final	8.09	8.49
Unadjusted initial	7.88	7.55
Unadjusted final	7.62	7.73
Large mirror (public)		
Adjusted final	8.64	8.36
Unadjusted initial	8.81	7.93
Unadjusted final	9.01	7.95

Note. Adjusted final mood scores are averages of final mood items, adjusted for averages of initial mood items.

marily to focusing the subject on his or her private self rather than on his or her public self. Thus, we performed a 3×2 ANCOVA, using only the control and private self-awareness conditions. No main effects were found, but the interaction between self-monitoring and self-awareness was again significant, $F(2, 65) = 5.48, p < .01$.

To be certain that the interactions obtained in Experiments 3 and 4 could be justifiably considered not different, we performed an analysis on the combined data from both experiments. In the combined experiment, only those data from the control and private self-awareness (small-mirror and instruction) conditions were used ($N = 144$). The ANCOVA used three levels of self-awareness, two levels of self-monitoring, and two levels of experiment (3 and 4). In the combined analysis, there were no significant effects involving the experiment variable. Thus, an additional ANCOVA was performed, eliminating the experiment variable. No main effects for self-monitoring or self-awareness were found, but the interaction of interest was again significant, as the combined means in Table 5 indicate, $F(2, 137) = 9.34, p < .001$. Tests for simple effects indicated that low self-monitors had significantly higher moods in private self-awareness conditions than in the control condition, $F(2, 137) = 8.36, p < .001$, whereas the high self-monitors showed nonsignificant decreases in moods in private self-awareness conditions, relative to the control condition, $F(2, 137) = 2.22, p = .11$.

We found similar patterns in separate ANCOVAs on each of the Private Self-Awareness \times Control conditions. The combined ANCOVA for small mirror versus control revealed a significant interaction, $F(1, 91) = 19.30, p < .001$, and the combined ANCOVA for instruction versus control also revealed a significant interaction $F(1, 91) = 10.42, p < .002$. In neither ANCOVA were there significant main effects for private self-awareness or self-monitoring. Thus, the convergent validity for the small-mirror and instruction manipulations was demonstrated.

General Discussion

The results of these studies help to explicate the differential response patterns of high and low self-monitors to situations that induce private or public self-awareness. The original prediction that guided Experiment 1 was that high self-monitors, because of their greater sensitivity to external cues for appropriate social behavior, would also be more responsive to manipulations of focus of attention. No distinction was made about whether that attentional focus was on the public or private aspects of the self. Results from the other experiments, however, suggest that this distinction is an important one. High self-monitors were sensitive to public self-awareness manipulations, showing patterns of high attributions of responsibility to self under conditions of public self-awareness. Under these public conditions, low self-monitors were unaffected by manipulations of focal attention. However, when a more internally relevant measure (mood) was used in conjunction with a manipulation that focused the individual on the more private aspects of the self, low self-monitors were differentially affected.

With these interactions, the present research supports the distinction between public and private self-awareness (A. H. Buss, 1980; Fenigstein et al., 1975). Wicklund's (1975; see also Gollwitzer & Wicklund, 1987, and Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1987) contention that various self-focusing stimuli are functionally equivalent was not supported. Although on the surface the distinction between a small and a large mirror may appear artificial and trivial, the differences in their effects were not. The large mirror's effect was similar to the effect of anticipated discussion with others; the small mirror's effect was similar to the effect of introspection. Moreover, these effects in interaction with self-monitoring were consistently replicated across experiments. It is likely that in a more naturalistic setting (i.e., a setting not as contrived as mirror size) the cues directing one toward public or private aspects of self might have an even stronger effect.

The response differences of high and low self-monitors to self-awareness manipulations cannot be attributed solely to their

Table 5
Mood Scores for Experiments 3 and 4 Combined

Self-awareness	Self-monitoring	
	High	Low
Control		
Adjusted final	8.59	7.97
Unadjusted initial	8.70	8.29
Unadjusted final	8.78	7.79
Small mirror (private)		
Adjusted final	8.28	8.68
Unadjusted initial	9.18	8.48
Unadjusted final	8.90	8.68
Instruction (private)		
Adjusted final	8.24	8.51
Unadjusted initial	8.30	7.98
Unadjusted final	8.07	8.04

Note. Adjusted final mood scores are averages of final mood items, adjusted for averages of initial mood items.

differential sensitivity to public versus private cues to self-focus. Both high and low self-monitors responded to the private self-awareness manipulation in Experiment 2 by attributing more responsibility to self. Likewise, low self-monitors showed a pattern of mood maintenance (suggestive of demand characteristics) in the public condition in Experiment 4 that they did not exhibit in either the private condition (where mood was enhanced) or the control condition (where mood showed the expected decay). Thus, a more compelling explanation of our results lies in the ability (or motivation) of high and low self-monitors to *respond* to the aspect of the self to which they have been directed. It may be that low self-monitors are sensitive to public factors and high self-monitors to private factors, but that these factors have circumscribed effects as a result of limited access to the private domain for high self-monitors (Snyder & Campbell, 1982; Snyder & Cantor, 1980) and limited ability or motivation to tailor self-presentations for low self-monitors (Berscheid, Graziano, Monson, & Dermer, 1976; Elliott, 1979).

Such a contention suggests that the self-presentational strategies with which high and low self-monitors approach social interactions may have important implications for their self-conceptions. Low self-monitors may be more responsive to cues for private self-awareness because they have easier access to private aspects of the self such as mood; high self-monitors may be more responsive to cues for public self-awareness because they have easier access to public aspects of the self. This explanation follows previous research that suggests differences in the self-conceptions of high and low self-monitors (Ickes et al., 1978; Sampson, 1978; Snyder & Cantor, 1980). Snyder (1987) and Snyder and Campbell (1982) have characterized the flexible, role-based self-concepts of high self-monitors as pragmatic, whereas the consistent, trait-based self-concepts of low self-monitors are characterized as principled, thereby suggesting two discrete classes of individuals, each with a different intentional and motivational agenda toward private as well as public self-conception. This view implies that the Self-Monitoring Scale measures a bipolar construct.

Such a claim has been challenged by findings that self-monitoring is not negatively correlated with scales that tap private aspects of identity (Briggs & Cheek, 1988; Cheek & Briggs, 1981). In the current study, for instance, we found moderate positive correlations between self-monitoring and both private and public self-consciousness (see Footnote 4). (Private and public self-consciousness are the dispositional counterparts to private and public self-awareness.) Additionally, Cheek (1987) found that, although self-monitoring was correlated with the importance of social aspects of identity, it was not related to personal aspects of identity.

Experiments 1 and 2 of our study can be explained without assuming bipolarity in the Self-Monitoring Scale. Those who are concerned with self-presentation (high self-monitors) are more responsive to public self-awareness manipulations than those who are relatively unconcerned with self-presentation (low self-monitors). It is more difficult, however, to explain why those low in self-presentational concerns would be more responsive to private self-awareness inductions in a private context than would high self-monitors. Although the Self-Monitoring Scale may not directly differentiate public from private self-orientations, the results of Experiments 3 and 4 suggest that

there is a difference between high and low self-monitors in their ability to access intrapersonal information (e.g., mood).

To summarize, our results demonstrate interactions between self-monitoring and self-awareness, the form of which varies by context. High and low self-monitors were differentially responsive to manipulations of public and private self-awareness when the dependent measure was of a corresponding public or private nature. Whether or not these findings can be attributed to differences in private as well as public self-conceptions of high and low self-monitors is still an unresolved issue. More centrally, we have demonstrated that the private versus public context of self-awareness is an important determinant of the expression of self-monitoring orientations.

References

- Arkin, R. M., & Baumgardner, A. H. (1986). Self-presentation and self-evaluation: Processes of self-control and social control. In R. M. Baumeister (Ed.), *Public self and private self* (pp. 75-97). New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Baldwin, M. W., & Holmes, J. G. (1987). Salient private audiences and awareness of the self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 52, 1087-1098.
- Baumeister, R. F. (1982). A self-presentational view of social phenomena. *Psychological Bulletin*, 91, 3-26.
- Baumeister, R. F. (Ed.). (1986). *Public self and private self*. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Berscheid, E., Graziano, W., Monson, T., & Dermer, M. (1976). Outcome dependency: Attention, attribution, and attraction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 34, 978-989.
- Briggs, S. R., & Cheek, J. M. (1987, August). *The nature of self-monitoring: Have we rediscovered the wheel?* Paper presented at the 95th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, New York.
- Briggs, S. R., & Cheek, J. M. (1988). On the nature of self-monitoring: Problems with assessment, problems with validity. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 54, 663-678.
- Briggs, S. R., Cheek, J. M., & Buss, A. H. (1980). An analysis of the Self-Monitoring Scale. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 38, 679-686.
- Buss, A. H. (1980). *Self-consciousness and social anxiety*. San Francisco: Freeman.
- Buss, D. M., & Scheier, M. F. (1976). Self-consciousness, self-awareness and self-attribution. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 10, 463-468.
- Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1981). *Attention and self-regulation: A control theory approach to human behavior*. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1987). The blind men and the elephant: Selective examination of the public-private literature gives rise to a faulty perception. *Journal of Personality*, 55, 525-541.
- Cheek, J. M. (1987, May). *Identity orientations*. Paper presented at the Fourth Annual International Conference on the Self, Nags Head, NC.
- Cheek, J. M., & Briggs, S. R. (1981, August). *Self-consciousness, self-monitoring, and aspects of identity*. Paper presented at the 89th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Los Angeles.
- Cheek, J. M., & Briggs, S. R. (1982). Self-consciousness and aspects of identity. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 16, 401-408.
- Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. A. (1972). *A theory of objective self-awareness*. New York: Academic Press.
- Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. A. (1973). Effects of objective self-awareness on attribution of causality. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 9, 17-31.

- Elliott, G. C. (1979). Some effects of deception and level of self-monitoring on planning and reacting to a self-presentation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *37*, 1282-1292.
- Fenigstein, A. (1987). On the nature of public and private self-consciousness. *Journal of Personality*, *55*, 543-554.
- Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H. (1975). Public and private self-consciousness: Assessment and theory. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, *43*, 522-527.
- Franzoi, S. L., & Sweeney, P. D. (1986). Another look at the relation between private self-consciousness and self-attribution. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *20*, 187-206.
- Froming, W. J., Walker, G. R., & Lopyan, K. J. (1982). Public and private self-awareness: When personal attitudes conflict with societal expectations. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *18*, 476-487.
- Gabrenya, W. K., Jr., & Arkin, R. M. (1980). Self-Monitoring Scale: Factor structure and correlates. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *6*, 13-22.
- Gibbons, F. X., Carver, C. S., Scheier, M. F., & Hormuth, S. E. (1979). Self-focused attention and the placebo effect: Fooling some of the people some of the time. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *15*, 263-274.
- Gollwitzer, P. M., & Wicklund, R. A. (1987). Fusing apples and oranges: A rejoinder to Carver & Scheier and to Fenigstein. *Journal of Personality*, *55*, 555-561.
- Gordon, C. (1968). Self-conceptions: Configurations of content. In C. Gordon & K. Gergen (Eds.), *The self in social interaction* (Vol. 1, pp. 115-136). New York: Wiley.
- Greenwald, A. G., & Breckler, S. J. (1985). To whom is the self presented? In B. R. Schlenker (Ed.), *The self and social life* (pp. 126-145). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Ickes, W., Layden, M. A., & Barnes, R. D. (1978). Objective self-awareness and individuation: An empirical link. *Journal of Personality*, *46*, 146-161.
- Lennox, R. D., & Wolfe, R. N. (1984). Revision of the Self-Monitoring Scale. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *46*, 1349-1364.
- Sampson, E. E. (1978). Personality and the location of identity. *Journal of Personality*, *46*, 552-568.
- Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (1977). Self-focused attention and the experience of emotion: Attraction, repulsion, elation, and depression. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *35*, 625-636.
- Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (1980). Private and public attention, resistance to change, and dissonance reduction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *39*, 390-405.
- Scheier, M. F., & Carver, C. S. (1983). Two sides of the self: One for you and one for me. In J. Suls & A. G. Greenwald (Eds.), *Psychological perspectives on the self* (Vol. 2, pp. 123-157). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Schlenker, B. R. (1980). *Impression management: The self-concept, social identity, and interpersonal relations*. Monterey, CA: Brooks-Cole.
- Schlenker, B. R. (1986). Self-identification: Toward an integration of the private and public self. In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.), *Public self and private self*. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Snyder, M. (1974). The self-monitoring of expressive behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *30*, 526-537.
- Snyder, M. (1976). Attribution and behavior: Social perception and social causation. In J. H. Harvey, W. J. Ickes, & R. F. Kidd (Eds.), *New directions in attribution research* (Vol. 1, pp. 53-72). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Snyder, M. (1979). Self-monitoring processes. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 12, pp. 85-128). New York: Academic Press.
- Snyder, M. (1987). *Public appearances/private realities: The psychology of self-monitoring*. New York: Freeman.
- Snyder, M., & Campbell, B. H. (1982). Self-monitoring: The self in action. In J. Suls (Ed.), *Psychological perspectives on the self* (Vol. 1, pp. 185-207). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Snyder, M., & Cantor, N. (1980). Thinking about ourselves and others: Self-monitoring and social knowledge. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *39*, 222-234.
- Snyder, M., & Monson, T. C. (1975). Persons, situations, and the control of social behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *32*, 637-644.
- Swann, W. B., Jr. (1983). Self-verification: Bringing social reality into harmony with the self. In J. Suls & A. G. Greenwald (Eds.), *Psychological perspectives on the self* (Vol. 2, pp. 33-66). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Swann, W. B., Jr., & Read, S. J. (1981). Self-verification processes: How we sustain our self-conceptions. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *17*, 351-372.
- Velten, E. (1968). A laboratory task for induction of mood states. *Behavior Research and Therapy*, *6*, 473-482.
- Wicklund, R. A. (1975). Objective self-awareness. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 8, pp. 233-275). New York: Academic Press.
- Wicklund, R. A., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1987). The fallacy of the private-public self-focus distinction. *Journal of Personality*, *55*, 491-523.
- Wicklund, R. A., & Hormuth, S. E. (1981). On the functions of the self: A reply to Hull and Levy. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *40*, 1029-1037.

Received October 26, 1987

Revision received March 25, 1988

Accepted April 5, 1988 ■