EDITOR’S FORUM

AN INTEGRATIVE MODEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL TRUST: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

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A considerable amount of research has examined trust since our 1995 publication. We revisit some of the critical issues that we addressed and provide clarifications and extensions of the topics of levels of analysis, time, control systems, reciprocity, and measurement. We also recognize recent research in new areas of trust, such as affect, emotion, violation and repair, distrust, international and cross-cultural issues, and context-specific models, and we identify promising avenues for future research.

As we wrote our 1995 paper on trust (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995), we were struck by the relative scarcity of research in the mainstream management literature focusing directly on trust. This led us to several bodies of literature, including management, psychology, philosophy, and economics. We found that scholars from diverse disciplines were presenting many insightful views and perspectives on trust but that many of them seemed to talk past one another. Our goal was to integrate these perspectives into a single model.

This work came to fruition at about the same time as several other works on trust. Papers on trust by Hosmer (1995) and McAllister (1995) were also published in Academy of Management journals that year, followed the next year by a book edited by Kramer and Tyler (1996). The confluence of these works, fueled by practical concerns raised by now infamous government and corporate scandals over the next decade, produced a groundswell of interest in understanding this basic and ubiquitous construct.

Since we were drawing perspectives from multiple disciplines as inputs to the model, we wanted to provide a model that was generally applicable and would be used across multiple disciplines. We were gratified to find in a recent search that our paper has been cited over 1,100 times (according to Google Scholar). In addition to management and general business, it has been cited in such diverse areas as marketing, accounting, finance, economics, information systems, industrial engineering, political science, communication, ethics, law, psychology, sociology, health care, and agribusiness. We would like to use this opportunity to revisit some of the issues raised by our 1995 paper and review how the field has dealt with them. We will also discuss the new concerns and opportunities for future research on trust.

CLARIFICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS OF THE MODEL OF TRUST

Trust As an Aspect of a Relationship

One of the difficult conceptual decisions that we faced as we developed our definition of trust was to break with the widely accepted approach, to that point, that trust was dispositional and “trait-like” and to argue that trust was an aspect of relationships. That meant it varied within person and across relationships. With some exceptions (e.g., Driscoll, 1978; C. L. Scott, 1980), the dominant conceptual and operational

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definition of trust in the literature was Rotter's (1967). We then went the next step and included ability as an antecedent of trust that allowed a party's trust to vary within a given trustee but across domains. The dispositional aspects of trust considered by Rotter are contained in the construct of propensity to trust in our model. The literature that has followed our model has not questioned this decision and has accepted the view that trust is based in relationships.

Application Across Levels of Analysis

The importance of multilevel and cross-level perspectives is gaining increasing attention in organizational research. This has led to a call for examining trust across levels of organizational analysis (e.g., Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). There is a need to understand trust both within and between organizations because methodological difficulties can arise in the absence of a clear multilevel conceptual model (Carrall & Inkpen, 2002; Mossholder & Bedeian, 1983; Rousseau, 1985).

We have heard from a number of scholars that the 1995 framework is fairly robust across levels of analysis. A bit of history on the development of our theory may shed light on this issue. Early drafts of our paper developed our trust model across multiple levels of analysis. One of our initial goals was to develop a theory that would be applicable across levels of analysis. We were careful to develop constructs that would cross levels of analysis, and we developed examples of how cross-level applications of the model would work. Perhaps it was fortunate that early reviewers of our paper made the accurate observation that the paper was very cumbersome (and long) because it developed the multilevel model. They recommended that we restrict our paper to a single level. The fact that our initial goal was to develop a multilevel theory is probably why the model works as well as it does across levels, but we do agree with those who argue that one of the weaknesses of the book is that it is limited to relationships at a single level of analysis, considering either dyadic trust relationships within organizations or trust between organizations.

Several authors have recognized differences in trust for single referents at different hierarchical levels within an organization (e.g., Cook & Wall, 1980; Driscoll, 1978; D. Scott, 1980). Recent research points out that trust should be examined at both the macro and micro levels within an organization (McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998). While the need to understand trust has been noted in areas of study both within and between organizations, methodological difficulties can arise in the absence of a clear multilevel conceptual model (Mossholder & Bedeian, 1983; Rousseau, 1985).

Just as perceptions about an individual's ability, benevolence, and integrity will have an impact on how much trust the individual can garner, these perceptions also affect the extent to which an organization will be trusted. We defined each of these trustworthiness dimensions so that it could be applied to interpersonal, intergroup, or interorganizational levels of analysis.

At higher levels of analysis, such as between organizations, viewing the trustee in terms of ability and integrity seems to be well accepted. At macro levels of analysis, however, benevolence has received little attention. We defined benevolence as the extent to which a party is believed to want to do good for the trusting party, aside from an egocentric profit motive. Does the other company hold the focal company's best interests as highly important? While we may be able to identify situations, such as sole proprietorships, where the owners have strong bonds that display significant benevolence toward one another, the more traditional mode is probably one wherein each company is motivated primarily by its own financial interests. If this is indeed the norm, benevolence is not likely to be the most important factor in the development of interorganizational trust. However, acts of benevolence (e.g., allowing benchmarking) from a potential partner in a joint venture would help to build trust.

We contend that all three factors of ability, benevolence, and integrity can contribute to trust in a group or organization. Consider, for instance, a supplier-buyer relationship. The buyer may believe that a supplier is able to provide a quality product in a timely fashion. However, this only assures that the supplier will perform. This does not mean that it will perform, and, therefore, the supplier will not necessarily be trusted. The perception that the supplier has integrity suggests that it will fulfill agreements as promised. Yet even if there is an
agreement, if the supplier’s ability to deliver is questionable, it will not be trusted. If the supplier is perceived as benevolent, it will have a strong desire to serve this particular buyer’s needs. If the supplier’s integrity is suspect because, for instance, its track record with other firms is inconsistent with its stated policies, trust will again be lacking. As the perception of each of these factors increases, we would expect an increase in willingness to take a risk in the relationship.

The trust of either the dominant coalition or the management team is critical to understanding organizational trust, since it is this level of trust that will govern the strategic actions of the organization (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1957). As with individuals, we propose that some organizations develop greater propensities to trust than do others. For organizations, these propensities develop from geographic, industry, and economic histories. A series of previous interactions with other organizations that resulted in, for example, lawsuits or monetary losses would lower an organization’s propensity to trust. Conversely, a series of such experiences as mutual benchmarking with various organizations that significantly improved the quality processes for an organization would increase its trust propensity.

In summary, groups and organizations can both garner trust from other parties and trust other parties. Our model was designed to understand the major factors that explain trust from not only the individual level but from the group and organizational perspectives as well.

The Time Dimension

One of the issues explicit in our theory was that “time” would play an important role in the meaningfulness of the variables in the model. We noted that propensity, as a dispositional quality, would be an important factor at the very beginning of the relationship. We also noted that judgments of ability and integrity would form relatively quickly in the course of the relationship and that benevolence judgments would take more time. Proposition 3 states that “the effect of integrity on trust will be most salient early in the relationship prior to the development of meaningful benevolence data” (1995: 722); Proposition 4 states that “the effect of perceived benevolence on trust will increase over time as the relationship between the parties develops” (1995: 722).

Despite these assertions, in many empirical studies researchers have raised questions about the high observed correlation between benevolence and integrity and have questioned the independence of these variables. In a discussion of several empirical studies, Schoorman (2002) observed that the findings as a whole were completely consistent with the model. Those studies conducted in laboratory settings were more likely to show a high correlation between benevolence and integrity because the relationships had not had time to develop any real data about benevolence. In field samples where the parties had longer relationships, benevolence and integrity were more likely to be separable factors. We continue to find this pattern to be consistent in our research. We think it would be interesting for future research to establish more specifically the process and time frames in which each of the variables contributes to trust.

Trust, Risk, and Control Systems

In our model we argued that trust would lead to risk taking in a relationship (see Proposition 5). Perceived risk moderates the relationship between trust and risk taking in our model. Trust is the “willingness to take risk,” and the level of trust is an indication of the amount of risk that one is willing to take. Clearly, control systems are an alternate mechanism for dealing with risk in relationships. Recently, several scholars have speculated about the relationship between trust and control systems in dealing with risk (McEvily et al., 2003; Sitkin & George, 2005).

Our views on this issue are developed further in Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson (1997), in which we argue that one of the major distinctions between agency theory and stewardship theory is the use of trust versus control systems to manage risk. However, we do not see these mechanisms as being mutually exclusive. On the contrary, when the risk in a situation is greater than the trust (and, thus, the willingness to take risk), a control system can bridge the difference by lowering the perceived risk to a level that can be managed by trust. For example, in an organization that has a culture of “open book management” and transparency in numbers (a control system), the levels of perceived risk may be lower. There is a greater
opportunity to empower employees by trusting them to manage larger budgets and for employees to trust the supervisor that performance-based compensation is fair.

However, there is an important caveat that must be noted. If there is a very strong system of controls in an organization, it will inhibit the development of trust. Not only will there be few situations where there is any remaining perceived risk but trustworthy actions will be attributed to the existence of the control system rather than to the trustee (cf. Strickland, 1958). Thus, a trustee’s actions that should be interpreted as driven by benevolence or by integrity may be viewed simply as responses to the control systems. The use of control systems is how agency theory proposes dealing with risk management, and this does not foster the development of trust.

The Reciprocity of Trust

One of the limitations of our model that we noted in the conclusion of our 1995 paper was that our conceptualization was unidirectional. We did not explore the reciprocity in trusting relationships. This is a particularly salient issue in the area of leader-subordinate relationships, since the dominant view among leadership theorists is that leader-member exchange (LMX) is mutual and reciprocal (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995; Liden, Wayne, & Stillwell, 1993). In an extension of our model, Brower, Schoorman, and Tan (2000) argued that, unlike LMX, trust is not necessarily mutual and is not reciprocal. One of the implications of this argument is that, in a relationship, A can trust B, but B may not trust A. This is completely consistent with the approach to trust and trust formation that we presented in our model but is inconsistent with the views in the leadership literature. Empirical studies that examine this reciprocal linkage of how one party’s trust affects the other party’s trust in return, rather than assuming them to be equivalent, are rare (Serva, Fuller, & Mayer, 2005). We feel that this presents a fruitful area for future research.

Measurement of Trust As “Willingness to Be Vulnerable”

While the theory of trust described in the 1995 paper has been very influential in the development of trust research, the measurement of trust has been a different story. We defined trust as a willingness to be vulnerable to another party. As such, suitable measurement of the construct necessitates that questions be asked that assess the extent to which a trustor is willing to voluntarily take risks at the hands of the trustee.

We developed a short, four-item measure, with each of the items tapping into how willing the trustor was to be vulnerable to the trustee. We (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 1996a) found that veterinary doctors took bigger risks with those employees they trusted more. The impact of trust went beyond that explained by the ability, benevolence, and integrity of the trustee. Despite the measure’s brevity, we found its internal consistency strong (Cronbach’s alpha = .82).

We (Davis, Schoorman, Mayer, & Tan, 2000) used the same measure in a restaurant setting to measure the trust that employees had in their general manager and found an alpha of .62. This measure of trust in the leader significantly predicted subsequent sales, profits, and employee turnover in the restaurants (Davis, Mayer, & Schoorman, 1995; Davis et al., 2000). Based on these results, we concluded that if trust in the general manager could be developed and sustained, it would be a significant competitive advantage to the firm, and the framework, including ability, benevolence, and integrity, merited further consideration as an approach to building trust in management.

Using this same measure, a quasi-experiment (Mayer & Davis, 1999) showed that trust in top management was significantly improved by identifying and replacing an invalid appraisal system. While the alpha in this study was lower (i.e., .59 and .60 in two waves of data), the test-retest reliability was quite strong, at .75 over five months and .66 over nine months. Furthermore, the quasi-experimental results were significant, even though the sizes of the groups being compared were modest (i.e., twenty-two and fifty-seven). In additional analyses we found an average interitem correlation of $r = .32$. For each item we calculated a correlation between it and a composite of the other three items. These correlations ranged from .23 to .49, with an average of .38.

These results fall well within Kline’s (1986) description of a measure of a complex construct that has maximum validity. Kline noted that such a measure would only have low internal
consistency reliability. Internal consistency estimates suffer because of the brevity of this measure. As Cortina says, “[Alpha] must be interpreted with the number of items in mind” (1993: 102). If the measure were truly unreliable, we would not have been able to attain the significant results we have repeatedly found with its use (Nunnally, 1978). The results of these studies all support the idea that while our four-item measure of willingness to be vulnerable has at times had lower than desired levels of Cronbach’s alpha, it is a robust, stable, and valid measure of the construct as we defined it.

More recent efforts to develop the measure have yielded higher alpha levels. Mayer and Gavin (2005) expanded the measure to ten items, yielding alphas of .82 and .76 for the plant manager and the top management team, respectively. Further analysis revealed two factors, however. One factor consisted of the original measure with an additional item, whereas the second factor consisted of five items that generally cited willingness to engage in specific behaviors that would put a trustor at risk, such as communicating sensitive information to the trustee. The five-item general willingness to be vulnerable scale yielded an alpha of .81 for the focal plant manager and .72 for the top management team. Both of these were improvements of .06 and .07, respectively, over the four-item measure. While results using the five-item scale were reported in that study, the ten-item scale yielded nearly identical results.

In what may be the most promising measure to date, Schoorman and Ballinger (2006) expanded the original measure to seven items, taking care to maintain the conceptual definition but not create redundant items. It has produced an alpha level of .84 in a sample of veterinary hospital employees. This measure appears in the Appendix.

Gillespie (2003) developed and validated a measure of trust based on the willingness to be vulnerable definition. This ten-item Behavioral Trust Inventory has good psychometric properties and shows promise for future research based on this conceptual definition.

The upshot of this discussion is that measuring trust as we defined it involves asking questions that measure a trustor’s willingness to be vulnerable. We are aware from numerous personal communications from other researchers that many of them are concerned with the lower than desirable alpha levels of our original measure. While we think that a combination of its conceptual clarity, test-retest reliability, and relationship with other variables in the nomological net across a number of studies is just as important a consideration as the alpha level of a four-item measure, we recognize that development of the more recent longer measures with higher alpha levels was warranted. The measures we have developed more recently appear to have overcome concerns with Cronbach alpha levels. We believe that as these measures become more widely available, more researchers will choose to measure trust as defined in our 1995 paper.

On a related note, work on trust would be facilitated by further development of measures of propensity. Many researchers have found Rotter’s (1967) twenty-five-item measure too long to include as a variable in studies with many other variables and are concerned about its multidimensionality. Our adaptation (Mayer & Davis, 1999; Schoorman et al., 1996a), while much shorter and unidimensional, has not consistently produced high Cronbach’s alphas (e.g., .55 and .66 in Mayer & Davis, 1999). We are not aware of any brief, unidimensional published measure of propensity that produces consistently high alpha levels. Development of such a measure might enable finding more relationships between propensity and other variables of interest, particularly early in the development of a relationship.

**NEW DIMENSIONS IN THE RESEARCH ON TRUST**

**Affect, Emotion, and the Impact on Trust**

The basis of our model was to understand how parties process information about others, thereby deciding how much risk to take with those others. Perceptions of others and perceptions of risk inherent in the behaviors being considered must be processed in order to come to decisions about taking risks. For instance, as one evaluates a trustee’s ability in the domain of interest or considers relevant inputs about a trustee’s integrity, one is thinking. As such, our model represents a cognitive approach to trust. More recent work has pointed to the fact that trust also involves emotion. Williams (2001) has pointed out that affective responses influence
how people evaluate their level of trust in another party. Similarly, Jones and George (1998) have argued that emotions and moods provide people with information on how they are experiencing trust. Dunn and Schweitzer (2005) found that emotional states—even unrelated to the trustee or the situation—have an effect on trust. Weber, Malhotra, and Murnighan (2005) have shown that emotional attachments can cause a trustor to take a sudden risk not warranted by the available evidence.

Proponents of the strictly cognitive approach to decision making about trust would argue that while emotions may create a temporary “irrationality” about the data on ability, benevolence, and integrity, after a period of time the perception would return to a rational perspective. Nonetheless, it appears to be clear that emotions do influence the perception of the antecedents of trust and, therefore, the trust in relationships. It is also likely that this emotion does dissipate over time after a violation of trust. What is not clear is whether it ever completely dissipates and returns to a nonemotional evaluation. Alternatively, while emotions are being experienced, they may lead the trustor to update prior perceptions of the trustworthiness dimensions and trust such that even after the emotions dissipate, the effect on the cognitive evaluations remains. We think the role of emotions is a very interesting area of research and will add a new dimension to the model.

Violation and Trust Repair

Some exemplary work has been done to understand trust violation and repair (e.g., Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Morrison & Robinson, 1997; Robinson, 1996), but this topic warrants more research. As part of their contributions, these authors highlight the idea that violation of trust is likely to be an emotional event for the trustor. At the time of this writing, a special issue of the Academy of Management Review (edited by Dirks, Lewicki, and Zaheer) focused on trust repair in preparation. This is a very appropriate topic and promises to add valuable insight into the process by which trust development can move forward after trust has been damaged.

We believe that in order to repair trust, it is critical to first understand how it was damaged in the first place, since different means of damaging trust are likely to require different reparative responses. Dating back to the 1950s (e.g., Kruglanski, 1970; Strickland, 1958), some work has been done that begins to lay the groundwork for how attributions are made when trust is broken. We suggest that which trustworthiness factor is damaged and how it was damaged influence not only how repairable the damage is likely to be but how effective various repair strategies are likely to be. Repair attempts might be looked at either as mediating processes within the feedback arrow in our model or as influencing the trustworthiness factors directly (e.g., receiving information about trustworthiness factors outside the process of having taken a risk that went awry). Further theoretical work in this area to understand the conditions under which various repair strategies are effective would help in developing prescriptive roadmaps for repairing broken trust.

Forgiveness is another evolving area that holds promise for understanding trust repair after a violation. An insightful paper by Aquino, Grover, Goldman, and Folger (2003) provides an important separation between resolving negative emotions (i.e., forgiveness itself) and behaviors that follow that restore the relationship. More work in this area is needed to determine such basic issues as the conditions under which forgiveness enhances trust repair after a violation, what conditions increase the likelihood that an offended party will forgive the violator, and the role that forgiveness plays in the trust repair process.

The Concept of Distrust

There has been considerable discussion in the literature about the concept of distrust, as well as the relationship between trust and distrust. Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies (1998) framed the debate in the organizational literature, arguing that trust and distrust are separate dimensions and not the opposite ends of a single continuum. They noted that two-factor models of satisfaction and dissatisfaction had been proposed before (Herzberg, Mausner, & Snyderman, 1967), and that the contemporary evidence from studies of positive and negative affectivity supports this view. Their main reason for suggesting such an approach to the trust-distrust distinction was because “relationships are multifaceted or multiplex” (1998: 442), and we need a model that
allows for both trust and distrust to exist in the same relationship.

In our model we chose to take the opposite (and more traditional) view that trust and distrust are the opposite ends of the same continuum. This is consistent with dictionary definitions—for example, Webster’s defines distrust as “the lack or absence of trust” and Random House as “to have no trust in.” In sociology, Ross, Mirowski, and Pribesh define “mistrust” as the “absence of faith in other people” (2001: 568). Luhmann argues that distrust is a “functional equivalent of trust” (1979: 71). Our definition of trust—willingness to take risk (i.e., be vulnerable) in a relationship—means that at the lowest level of trust, one would take no risks at all. We felt that the complete lack of trust and distrust are the same thing.

In our model of trust, however, we argued that ability is an important antecedent of trust, along with benevolence and integrity. This was a deviation from an emerging view that trust was more affective. This point is further clarified in Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis (1996b). The important implication of the addition of ability to the antecedents of trust is that it creates a framework of trust that is domain specific. This is noted in our original article (1995: 717) and follows from the work of Zand (1972). Trust being domain specific allows for the multifaceted and multiplex relationships about which Lewicki et al. (1998) raised concerns. For example, it may be appropriate to trust a colleague to do a good job collaborating on a research project but to not trust him/her to do a good job teaching your class in your absence. The difference in the level of trust within the same relationship is a function of the different abilities across different domains. The skills required to present and interact effectively in class differ from those necessary to do research.

Lewicki et al. (1998) produced a chart with a high trust and high distrust condition in which one would presumably “trust, but verify.” We feel this is not a reasonable argument within domain. If you trust a partner, you do not need to verify. Doing so would be the clearest indication that you do not trust. We do agree that you might trust your colleague to produce a literature review but may need to verify his/her ability to deliver in the classroom by reviewing his/her lecture notes and presentation. Our model says that you don’t need different constructs to account for this.

McKnight and Chervany (2001) produced an excellent summary of the literature on definitions of trust and distrust and the models that describe each of the constructs. They reviewed the literature on trust and distrust and developed separate conceptual models (antecedent and contextual variables) for each construct. The resulting models are identical for both trust and distrust, which suggests to us that perhaps we do not need both models. In fact, these authors conclude that “most trust theorists agree that trust and distrust are separate constructs that are opposites of each other” (2001: 42). We would simply add that if they are opposites of each other, there is little added value to treating them as separate constructs.

A review of empirical work on the conceptualization of distrust in the literature produced surprising results. Some who argue that trust and distrust are different dimensions only study one of the constructs at a time, making it difficult to develop data on the differences. It is particularly interesting that some researchers who study the concept of distrust (e.g. McAllister, Pang, Tan, & Ruan, 2006) have used our measure of trust as a willingness to be vulnerable (Mayer & Davis, 1999; Schoorman et al., 1996b) and reverse-scored it to represent their measure of distrust. In sum, we can find no credible evidence that a concept of distrust that is conceptually different from trust is theoretically or empirically viable.

International and Cross-Cultural Implications for Trust

Over the same time frame in which interest in trust accelerated, there was a significant increase in interest in studying cross-national and cross-cultural differences. It is therefore not surprising that much of the explosion of interest in trust research has come from around the globe. Over 20 percent of the 1,100 studies listed in Google Scholar that cite our paper were written in a language other than English. The World Economic Forum is made up of the world’s leading politicians and business leaders. It meets annually in Davos, Switzerland to discuss a wide range of international issues. It has been monitoring public trust levels since 2003 through a biannual global public opinion poll conducted by GlobeScan Incorporated. The latest findings
from the poll show that trust in a range of institutions has dropped significantly since January 2004 to levels not seen since the months following the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001 (www.weforum.org). GlobeScan reports that the overall trust level for global companies is the lowest since the tracking began. While we are not sure what definition of trust was used in this poll, these results present obvious reasons for concern.

The recent GLOBE project by House and colleagues (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004; House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002) measured the cultural orientation of sixty-two societies around the world based largely on the cultural dimensions identified by Hofstede (1980). These scholars used nine dimensions of culture, as well as twenty-one leadership dimensions. All of this research has led to the inevitable question of how trust is different across cultures (Den Hartog, 2004; Wasti, Tan, Brower, & Onder, in press).

We believe that one of the ways in which culture affects trust is through the propensity variable. We have proposed that the antecedents of propensity include personality, experiences, and culture. There is evidence in the culture literature that initial trust of strangers varies across cultures. One of the dimensions of culture that is most relevant to this issue is the task versus relationship orientation of a culture. Task-oriented cultures seem to have a higher initial trust of strangers and therefore a higher propensity, while relationship-oriented cultures need time to develop a relationship prior to working on the task. The cultural variable of uncertainty avoidance is well-established as a predictor of predispositions to take risk or be risk averse (Sully de Luque & Javidan, 2004). If trust is the willingness to take risk in a relationship, how does uncertainty avoidance as a dispositional quality affect the development of trust? We think there is considerable work that needs to be done in fine-tuning what we know about the influence of culture on the propensity to trust.

Culture can also affect the perception of ability, benevolence, and integrity and the importance given to each of these variables in the model. More action-oriented, competitive, performance-oriented cultures—what Hofstede has called “masculine” cultures—tend to place a higher value on the ability variable. More collaborative, being-oriented, “feminine” cultures tend to put more emphasis on the benevolence variable. While these are broad generalizations of relationships between culture and trust, they illustrate the potential value of future research to develop these links more carefully.

Context-Specific Models of Trust

It was our intention in developing the model to be as parsimonious as possible and to develop a model that would be generalizable to the broadest number of contexts. In order to achieve this, we neglected many specific context variables that would be relevant to a more restricted trust domain. We think it would be appropriate to specify contextual variables for the model that are unique to studying trust within a particular context. For example, much of the research on trust in organizations has focused on the relationship between supervisors and subordinates. In this context, the hierarchical power difference and the asymmetry of information that exist between the two individuals in the trusting relationship have some important implications for how trust might develop. If the supervisor has more access to information about the subordinate and can initiate opportunities to gather information about ability, benevolence, and integrity, and if these opportunities are not available to the subordinate, we would expect that the supervisor’s trust in the subordinate would develop more quickly than vice versa.

Additionally, since risk taking in the relationship is caused by an interaction between trust and risk, one’s perceptions of risk in the action being contemplated (which our model separates from the trustee in question) will affect risk-taking actions. Ceteris paribus, the party who has more power in the relationship will likely perceive—by virtue of that power—less risk and, thus, will engage in more risk-taking actions. This would give the appearance that this party’s trust is higher still. In the context of trust between peers, there is likely to be a different set of variables that predict the development and use of trust. We expect that studies in particular contexts will develop additional variables that help better explain the antecedents and consequences of trust.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this paper we have taken the opportunity to reflect on our thinking as we developed the 1995 piece, “An Integrative Model of Organizational Trust,” and the knowledge context in which it occurred. This paper has given us an opportunity to revisit some of the decisions that we made and to evaluate them in light of the research that followed. A part of our charge in writing this paper was to indicate how our own research in this area has progressed and how we view the growing body of literature on the topic.

The levels-of-analysis issue continues to be an interesting topic of discussion, and more explicit extensions to group and organizational levels are warranted. We note that time issues addressed in our paper have not received the attention that we expected. Research attempts to study trust in very short laboratory simulations have yielded mixed but not unexpected results. By including a consideration of time, studies of trust should lead to more predictable results. The interplay of trust, risk, and control systems continues to be a much debated topic. We have attempted to clarify our thinking on these dynamics. We see trust and control systems as alternate and sometimes compatible means for managing risk. We have extended our thinking about the reciprocity of trust to explicitly recognize the notion that, unlike relational leadership constructs (e.g., LMX), trust is not mutual and not necessarily reciprocal. The measures of trust that we had developed based on our definition of trust have produced mixed results in terms of internal consistency reliability estimates. Here we have explored some of the developments and advances in the measurement area and have noted the need for continued improvement.

We also have reviewed some of the interesting new directions in the research on trust. Prominent among these is the inclusion of the role of affect and emotion, trust violations, and repair. We believe these constructs will add new dimensions to the model of trust and provide for valuable research in the future. Another area seeing rapid growth in interest is the role that international and cross-cultural dimensions play in the model of trust. We see the greatest opportunities in the development of the concept of propensity across cultures, as well as for the relative importance of ability, benevolence, and integrity across cultures. Finally, we note that while we deliberately focused on a model that was maximally generalizable and parsimonious, it is appropriate to now examine context-specific variables that might add to the model of trust. One such area that our research has taken us into is the specific relationship between supervisor and subordinate in the workplace. Issues of power and information asymmetry make this relationship and the trust it produces somewhat unique.

While a great deal of research has occurred in the area of trust over the past decade, the new research only suggests that there is a lot more to be done and many very promising avenues to pursue. We hope that our comments in this paper can be a catalyst for some of this research.

APPENDIX

Trust Items from Schoorman and Ballinger (2006)

1. My supervisor keeps my interests in mind when making decisions.
2. I would be willing to let my supervisor have complete control over my future in this company.
3. If my supervisor asked why a problem occurred, I would speak freely even if I were partly to blame.
4. I feel comfortable being creative because my supervisor understands that sometimes creative solutions do not work.
5. It is important for me to have a good way to keep an eye on my supervisor.
6. Increasing my vulnerability to criticism by my supervisor would be a mistake.
7. If I had my way, I wouldn’t let my supervisor have any influence over decisions that are important to me.

Response Scale

1 strongly disagree 2 somewhat disagree 3 neither agree nor disagree 4 somewhat agree 5 strongly agree

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