A Conversation about Communication Ethics
with Richard L. Johannesen

How did you become interested in studying communication ethics?

It has become very clear to me that the starting point was somewhere toward the end of my doctoral work. It occurred to me that in the coursework that I had taken in Speech/Speech Communication, now Communication, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, that virtually all of what we were taught or were teaching in those courses was “how to”: how the communication process worked, how the techniques functioned, which processes were most effective and successful with which audiences and under what conditions. At the same time it occurred to me that very seldom did we ask or were we asked “whether to” questions. Even if we knew that something would work, even if we knew how something would work, ought we to do it in terms of ethical responsibility?

As I best recall, the only places in the late 1950s and early 1960s where communication ethics was focused in textbooks were persuasion textbooks: one by Robert Oliver and one by Wayne Minnick. And there was an argumentation and debate and discussion book by Henry Eubank and J. Jeffrey Auer that included a solid chapter on ethics. As I recall that’s about it. Unless you were taking a persuasion course that used one of those texts or an argumentation and group discussion course that used the Eubank and Auer book, you probably weren’t forced by many teachers to ask questions about ethical responsibility.

For some reason, that bothered me. I guess it was a nagging realization that there was something missing in my education and perhaps the education of others that was really important. That puzzled me and it bothered me. I think that was the initial “click” moment that made me decide to include communication ethics as part of my professional life—even though most of my training in doctoral work was in the history and criticism of American public address, with a minor in American history. If I had to do it over again I would minor in philosophy, but you know, you can’t do it over again. That really was the motivational force.

Do you prefer the term “communication ethic” or “communication ethics”?

Over time I’ve become more comfortable with the phrase “communication ethics” to designate what I’m working in or about, rather than a communication ethic. I think the phrase communication ethics is broad enough, flexible enough in scope, to include a variety of issues and contexts. It can still allow
anyone working in the field to propose and argue for a communication ethic as most appropriate as they see it, or the best that we can do at this point. I don’t start out by thinking that there is a communication ethic and that it is out there somewhere, like a Platonic ideal, and I can intuit it. It’ll be constructed by us collectively over time. So I’m very comfortable with the phrase “communication ethics.”

I also don’t differentiate much between rhetorical ethics and communication ethics. I guess I would have coming out of graduate school, but I don’t anymore. I think both of them have a communicator with the intent or purpose to influence others in some way to some degree. Both involve choices among communicative means to achieve whatever the communicative end might be, and we’re responsible for those choices. Sometimes, even in my texts, I’ll use rhetorical ethics or communication ethics more or less interchangeably. Others may not feel comfortable in doing that, but I have tended to. I like the phrase “communication ethics” because it is comfortable for me to designate a field of study, not a formal traditional discipline, but an interdisciplinary field of study. Also I see communication ethics, in one sense, clearly as applied philosophy of ethics. Practical ethics, but not just any old practical ethics, because I think we’ve become collectively more and more convinced that communication is central to what it means to be human. If that’s the case, then we can’t avoid communication ethics playing a central role in the exploration of ethical issues generally.

To be human is to be a communicator in an essential way, in my mind at least. We should be asking questions about groundings of our communication ethics, underpinnings, basic principles, and not just be about applied ethics. I think we have an obligation to also do philosophical theory and critique. Over time a lot of this has evolved. I know I wouldn’t have answered some questions the same way fresh out of graduate school that I do now or even at midpoint, but two years into retirement, that’s the way I think.

Would you talk about the themes in your scholarship related to communication ethics?

I would describe it by who influenced me, and I can describe it by themes that I think are typical of my work over time. At the end of my doctoral work and very early in my career, I was clearly influenced by the writings of three people whom I consider within our field as founders of the study of commu-
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Communication ethics. Namely Karl Wallace at University of Illinois, Franklyn Haiman at Northwestern University and, often neglected, Tom Nilsen at the University of Washington. All of them were actively publishing in the 1950s in national and regional journals on communication ethics. I think of Karl Wallace’s article that appeared in *The Speech Teacher* on an ethical basis for communication. I would warrant it is one of the most reprinted and commented on pieces in communication ethics during the 1950s and ’60s. Franklyn Haiman, who we identify with massive and solid work on freedom of speech, started out early writing about communication ethics and persuasive ethics, and he’s always worried about both. An early article of his reexamining the ethics of persuasion appeared in the *Central States Speech Journal* in 1952, and more predominate was his article on democratic ethics and the hidden persuaders in the *Quarterly Journal of Speech* in 1958. I suppose that Tom Nilsen’s work was most influential to me early on. One journal article, of which he published a number, that I found most helpful was “Free Speech, Persuasion, and the Democratic Process,” also published in the *Quarterly Journal of Speech* in 1958. Nilsen’s textbook, the first textbook in communication ethics, *Ethics in Speech Communication*, went through two editions and was very influential. I always admired it because, unlike mine, although my bias has become apparent in it, his was a book written from a standpoint about democracy and reason and discussed the implications for a communication ethic. His wasn’t a survey of various approaches or emerging trends or issues, but it was a very valuable book, I think, both for students and teachers. Admittedly, the writings of those three people were very influential on me.

Then, over time, my interest in Martin Buber has also been a major influence on my writing and on my life, especially his three major books: (i) *I and Thou*, (ii) *Between Man and Man*, and (iii) *The Knowledge of Man*. Those three books collectively capture the heart of his philosophy of dialogic communication. So you’ll find that clearly reflected in a lot of my work. More recently I would point to the books and articles of Ron Arnett, particularly his books (i) *Dwell in Peace*, (ii) *Communication and Community*, and (iii) *Dialogic Education*. He has influenced me interpersonally as well as through his writings. Two people who have not been directly active in the work of this conference or the National Communication Association Communication Ethics Division, but who were influential in writing about Martin Buber and ethical implications, are Rob Anderson and Ken Cissna. Their books and writings have been influential on my understanding of not only
Buber's approach to dialogue, but also other conceptions of dialogue including Mikhail Bakhtin's work. Their books hold fascinating content, especially the critical analysis of *The Martin Buber–Carl Rogers Dialogue*—how it is or is not Buberian dialogue, or another of their books entitled *Moments of Meeting*. A third book of theirs, *The Reach of Dialogue*, was done in conjunction with Ron Arnett. And most recently, a fascinating book simply called *Dialogue: Theorizing Difference in Communication Studies*, edited along with Leslie Baxter. I think they've moved the discussion about the nature of dialogue forward through all of their work.

Then, admittedly, Cliff Christians and his writing and example have influenced me with his books, his articles, and the broad range of concerns that he presses upon us. First, the notion of looking for some kind of minimal universal ethical norm for communication. This is perhaps best reflected in the book of original essays that he edited with Michael Traber called *Communication Ethics and Universal Values*. Along with that is a continuing concern of his for not just worrying about personal ethics—individual ethics—but really worrying more about institutional ethics, systemic ethics, and organizational ethics. That’s reflected in part in his book with John Ferré and Mark Fackler called *Good News: Social Ethics and the Press*, and particularly crystallized in a very recent article of his with Kaarle Nordenstreng called “Social Responsibility Worldwide” in the 2004 *Journal of Mass Media Ethics*. Also influential has been his openness to exploring diverse approaches to communication ethics. He attends to non-major traditions of ethical theorizing, and to theorists that may be a little on the periphery of what we’ve been used to, or to at least what formal ethics and philosophy departments have been used to. That’s pulled together, I think brilliantly, in the edited volume that he did with Sharon Bracci, that was published a few years ago called *Moral Engagement in Public Life*. Those kinds of themes in his work, in both books and articles, have caught my attention and generally I’ve agreed with much of what he’s argued. So those are some of the kinds of influences that I guess I would look back on.

I do think that there are some themes in my work. I guess, since I preach about it in my classes and writings, one of the major themes has to be the ongoing tension between freedom and responsibility. We can’t avoid that tension in what we’re teaching about communication. We have to make students understand that, yes, at least in our political system, we have certain maximum freedoms of communication. At least in theory we do and we need to understand what they are. We also need to understand that you can
exercise those freedoms in more or less responsible or ethical ways. Freedom and responsibility are related but separate issues: “What are my constitutional rights?” “What is the tension between legality and ethicality?” “Should we make them synonymous—that which is legal is ethical—and try to disabuse students of that tension?” That has, I think, been a theme in my text *Ethics in Human Communication* through all five editions.

The one time I had to really pull that together was for a chapter in a book edited by Ron Arnett and Josina Makau, *Communication Ethics in an Age of Diversity*. It was a chapter entitled “Diversity, Freedom, and Responsibility in Tension.” I tried to talk about the tension between ethics and freedom in three contexts—allegedly obscene rap lyrics, pornography, and hate speech—and explore how that tension works itself out.

A second theme has become more and more important in my work; the role of what I call formed ethical character in ethical decision making. This entails who we are at a given moment, in terms of our formed ethical character, and has a lot to say about our sensitivity to ethical issues. Depending on who we are at that moment, we will either recognize or not recognize that there is an ethical issue at all. Who we are in terms of ethical character at that moment will determine how motivated we are to do anything at all about an ethical issue, and whether to worry about it at all. As several people have pointed out, there may be time constraints where we don’t have the luxury of reflection: deadlines, pressure, and crisis. In those moments who we are, our ethical character, will more or less determine whether we do the right thing or not, rather than applying some formal ethical framework in a more leisurely fashion. My argument would be that a healthily developed ethical character would allow a person more times than not to do the right thing in those kinds of situations. Not invariably, not absolutely, but given the uncertain circumstances that you’re in, a person of sound formal moral character will probably do the right thing. That’s been at least in the last couple of editions of my text. I had the opportunity to really focus on that topic in a book chapter called “Virtue Ethics, Character, and Political Communication” published in an anthology called *Ethical Dimensions of Political Communication* edited by Robert Denton.

I guess the third theme that I have become more interested with and about in the last couple of editions of my text are the various versions of the feminine or feminist ethic of care as it has developed somewhat similarly but somewhat differently in various authors, starting with Carol Gilligan, and Nel Noddings, but including Rita Manning, and Joan Tronto, and our own
Julia Wood. They all approach this topic in slightly different ways. I had the chance to look at some connections between Martin Buber and Nel Noddings’s work in an article published in the *Southern Communication Journal* entitled “Nel Noddings’s Uses of Martin Buber’s Philosophy of Dialogue.”

I’ve been fortunate to be able to play out those themes in textbook form for students but also in book chapters where you can really approach it in more detail with more examples and see how it works. I’m comfortable with identifying those as three really important themes for me over time in work on communication ethics. There may be other themes that people would detect in my work, and that’s probably true.

*The inclusion of feminist communication ethics attests to a change in the way we understand and study communication ethics. What are your thoughts about communication ethics and the historical shift to postmodernity?*

Well, I’ve tried to grapple with the issue of postmodern ethics and include some of that in my my text. From my point of view, I don’t think there is any one universally accepted definition of postmodernism. I’ve tried through a series of questions with my students and in print to capture the contrast between what went before postmodernism, whether it’s called traditional or modern or whatever, and the postmodern critique itself.

Let me suggest these kinds of questions as my way of thinking about some of the essential elements of the postmodern critique: “What would be the result for communication ethics if truth, reality, is contextual, contingent, and constructed in discourse rather than universal, absolute, and discovered?” “What if there is no individual moral agent, no autonomous unencumbered individual self, deciding ethical questions impersonally about abstract others apart from the social, economic, and institutional contexts in which the self is embedded and constructed?” “What if there are no personal speakers in communication with attendant ethical responsibilities for choice, but only interchangeable role players, whose communication is dictated by the discourse rules of a dominant culture?” “What if there are no grand master narratives or absolute universal values that warrant general allegiance across groups and cultures?” “What if probing the nature of human nature is but a delusion or an exercise in political power?” “What if the alternative to absolutism and universalism is nothing but fragmentation and alienation?” “What if there can no longer be ethics as we know it?” That set of questions and discussion about them have served to crystallize for me, and hopefully
for students, what the postmodern critique is about, in terms of contrasting former assumptions and postmodern assumptions.

I think a good example of that has to do with debate over the self as an ethical agent, whether there can be an ethical agent or not. “Can we devise a viable concept of the self as an ethical agent?” I think of a journal article by Lynn O’Brien Hallstein in the *Western Journal of Communication*. She argued for a postmodern perspective of self within a feminist context of an ethic of care. She comes fairly close to trying to grapple with melding some concerns about postmodernism with the need for some sense of self—not an unencumbered self but an embedded self, and an interrelationally developed self. This is just one example, and there are others, of not going all the way as some postmodernists do to say that the self is completely fragmented, alienated, impotent, and determined—and doesn’t really have any choice at all and has no responsibility at all.

If we were to ponder the issue of what’s the next development, where to go after postmodernism—is there a post-postmodernism, in terms of communication ethics—I don’t know. I don’t know how I would venture guesses about it. What I do know, however, is I think we shouldn’t jump too quickly to some notion of post-postmodern ethics until again we further explore more carefully and in-depth some of the attempts that have been made to develop a postmodern communication ethic. There have not been many, but there have been some in the English Department's version of rhetoric. I think the book by James Porter called *Rhetorical Ethics and Internetworked Writing: An Ethic For the Computer Age* is an interesting attempt to blend Aristotle and Kenneth Burke on the one hand with Michel Foucault, François Lyotard, Seyla Benhabib, and Luce Irigaray on the other. A book that blew me away in some senses, puzzled me in others, was a recent book by James Anderson and Elaine Englehardt titled *The Organizational Self and Ethical Conduct*. To my knowledge it’s the first flat-out thorough postmodern organizational communication ethics book: “Modernist writing is objective, its authorship is concealed, and its claims are essentialist. Postmodernist writing declares its standpoint, reveals its authorship, and reflexively analyzes the constructed character of the claims.” That’s not the only place they heighten their devotion to postmodernism in their writing. I’ll be interested to see what the people working in organizational communication make of the book.

Of course, I would urge reexamination of the work of my late colleague Martha Cooper, particularly two of her book chapters. The first, now a decade or so old, is called “Ethical Dimensions of Political Advocacy from a
Postmodern Perspective,” and that appeared in the book titled *Ethical Dimensions of Political Communication* that Robert Denton edited. Then more recently, and it’s reprinted in the 5th edition of my text, her chapter titled “Decentering: Judgment: Toward a Postmodern Communication Ethic.” It’s a serious attempt to construct a postmodern communication ethic. It’s in the book * Judgment Calls*, edited by John Sloop and James McDaniel, and she draws in varying ways on Jürgen Habermas, Michel Foucault, Nancy Fraser, and the feminist ethic of care.

I also think of the work of another colleague in my department, David Gunkel, who may not be well known yet but he will be, writing about cyberspace ethics. He finds traditional modern standards really not workable. He doesn’t always know where to go from there and that’s part of his project. Starting with his book called *Hacking Cyberspace*, but more recently and more provocatively in a journal article that he co-authored with Debra Hawhee titled “Virtual Alterity and the Reformatting of Ethics” in the *Journal of Mass Media Ethics*. I haven’t quite come to grips with some of his conclusions yet. Part of his worry about traditional approaches not applying to cyberspace ethics is that they are too human centered and don’t work that well in cyberspace for an ethic. He’s questioning, really, the humanist centeredness of ethics generally: “Does alterity have to be human to involve us in ethical issues?”

Before we jump to post-postmodernism we need to carefully and thoroughly consider at least some of the attempts that have been made toward a postmodern ethic, whether we agree with or disagree with parts of it. I think perhaps these attempts at a communication postmodern ethic have been passed over or haven’t been noticed. We worry about postmodernism generally, what it is and what impact it has, but I’d urge that we reconsider these specific attempts at a postmodern communication ethic.

I’ve been fascinated by Cliff Christians’s emphasis on a minimalist universal ethic. I puzzle over that a lot and read a lot in that area. Some of that is reflected in my textbook now, finally. I think that a lack of commitment solely to some kind of invariable and universal absolute ethical principles doesn’t mean we can’t be committed to a minimalist set of some universal norms that can be transcultural. This minimalist set of norms, it seems to me, could readily acknowledge that ethical standards within a culture or among co-cultures within a culture can be more relative to their specific cultural, ethnic, gender, or class context.
The minimalist set of universal norms that we’ve committed to, whatever they are, can be used then to critique practices within these more relative applications of ethics. To put it another way, relativistic, culturally bound, situationally bound ethics always should be open to critique by that minimalist set of transcultural norms—such as those that Cliff and others have been searching for.

“If there are transcultural values considered universal, in what sense do we mean universal or should we mean universal?” Here I found most helpful a book by Robert Kane, called Through the Moral Maze: Searching for Absolute Values in a Pluralistic World. He tries to voice his view about what we could mean by universal. Universal, he says, “does not have to mean that we are absolutely certain about values or that we have the right to impose them on others through fanaticism or authoritarianism. Universal simply means that we believe these values are valid for all persons, times, and viewpoints.” The real issue, he says, “is whether we have good reasons for believing in at least some universal values despite not being certain.” Kane also argues we “need not require that the ethically relevant human traits that we seek be completely universal traits and provably so.” Merely that they are common human traits. It’s enough, he feels, “to know that human beings commonly need certain things. . . . We can reason that since we are human, there is a high probability that we need these things as well for a fulfilling human life.” Cliff Christians, Michael Traber, Sissela Bok and others have worked in the direction of trying to figure out people’s universal ethical standards—their universal, but not absolutely certain, commitment to values that are highly probable and defensible as transcultural norms.

I would urge you to look at Sissela Bok’s book called Common Values. It is a fairly brief book but was very influential on me. She’s well known for her book Lying and her book Secrets, but this is well worth reading also, because she presents her argument for a minimalist starting point for the search for transcultural values. She “seeks out the values that are in fact broadly shared without requiring either absolute guarantees of them or unanimity regarding them.” Such minimalist values, she says, “can serve as a basis for communication and cooperation across cultures and for discussion of how they might be applied or extended in scope.” In addition such common values “provide criteria and a broadly comprehensible language for a critique of existing practices both within a particular society or culture and across societal boundaries.” She identifies a small cluster of minimalist moral values that are held in common by most human beings that had to be
worked by all human societies, at least in her viewpoint. Namely, she suggests the positive duties of mutual support, care, loyalty and reciprocity; the negative duties of refraining from hurtful actions of deceit, betrayal and violence; and the standards for rudimentary fairness and procedural justice when conflicts arise.

I find her attempt resonates with the work of Cliff Christians and Michael Traber in their book *Communication Ethics and Universal Values*. Their search for universal values is rooted not solely in anthropological sameness but is rooted in philosophical assumptions about human nature. The ethical values that they identify, from their viewpoint, are not foundational assumed certainties. They are commitments open to reexamination. The universality of these values, they believe, is beyond culture. It’s “rooted ontologically in the nature of human beings”; these values are universal by virtue of what it means to be human. Furthermore, they say, no matter the cultural differences that focus either on individualism or the community, communitarianism, there is a “growing consensus that certain universal standards for social accordance of human dignity must be upheld regardless of cultural differences.” The protonorm or foundational value underlying most cultures, and at the heart of what it means to be human, is the sacredness of life—the “irrevocable status” of respecting human life. From that, they identify some guides for our uniquely human capacity to use language, namely truth telling, human dignity, no harm to the innocent, unconditional acceptance of the other as a person, and solidarity with the weak and the vulnerable. They call their approach “world view pluralism,” in which ethical beliefs are held in good faith and debated openly and a commitment to universals does not eliminate differences of viewpoint. The only question for them “is whether our world views and community formations contribute in the long run to truth telling, human dignity, and nonmaleficence.”

Sissela Bok seems to agree. She says “cultural diversity can and should be honored, but only within the context of respect for common values. Any claim to diversity that violates minimalist values…can be critiqued on cross-cultural grounds involving the basic respect due all human beings.” That’s one answer to the notion of where do we go if there aren’t absolutely certain lists of values we must abide transculturally and not go all the way to extreme relativism, be it cultural or ethical relativism at the other end. I’m comfortable, so far, with this kind of a project that they seem to be working out for a minimalist set of universal values.
What are some of the significant areas for future communication ethics research?

Well there are many that could be suggested. The first one that I view as important, in a sense, is one that’s been with us throughout the development of communication ethics as a field. It’s an important one continually: that in our work on communication ethics we balance, not in some precise way, but we balance our research on and teaching about both individual personal ethics on the one hand and institutional systemic, organizational ethics on the other. We can’t view communication ethics as wholly dealing with individual standards and responsibilities or think that the only really important question is how the social system influences ethical decisions and constrains, constrains, and restrains them. I think you’ve got to consider both continually.

I hope we don’t ignore individualism and individual responsibility and forget about that; lose the sense of personal responsibility. I just can’t buy, “I was just following orders,” as the reason for some of the abuse in the prison in Iraq. It didn’t wash in Nuremberg, and I don’t think it should wash here. Now that’s not to say that the system of which the soldiers were a part also didn’t have causal influence on what happened, but I don’t think the soldiers were just automatons in the grip of a system.

My worrying about the continuing concern for individual ethical responsibility was best captured two years ago in my keynote address at the 7th National Communication Ethics Conference on a role for shame in communication ethics. It’s a controversial topic, examining in what contexts it manifests itself and how we can too often be just satisfied with the work of psychologists and psychiatrists who are against shame—by which they mean that kind of a pervasive and debilitating shame that influences our entire life. I think we need to also to consider a role for what I, and others, call “situational shame.” Situational shame is what Michael Hyde, in the beginning of his book *The Call of Conscience*, indirectly sees as an element of conscience. Without conscience, shame goes out the door. My views on shame aren’t all worked out, but it illustrates my concern for individual responsibility issues.

At the same time we need to continue to work out how the structures, norms, rules, regulations, and expectations of a given organization, system, or institution either helps or hinders ethical development within the organization: “What’s acceptable and why?” “How are decisions made?” “Are there very many systems and organizations where for virtually every decision
ethical questions are asked right alongside questions about costs, efficiency, implementation, legality, and so on? And if not, why not?” “How do elements of the system retard people’s ability to act ethically, perhaps forcing them to act unethically to save their job, or allow them to think that ethics aren’t important in that institution or organization?”

There have been a number of explorations of organizational communication ethics, certainly. For example, looking at the role of formal codes of ethics in organizations. I’ve been doing that in print for a while. There are serious pros and cons of formal codes. Codes can be just public relations puff pieces to fend off government regulation: “Yeah, we’re self-regulated. We’ve got a code; government you don’t need to tell us what to do.” A code can be self-serving in the sense that it’s very carefully written to give approval to existing ethically suspect practices by excluding certain things, thereby sanctioning existing ethically suspect practices. I think there are legitimate uses for codes. A code of ethics can depict in words the ideal ethical character expected in that organization. Not so much a list of rules and regulations but a word picture of the ethical character of an employee. It can be very practical as a source of argument. At least it gives something to everybody to which they can turn to make arguments about ethicality. Just because a behavior is either in the code or not in the code doesn’t mean it’s ethical or unethical, but it gives a starting point for talk in the organization about ethics and judgments about ethics.

I agree also that codes alone won’t do it. They are very ineffective. Codes have to be integrated with many other efforts within the system, within the organization—top down leadership by example as role models of ethical behavior: “What resources is the organization willing to commit to the organization and the employee’s thinking about ethics?” “Is there an ethics officer to whom people can turn for advice?” “Is there an ethics office?” “Is there an ethics training program at all levels?” If a code is integrated along with those kinds of things it might be a little more effective. In any case, I think we need to continue to balance our concern both for issues of individual ethical responsibility and institutional ethical responsibility. We shouldn’t forget about this topic simply because it has already been addressed.

The other area, ethics for nonverbal communication, may seem old hat, too, but I’ve thought about it in print for about two decades. We talk about ethics for visual communication. This presents the whole issue of where to go for advice about ethical nonverbal communication. You can’t go to a
nonverbal communication textbook. You won’t find it there. For example, silence is a dimension of nonverbal communication. “What are the ethics of silence?” I don’t know where I would go for ethical advice on that. “Can we assume that ethical norms for verbal communication apply equally well to nonverbal?” I don’t think so in every case, but I don’t think it’s an issue that we’ve looked at enough. There are elements of it that people are writing about, but we should have some more sustained analysis by people trained in communication ethics.

For example, images in commercial advertising, such as in the video that many people use in class called Killing Us Softly. Or images in music television: some people expose their students to a video entitled Dream Worlds, which includes perfect examples for ethical analysis. The people producing the videos don’t put it in quite those terms, but they are golden opportunities to raise the issues or for a scholar who studies some of the instances appearing in such videos: “What do we make of this in terms of ethical responsibility?” “Who’s responsible directly or indirectly?” Another area is documentaries and documentary images. Larry Gross and his colleagues consider that in their book Image Ethics, but beyond that there has not been a lot done recently in terms of the responsibilities of the documentary video or filmmaker: “What are their responsibilities to their subjects? To the art in general?”

Probably the area that catches our attention and makes us think that people have been worrying about visual communication ethics is journalistic ethical images—the images captured by photographers and videographers. I think of an image, a photograph of 9/11 of the person who jumped from one of the burning towers and was caught in a still photo as he plunged to his death. In some versions, that photo was enhanced enough that the person’s face could be recognized: How does the family feel about that? What’s the impact on friends that knew this person? The photograph is no longer just an abstract representation of the tragedy, it’s personal and it invades privacy. Then we have the issue of the photos from the prison in Iraq. In this instance, it’s not the ethical issue of what they did. Now it’s the issue of journalists deciding which images to disseminate to us out all of those they have available: “Are any of the images ethically questionable?” “What standards do they use?” I agree that Tom Wheeler’s book Phototruth or Photofiction is a good stab in the right direction of trying to figure out some guidelines for that, but there aren’t a lot of books that I know of in photojournalism that worry about the ethical issues. There’s the “how to,” still not enough of the
“whether to.” So the issue of ethical standards of nonverbal communication is still one I think worthy of further exploration. Those are the two major ones I’d suggest as we continue our scholarship on communication ethics.

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